This second appeal is directed against an order for the ejectment of the appellant, Muhammad Sharif from a portion of a shop owned by the respondent, Hussain Bakhsh.
2. The appellant's ejectment has been ordered on the ground of default and personal need.
3. There is a concurrent finding of the learned Rent Controller, who heard the ejectment application' filed by the respondent, and the District Judge, who disposed of the first appeal of the appellant against the order of ejectment, to the effect that the appellant (tenant), had committed default in the payment of rent inasmuch as he paid rent for the months of February, 1975 to March, 1976 in the month of March, 1976. Learned counsel for 'the appellant contended that the rent was paid by the respondent against a receipt in March, 1976 for the second time and that before the said payment he bad been paying rent for each month in advance. There is no evidence to support this contention except the statement of the appellant. Even in his reply to the ejectment application he did not put forth the aforesaid plea nor this was done in his reply (Exh. R. 4) to the notice of ejectment served by the respondent on the appellant before taking out the ejectment proceedings.
In the circum--stances, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel that the rent in question was paid in advance regularly before it was paid again in lump sum in the- month of March, 1976.
"4. The next point raised by the learned counsel for the appellant was that even if the appellant was found to have committed default it was only for two months and was not deliberate and, therefore, it did not warrant his ejectment. It is true that if any default is not wilful the ejectment of the tenant cannot be ordered on the ground of such default. It has, however, been' ruled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ghulam Muhammad Khan Lundkhor v. Safdar Ali (PLD 1967 SC 530) that default is not wilful which occurs due to circum--stances beyond the control of the tenant. No. Such circumstances have been pointed out by the appellant before me. I am, therefore, unable to agree with the learned counsel that his default is not deliberate or wilful.
5. As for the personal need of the respondent, it was urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that there is no evidence to support the respondent's plea: I have gone through the record of the case and find that besides the respondent his three witnesses had deposed that he wanted the shop for his own occupation. It is, therefore, not correct to say that there is no evidence to justify the finding that the respondent requires the premises in dispute for personal use.
6. It was also pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant that there was no appeal filed by the respondent against the finding of the learned Rent Controller whereby he -had decided the issue of personal need against the respondent and, therefore, the learned District Judge was not justified in reversing his said finding while disposing of the first appeal brought by the appellant. He did not cite any authority to support this proposition. Even if the finding of the learned District Judge in regard to the personal need be ignored, the result would be the same namely the ejectment order passed against the appellant on the ground of default will be upheld.
7. I. Therefore, see no merit, in this appeal and dismiss it in limine. The appellant is, however, allowed one month's time to vacate the premises in dispute.