M. TABASSUM AFTAB ALVI, C J.-- The petitioners-accused have filed the instant application under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. for quashment of FIR No,31, 2017, dated 15.05.2017, registered against them at Police Station, Baloch, in offences under sections 147, 148, 149, 337, 353, 186, 506, A.P.C, 6 and 48, FR.
2. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioners as well as the learned State Counsel and gone through the record of the case.
3. It is pertinent to observe here that the powers under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. have been intended to prevent abuse of the process of the Court but not to stifle the prosecution and this Court may quash FIR which does not contain any definite or clear allegation or the allegation levelled does not disclose the commission of any offence, otherwise the quashment of FIR at any early stage where no evidence has been recorded would give an impression of stifling of criminal proceedings and if the allegations levelled in the case do not disclose any offence, it is for the trial Court to consider evidence and determine whether the allegations are true or false. Therefore, the impugned FIR cannot be quashed simply on the ground that the accused has claimed that the allegations levelled against him are false. My aforesaid view finds support from a case reported as Haji Karim Bakhsh and another v. The State (PLD 1982 Peshawar 20), wherein the following . principle was enunciated:-- "Thus,' I find that the test laid down for interference in pending criminal proceedings is that if the proceedings are allowed to be continued, it would result in grave miscarriage of justice and there would be no other provision of law by which the aggrieved party would seek relief. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court should not normally be invoked where another remedy is available.
The inherent powers ought to be exercised only to prevent abuse of the process of the Court and in order to advance the interest of justice. The High Court may quash proceedings which do not contain any definite or clear accusation or the accusation made does not disclose the commission of any offence, otherwise the quashment of proceedings at an early stage where no evidence has been recorded would give an impression of stifling of criminal proceedings. If the allegations made in the case do not disclose any offence, it is, for the trial Court to weigh the evidence and determine whether the allegations are true or false. The proceedings cannot be quashed simply for the reason that the accused has claimed that the allegations against him are false and fantastic. The test laid down also is that the allegations in the complaint taken at their face-value and accepted in their entirety should not constitute an offence as alleged."
4. At preliminary stage, in order to consider the question of quashing FIR when evidence is yet to come, the Court has to take allegations against accused at their face value and accept the same in their entirety and then see if they do not constitute any offence for which a prosecution be warranted, the Court in its limited jurisdiction under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. will not embark upon an enquiry to ascertain the innocence or otherwise of the accused and if the allegations disclose an offence, the case cannot be quashed merely because the accused denies the allegations and asserts that he has a good defense, when his defense is yet to come. Thus, ordinarily the guilt or innocence of an accused depends on the totality of the facts and circumstances revealed during the trial. Therefore, without allowing prosecution to produce evidence, it would not be proper to accept the instant petition filed under section 561-A, Cr.P.C.
5. It is significant to observe here that after registration of an FIR, usually an application under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. is moved in each case in a routine manner, which practice not only creates hurdles in investigation but also stifles criminal proceedings; therefore, such like practice ought to be discouraged.
6. For what has been discussed above, I am not persuaded to accept the instant quashment petition, which is hereby dismissed.