Raja Saeed Akram Khan, J.--The titled appeal by leave of the Court has been addressed against the judgment of the High Court dated 28.04.2015, whereby, the writ petitions filed by the United Bank Limited have been accepted.
2. The facts of the case in brief are that the appellants, herein, were employed in different branches of the United Bank Limited (UBL) at Districts Poonch and Mirpur. The services of the appellants were terminated by the Bank. The appellants approached the Labour, Court Mirpur for redressal of their grievance by filing grievance petitions. On 16.12.2013, Respondents No, 6 to 9, therein, filed applications under Order VII, Rule 11, CPC, for rejection of the grievance petitions on the ground that as the petitioners do no fall within the definition of worker/workman, therefore, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the grievance petitions filed by the petitioners under Section 30 of the Industrial Relation Ordinance, 1974, (hereinafter to be referred as I.R.O.). The Labour Court dismissed the applications filed under Order VII, Rule, 11, CPC. Consequently, the respondent, herein, filed separate writ petitions before the High Court alleging therein s that the Labour Court misperceived the statutory law while entertaining the petitions under Section 30, I.R.O., filed by the appellants, herein. It was further alleged that under Section 30, I.R.O., only a worker/workman can avail the forum of Labour Court for the redressal of the grievance against establishment, whereas, the appellants, herein, do not fall within the definition of worker/workman. It was further alleged that the employees of the Bank, incorporated under the authority of Government of Pakistan, is precluded from the jurisdiction of Labour Courts. It was prayed that proceedings in labour Court, Mirpur be ordered to be abated being coram-non-judice. The High Court after necessary proceedings while accepting the writ petitions filed by the respondent, herein, declared' the petitions filed by the appellants, herein, before the Labour Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir under Section 30 of I.R.O, corum-non-judice -vide Impugned judgment dated 28.04.2015, hence, this appeal by leave of the Court.
3. Mr. Muhammad Riaz Tabassum and Sh. Masood Iqbal, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellants argued that the judgment passed by the High Court is against the statutory provisions of law which is not sustainable. They added that the legal and factual controversy involved in the matter has not been properly appreciated by the High Court while handing down the impugned judgment. The learned High Court failed to adhere to the principle of law laid down by the superior Courts regarding the proposition involved in the matter. They forcefully argued that the definition of worker/workman provided in the definition clause of I.R.O has wrongly been interpreted by the learned High Court and failed to taken into account that the nature of job of the appellants securely falls within the purview 'of the worker/workman. They added that mere designation of Manager does not ipso facto exclude them from the definition of the worker/workman. They further added that the learned High Court also failed to appreciate Section 42 of the I.R.O., which provides remedy of appeal against the order of the Labour Court before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, whereas, the respondent filed writ petitions against the orders of the Labour Court which were liable to be dismissed on this sole ground. They referred to paragraph 5 of the amended petition filed by one of the appellants, herein, Nazakat Hussain, before the Labour Court while submitting that the appellant took a specific plea that although he is a Branch Manager but has no authority to appoint or expel any subordinate employee from the service, therefore, he falls within the definition of the worker/workman but this important aspect of the case escaped the notice of the High Court while passing the impugned judgment. They relied upon the cases reported as Abdul Wahab & others vs. H.B.L, and others [PLJ 2013 SC 801]. Agriculture Workers' Union, Balochistan vs. The Registrar of Trade Unions, Balochistan, Quetta [1997 SCM R 66], UBL Progressive Employees Union through President and 2 others vs. United Bank Limited and 5 others [2016 PLC 306], Relationship Manager Professional Employer Services, Karachi vs. District and Sessions Judge 1st Labour Court Baluchistan, Quetta and 2 others [2012 PLC 290! and Agricultural Mechanization Research Institute (AMRI) through Director and another vs. Muhammad Arshad [2013 PLC 2431.
4. On the other hand, Syed Nishat Hussain Kazmi and Mr. Muhammad Idrees Mughal, Advocates, the learned counsels for the respondent, strongly controverted the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants. They argued that the judgment passed by the High Court is perfectly legal and in accordance with the statutory provisions of law which is not open for interference by this Court. They added that the provisions of Section 28 of the definition clause of I.R.O. are quite clear and unambiguous which clearly postulate that the appellants do not come within the purview of the worker/workman. They added that the proposition involved in the matter has attended by the High Court and rightly came to the conclusion that the grievance petitions filed by the appellants, herein, before the labour Court under Section 30; I.R.O., are coram-non- judice as the appellants are excluded from the definition of worker/workman. They further added that the remedy of appeal as argued was available to the respondent/bank is a misconception of law as Section 45(4) of the I.R.O., clearly speaks that all other decision except given under Section 41, I.R.O., the decision of the Labour Court shall be final and no appeal shall lie. They forcefully argued that the learned High Court thoroughly examined the material available on the record and rightly observed that a person employed in a Managerial or Administrative capacity does not fall within the definition of worker/workman. They referred the power of attorney which is part of the record while submitting that the nature of responsibilities assigned to the appellants are very much mentioned there from which it is clear that the same are administrative and managerial in nature.
5. We have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record made available along with the impugned judgment. Before adverting to the other arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the appellants in support of the appeal, we intend to dilate upon the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that alternate remedy of filing appeal before Labour Appellate Tribunal under Section 42, I.R.O., was available and the writ petition was not competent. In this regard, it may be observed that under Section 42, I.R.0, the appeal can only be filed in the Labour Appellate. Tribunal where a decision is given under Section 41 of I.R.O. by the Labour Court. Under Section 41 (2), IRO the Labour Court is vested with the power of adjudicating and determining any Industrial dispute, whereas, in the matter in hand, the respondents invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court for determination of the authority of Labour Court to adjudicate upon the matter through writ. petitions. Moreover, under Section 45 (4), I.R.O, all the decisions of the Labour Court other than referred to in sub-section (3) of this section and subsection (3) of Section 41, shall be final and no appeal shall lie. For better appreciation Section 45, I.R.O is reproduced as under:-- , "45. Awards and decisions of Labour Court:--(1) An award or decision of a Labour Court shall be given in writing and delivered in open Court and two copy thereof shall be forwarded forthwith to the Government.
(2) The Government shall, within a period of one month from the receipt of the copies of the award or decision, publish it in the official Gazette.
(3) Any party. aggrieved by an award given under sub-section (1) may prefer an appeal to Labour Appellate Tribunal within 30 days of the delivery thereof and the decision of the Tribunal in such. appeal shall be final.
(4) All, decisions of Labour Court, other than awards and decision referred to in sub-section (3) of this section, and sentences referred to in sub-section (3) of Section 41 shall be final and shall not be called in question in any manner by or before any Court or other authority."
The above referred section clearly manifests that all the decisions of the Labour Court other than awards and decisions referred to in Section 45 (3) and. sentences referred to in Section 41 (3) shall be final 13 and shall not be challenged before any Court or authority. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellants, in this regard, has no force, the same is hereby repelled. The respondent rightly invoked the extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court through writ petition.
6. While adverting to the. real controversy involved in the matter regarding status of the appellants as to whether they fall within the definition of worker/workman, it may be observed here that we have given our serious thought to the relevant definition clause of I.R.O which is reproduced by the High Court in the impugned judgment. The said clause unambiguously speaks that the employees who are assigned the managerial or administrative duties are excluded from the definition of worker/workman. It is admitted position that the appellants in the case in hand were serving as officers of the Bank in Grades II and III. The officers of grade II were admittedly serving as the Branch Managers in the Bank who explicitly falls within the definition of employees who perform managerial functions, hence, excluded from the definition of worker/workman. It is evident from the power of attorney executed in favour of Mr. Nazakat Hussain, appellant, No, 1, herein, being Officer Grade-II, by the bank, that he, was assigned the managerial functions. The powers assigned by virtue of the power of attorney are material for fixing the status as to whether or not he was a workman. All the powers assigned to appellant No, 1 through the power of attorney are relevant but the most significant are reproduced as under:-- "1. To open and operate on Current, Overdraft, Loan, Cash, Credit or other account or accounts in the name of the Bank or deposit any money with or borrow or obtain accommodation money or facilities upon or without security from any Bank or Banks or from the State Bank of Pakistan and its subsidiaries or any firm person or Company in Pakistan or elsewhere.
7. To purchase or take on lease or other terms any lands, houses or buildings for the purpose of office or premises suitable for carrying on the business of the Bank at any place and build alter and furnish any office, house or premises.
12. To do generally all acts, deeds and things not herein specifically mentioned which are necessary or requisite or expedient to carry on and manage the business of the Bank or which be necessary or requisite or expedient for the better and more effectively doing and performing the several acts, deeds and things aforesaid or incidental thereof."
The above powers conferred particularly the one to carry on and manage the business in para 12 sufficiently demonstrates the nature of his duties and functions as managerial and supervisory. As far officer of grade III is concerned, it is abundantly explained by the High Court in para 7 of the impugned judgment that the officer grade HI commands some of his subordinates in the particular matters and their duties are also managerial and supervisory in nature. The perusal of the promotion order of Mr. Muhammad Aziz khan, Appellant No, 2, herein, from clerical cadre to Officer Grade-III, clearly demonstrates that he was assigned the managerial functions. It would be expedient to reproduce the relevant contents of the promotion order which are as follows: "We are pleased to inform you that the management has promoted you from clerical cadre to officer Grade-III with effect from September 01, 2000.
Your promotion from clerical cadre to the officer cadre marks a turning point in your career. Your responsibilities will consequently increase with your new assignment in officer cadre. Your new assignment will be advised shortly by your supervisor. Please note that as an officer of the Bank, you may assigned any duties at the discretion of the management which may include any of the following managerial/supervisory position: a. Teller b. Relationship Manager c. ICU Officer d. Manger Operations e. Sales Officer f. any other managerial/ supervisory position."
In such state of affairs, it can safely be held that the responsibilities assigned to the appellants were supervisory, administrative and managerial in nature to the extent of their sphere which exceed the definition of worker/workman. Reliance may be placed on a case reported as Dilshad Khan Lodhi vs. Allied Bank of Pakistan and others (2007 PLC 41], wherein, it has been observed as under:-- "....The fact remains that undoubtedly the petitioner in his capacity as Officer Grade-II has been heading a department of the respondent establishment independently and supervising the work of a least five persons. No doubt, he did not have the power of hire and fire, the nature of job as performed by him and evident from the record including the power of attorney executed in his favour tends to show that he was not primarily employed as a workman doing manual or clerical skilled or unskilled work. The nature and duties performed by him primarily and essentially appeared to be of managerial and supervisory nature, which clearly fall beyond the ambit and purview of the term `workman'."
The learned High Court rightly came to the conclusion that the appellants do not fall within the definition of worker/workman, thus, we fully endorse the same.
7. For other argument that to determine whether the appellants fall within the definition of the worker/workman, evidence was required to be recorded, it may be stated here that in presence of clear and unambiguous statutory provisions of law and pronouncement of the superior Courts there was no need to indulge in the exercise of recording evidence. Moreover, it has also been proved from different documents that the appellants were performing functions mainly in a managerial or supervisory capacity therefore, the argument in this regard cannot be considered.
The case law referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants relates to the registration of employees' unions/trade unions, right of appeal of representatives of trade unions to the Registrar concerned and applicability of the I.R.O., hence, cannot be considered in this case as each case has its own peculiar facts and circumstances.
On the basis of what has been discussed above, we failed to find out any illegality or infirmity in the judgment of the High Court which has been passed after due deliberation and application of judicial mind. This appeal being devoid of any force is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.