1. The present second appeal under section 15 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance has been filed by Muhammad Sharif Ahmad to challenge the concurrent orders of the Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi, and the 3rd Additional .District Judge, Karachi, whereby the appellant was ordered to be evicted on the ground of default in payment of rent.
2. The brief facts are that the appellant was occupying one floor in House No. 4/108 in Drigh Colony, Karachi, on a monthly rent of Rs.150. This house was originally owned by Nuwab Ali Mazar, who sold the same to the respondent, S. Safdar Hussain, on 1-8-1974. On the same day viz. 1-8-1974, the respondent/landlord and the appellant/tenant entered into an agreement of tenancy, which has been produced on the record of the trial Court as Exh.
6. In the first paragraph of the said agreement, it was stated that monthly rent payable by the appellant to the respondent for the first two months from the date of this agreement, viz. For the months of August and September, 1974, was to be Rs.150, and such rent was payable in advance, and, in the same paragraph, it was further stated that, after September, 1975. If the tenant/appellant would seek further stay in the aforesaid premises, the monthly rent was to be enhanced by mutual consent. However, paragraph 2 of the same agreement provided that the agreement was to remain in force for eleven months. It is patent case that, after the payment of two months' rent in advance on 1-8-1974, the next tender made by the appellant to the respondent was on 30-12-1975 by way of a cheque for Rs.600. It seems that the cheque was not presented for encashment, and there is no difficulty in understanding the reasons, which may well be that the appellant having com--mitted a default, the respondent wanted to evict him. Ultimately, an applica--tion under section 13 of the said Ordinance was filed, which was allowed by the learned Rent Controller on the ground that the appellant was is default. An appeal was preferred but without success.
3. On the ground of default, Mr. Khalilur Rehman's had not much to say. The patent position on the record is that, after the tender of rent for the months of August and September, 1974, no further rent was paid, except by the cheque as stated above. To that extent, the appellant had, in his cross--- examination, clearly stated that he had sent the cheque, representing rent for the month of October 1974 onwards either in December, 1974, or, in January, 1975. The document is on the record, which bears the date as 13-12-1975, and there--fore there is no doubt that no rent was paid until December, 1975. Further, the appellant also admitted that, for the months of February to December, 1975, he had not paid any rent to the respondent, as the latter had filed a case of ejectment. On such premises, there can be no two opinions that the appellant was in default. The process of reasoning adopted by the Courts below, and the conclusion reached by them on facts are eminently reasonable and correct.
4. Mr. Khalilur Rehman's has, however, raised a point based on section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. His contention is that no notice, as contemplated by this section, was given by the respondent to the appellant. When it was pointed out to the learned Advocate that an agreement had been entered into between the parties, from out of which it can be safely inferred that the appellant knew that the building in question had changed hands, the learned Advocate put up the highly technical point based on section 13-A of the said Ordinance to state that, despite knowledge of the appellant in regard to change of ownership, and despite the appellant having acted on the agreement, the default of the respondent in giving a notice under section 13-A was fatal to the proceedings. The learned Advocate has relied on some case-law in that context. The first case relied upon by Mr. Khalilur Rehman's is the case of Muhammad Hussain v. Mst. Mubina Begum (1979 CLC 42), which is a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this High Court. In this case, the learned Judge took the view that the language employed in section 13-A made a notice imperative for a tenant, so that, on such default, the consequences stated in section 13-A, exonerating the tenant from the penalties of default, shall take full effect. In short, the argument is that, despite knowledge of the tenant, a notice not having been given would prove fatal. The learned Advocate has also relied on the case of E. A. Evans v. Muhammad Ashraf (PLD 1964 SC 536). This case is of little assistance, as it interprets section 30 of the Displaced Persons Act, an enactment different from the one with which I am dealing. On the other hand, Mr. M. G.
5. Dastgir, appearing for the respondent, has invited my attention to a Single Judge decision from the Lahore High Court in the case of Nazar Hussain v. Aslam Shah (PLD 1977 Lab. 210). In this case, the facts were that, after the property had changed hands, the tenant started paying rent to the legal heirs of the original owner. The learned Single Judge took the view that, on payment of rent to the legal heirs, a new contract had come into existence, and, if any default was committed there-- after, it shall be construed to be a default in regard to the terms of the new contract. Reference has also been made to a Supreme Court judgment in the case of Khuda Bakhsh v. Muhammad Yaqoob (1981 SCMR 179). Paragraph 7 of the Report succinctly points out the facts. It appears that the Supreme Court took the view that, if knowledge of the transfer was admitted by the tenant, then even if a notice had not been served under section 13-A, it would not stand in the way of the Court in granting relief of ejectment.
6. As it is, section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordi--nance is a provision, which seeks to believe the tenant of the burden of paying rent to a wrong persons or a person who has ceased to be the owner. It is designed to avoid any surprise that may come to the tenant to find that the old owner having ceased to be the owner, the rent should be paid to a person, who was entitled to it. In the instant case, the position clearly is that the appellant knew that the house had changed hands. He actually entered into an agreement with the new owner and indeed acted on that agreement by tendering rent for the months of August and September, 1974 in the first instance, and then sending the balance rent by a cheque. It cannot be said s that the appellant had no knowledge about change of ownership. Not only he had the knowledge, but he had acted on the changed circumstances in tendering rent. What is more that by his own conduct, he is estopped from raising a case that notice under section 13-A was necessary. I find no sub--stance in this contention of the learned Advocate.
7. I see no force in this second appeal, which I dismiss with costs.
8. By consent of Mr. M. G. Dastgir, I allow the appellant three months' time to vacate the premises.