CH. MUHAMMAD MASOOD JAHANGIR, J.---In concision, the facts of the case are that Hafizaan Bibi, Hameedan Bibi and Safia Bibi were three real sisters, whereas petitioner No,1 was the husband of the latter. On behalf of all the three sisters on 09.06.2004 a power of attorney (Exh.P1) was procured in favour of Ghulam Rasool son of petitioner No,1 and before the Sub-Registrar on the very next day the executants/ladies were identified by Muhammad Abdullah, real brother of petitioner No,l. Then the shares of his aunts were transferred by the attorney in favour of his father/petitioner No,
1. On 12.04.2008, Mst. Hameedan Bibi as well as legal heirs of Hafizaan Bibi through a civil suit challenged the power of attorney Exh.Pl as well as oral sale mutation Exh.P2 while claiming that the same being the result of collusiveness, fraud, misrepresentation and impersonation were ineffective upon their rights and liable to be cancelled. Despite due service none appeared on behalf of petitioners before the learned Civil Court, which on 12.12.2008 was compelled to initiate ex parte proceedings against them. Only beneficiary/respondent No,1 filed an application for setting aside of ex parte proceedings, but without any fruit having been dismissed by the learned Court of first instance and that order was further affirmed when his Civil Revision as well as Writ Petition was also dismissed up to the level of this Court. No doubt, learned counsel on behalf of petitioners off and on joined the proceedings of the trial in whose presence the ex parte evidence of the PWs and CWs was recorded, but they were not cross-examined and the learned Trial Court while relying upon ex parte evidence besides keeping in mind the philosophy rendered in catena of judgments by the superior Courts that an attorney without seeking special permission of his principal could not transfer the property of the latter in his own name or to some close fiduciary relation, decreed the suit on 22.10.2011. The petitioners also remained unsuccessful before the learned District Court when their Appeal was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 22.01.2014. Hence the instant Civil Revision.
2. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that on the basis of substituted service ex parte proceedings were initiated against the petitioners, who could not be deprived of their legitimate right to contest the suit and the learned Trial Court erroneously dismissed the application of the petitioners for setting aside of ex parte proceedings is without any merit. As observed supra, the effort through application was made on behalf of petitioner No,1 for setting aside of ex parte proceedings, which was not only declined by the learned Trial Court rather the Civil Revision as well as Constitutional Petition was also dismissed by the learned District as well as this Court respectively. Now the same question cannot be reagitated as per views rendered in the judgments by the superior Courts reported as Ch. Zulfiqar Ali v. Mian Akhtar Islam and Mian Bashir Ahmad (PLD 1967 SC 418), Baqa Muhammad v. Muhammad Nawaz and others (PLD 1985 Lahore 476) and Lal Khan and others v. Khizar Hayat and others (1994 SCMR 351). The next submission of learned counsel for petitioners that even if the petitioners were proceeded against ex parte, the Court was bound to allow them an opportunity to cross-examine the PWs as well as CWs is again misconceived. No doubt under the law petitioners despite having been proceeded against ex parte could join the proceedings and cross-examine the witnesses of his adversary if they desired so, but in spite of that the PWs were recorded in presence of their learned counsel, admittedly they were not subjected to said task, who thus relinquished the said right and thereafter the learned Civil Court was perfect in declining them to cross-examine those witnesses.
3. The other submission of learned counsel for petitioners that power of attorney being registered instrument attained strong presumption of truth and learned Courts below without dilating upon the said aspect of the case erred in law while decreeing the suit is not tenable. It is by now well settled principle of law that whenever the execution or validity of a purportedly registered document is denied, such registered document loses sanctity of being presumed to be correct, but its lawful veracity would depend upon quantum and quality of evidence to be produced to prove its lawful execution. Reliance can be placed upon judgments reported as Abdul Ghafoor and others v. Mukhtar Ahmad Khan and others (2006 SCMR 1144) and Abdul Majeed and 6 others v.
Muhammad Suhhan and 2 others (1999 SCMR 1245). In the latter case, the apex Court concluded in the following words:-- It is axiomatic principle of law that a registered deed by itself without proof of the execution and the genuineness of the transaction covered by it, would not confer any right. Similarly, a mutation although acted upon in Revenue Record, would not by its own force be sufficient to prove the genuineness of the transaction of which it purports unless the genuineness of the transaction is proved. There is no cavil with the proposition that these documents being part of public record are admissible in evidence but they by their own force would not prove the genuineness of document.
Additionally, under section 60 of the Registration Act, 1908, only a restricted presumption is attached that registration proceedings were regularly and honestly carried out by the attesting officer, but the said presumption attached to its certificate is always rebuttable and whenever the execution of an instrument is denied, then the presumption is deduced to have been sufficiently rebutted, then onus lies upon the person, who alleges execution to prove that the document was executed and the transaction did take place. The presumption in favour of a registered instrument does not dispense with the necessity of showing that person, who admitted the execution before the attesting officer was not an imposter, but the genuine one. Reliance can be placed upon the judgment reported as Gopal Das v. Siri Thakir Gee and others (AIR 1943 P.C. 83). This view has also been conceived by the Division Bench of this Court in a case reported as Siraj Din v. Jamila and another (PLD 1997 Lahore 633).
4. The emphasis of Ch. Abdul Majeed, Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioners that Courts below failed to take notice that the suit was badly time barred is also not forceful. In the present case, perspicuous stance of the executants that the impugned power of attorney C was procured through impersonation on the identification of uncle of the agent and when it is proved beyond any shadow of doubt that the power of attorney was outcome of fraud, such a document cannot be perpetuated, which can be assailed at any point of time. Reliance is placed upon the judgments reported as Abdul Rahim and another v. Mrs. Jannatay Bibi and 13 others (2000 SCMR 346) and Khair Din v. Mst. Salaman and others (PLD 2002 SC 677). Moreover, for the sake of arguments, if it is assumed that a valid power of attorney had been executed in favour of petitioner No,2, even then transfer of the property of the principal by the agent to his own father/petitioner No,1 without seeking any permission from the principal cannot be recognized and validated under the law.
Reliance can be placed upon judgments reported as Jamil Akhtar and others v. Las Baba and others (PLD 2003 SC 494), Mst. Bandi v. Province of the Punjab and others (2005 SCMR 1368), Muhammad Taj v. Arshad Mehmood and 3 others (2009 SCMR 114) and Mst. Naila Kausar and another v. Sardar Muhammad Bakhsh and another (2016 SCMR 1781). In such scenario, I am satisfied that the Courts below were perfect in decreeing the suit on the valid reasons through the impugned judgments.
5. The learned counsel for petitioners is unable to point out any irregularity or illegality as well as misreading and non-reading of evidence committed by the learned Courts below while passing the impugned judgments and decrees to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, hence this civil revision being devoid of any merit is dismissed accordingly.