The dispute relates to the allotment of residential ahata measuring 10 marlas under the provisions of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912. The petitioner filed an application before the authorities under the Act, for allotment of the ahata in his favour on the ground that he was an old occupant, owner to village and also the tiller of the land. It appears that before the Collector he agreed to the allotment of a part of the site measuring 7 marlas to the respondent but the Collector by his order dated ?-8-1978 allotted half of the ahata i.e. Site measuring 10 marlas, to the respondent. This order was upheld in appeal by the Additional Commissioner and the petitioner's revision also failed.
2. After having lost his case before the authorities under the Act he filed a declaratory suit that he was in possession of the ahata for more than 10 years, the respondent had no concern with it and that the orders passed by the authorities concerned were void and without jurisdiction. He also prayed for grant of permanent injunction.
3. The learned Civil .Judge while disposing of the petitioner's applica--tion for grant of temporary injunction rejected the plaint under Order VII, rule 11, C. P. C. He was of the view the Punjab Province being the owner of the site in dispute restrictions on its power to allocate the site to one of the contestants, could not be imposed. In his opinion, the petitioner had no cause of action to bring the suit.
4. In appeal the learned District Judge took the view that the real controversy filling fm consideration in the suit was as to who was better entitled for allotment of the ahata. He maintained that the question as to the determination of the entitlement of the parties essentially fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities under the Act. He was also influenced by the statement made by the petitioner before the Collector/ Assistant Commissioner agreeing to the transfer of part of the ahata to the respondent. The appeal filed by the petitioner was accordingly dismissed. The validity of this order has been assailed through this revision.
5. The petitioner---s learned counsel submitted that the authorities under the Act being tribunals of limited jurisdiction their orders can be challenged before the Civil Court, which is the Court of general Jurisdiction. It was argued that the view taken by the two Courts b0ow that the suit -was barred under section 36 was erroneous. The learned counsel also expressed a grouse over the rejection of the plaint on a date when only the application for temporary injunction was fixed for hearing. For his these submissions the learned counsel heavily relied on Ali Muhammad v. Hakim and others (AIR 1928 Lah. 121), Khadim Hussain and 3 others v. Ata Muhammad and 7 others (PLD 1967 Lah. 915), Karim Dad v. Arifand another (PLD 1978 Lah. 679) and Lt.-Col. A. H. Minhas v. Chujarn .Ahmad (1970 SCMR 128).
6. I have examined the record in the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel. The perusal of the plaint clearly indicates that in substance the petitioner has sought tire determination of his entitlement for allotment of the ahata through the civil Court. There is no gainsayin that it is primarily for the authorities under the Colonization of Government Lands Act to adjudicate upon the merits of entitlement of an aspirant for grant of lease of the State land. No doubt the tribunals of limit jurisdiction cannot be Judges of the facts laying down the foundation of their jurisdiction and if an order passed by such a tribunal is without jurisdiction, the corrective processes of the civil Court should be available for scrutiny of such orders. But, as held in Mian Sultan All Naghianan v.
Mian Nur Hussain (PLD 1949 Lah. 301), where a special tribunal has been created under a statute to determine the rights and obligations created under that statute, the tribunal's jurisdiction to determine the question touching such rights and obligations shall be exclusive and the civil Court cannot act as a Court of appeal for the orders of such tribunals. The only reasons specified in the plaint by the petitioner assailing the orders of the departmental authority are that the petitioner is in possession of the site for the last 10/11 years he is owner in the village, he is a displaced person and has raised construction and that at the time of allotment no notice was served on him. None of these averments furnish a valid basis for interference by the civil Court. The only ground which can be taken note of is that he was not heard. This plea does not appear to have been raised seriously, as the petitioner was party to all the orders passed by the authorities below.
7. As observed above the petitioner's grouse appears to be that the merits of his case were not properly appreciated b), the authorities concerned. This can hardly be categorised as a legitimate reason to regard the orders passed by the Collector or other authorities under the Act, as without jurisdiction. In Muhammad Hussain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others (PLD 1974 SC 139), it has been laid down "It is well settled that where a Court or a tribunal has jurisdiction and it determines that question it cannot be said that it acted illegally or with material irregularity merely because it came to an erroneous decision on a question of fact or even of law."
A reference to section 36 of the Colonization of Government Lands Ac will provide that in all those matters, which the Collector or other authorities under the Act are empowered to dispose of the jurisdiction of the civil Court has been excluded. The civil Court therefore, shall have jurisdiction, only if it is shown that the orders passed by the authorities under the Act were not within their jurisdiction. In Zajar-ul-Ahsan v.
The Republic of Pakistan (PLD 1960 SC 113), it has been laid down " If a statute provides that an order made by an authority acting under it shall not be called in question in any Court all that is necessary to oust the jurisdiction of the Courts is that the authority should have been constituted as required by the statute the person proceeded against should be subject to the jurisdiction of the authority, the ground on which action is taken should be within the grounds stated by the statute and the order made should be such as could have been made under the statute. These conditions being satisfied the ouster is complete even though in following the statu--tory procedure some omission or irregularity might have been committed by the authority. If an Appellate Authority is provided by the statute the omission or irregularity alleged will be a matter for that authority and not as rightly observed by the High Court for a Court of law."
I feel if the test laid down in this authority is applied to the facts of the instant case the jurisdiction of the civil Courts completely stands ousted.
PLD 1963 Kar. 215), while examining the question as to whether the civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit against the orders of the revenue authorities on the grounds that they were passed on mis-appreciation of evidence or an erroneous view of law, Waheeduddin Ahmad, J.
Observed:- " The question to whom the lands in dispute should have been granted was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Authorities. Merely because the petitioners are dissatisfied with the finding of the learned Revenue Authorities on this point or the impugned orders are based on a misappreciation of evidence such orders cannot be the subject-matter of dispute in the civil Courts.
8. I am unable to entertain the plea that for determining the question of jurisdiction legal merits of the orders passed by the Collector or other authorities under the Act can be examined by the civil Court and if the order is found to be wrong the civil Court, will be competent to entertain the suit.
The jurisdiction of the civil Court cannot be made dependent C on the correctness of the litigants' contentions. What is to be seen is whether the authority passing the order was empowered under the Act to pas such an order. In other words the test laid down in Zafar-ul-Ahsan's case provides the best yardstick for determining the question of civil Court's jurisdiction.
9. I have also glanced through the precedents cited by the petitioner's learned counsel. In Ali Muhammad's case the defendant was in possession of the land before the enforcement of the Colonization of Government Lands Act and the question was whether section 32 of the Act, which vests powers of re-entry in the Collector was applicable. In Khadim Hussain v. Ala Muhammad upon the facts of that case the applicability of section 36 was held contingent on the determination of the nature of the suit property which was claimed to be a trust property and it was alleged that the respondents unlawfully appropriated it to their own use. The decision of the Supreme Court in appeal against this judgment is reported as 1970 SCMR 127, whereby it was laid down that the order granting proprietary rights in respect of the land attached to graveyard is amenable to the jurisdiction of the civil Court. These rulings do not advance the petitioner's case in any manner. The proposition discussed in Hakim Ali's case was also different from the one requiring adjudication in this revision. In that case, the authorities under the Act fixed date for conferment of the proprie--tary rights on the petitioner different than the one laid down by the Government for grant of such rights in the State Land. Their orders were therefore, held ultra vires of their powers and section 36 was thus not bar to the maintainability of the suit. On the other hand the instant case is hit by a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Ghulam Muhammad and another v. Allah Bakhsh and others (AIR 1937 Lah: 78). In this case it was laid down that where certain rights are granted by the Collector under the Act it is not the function of the civil Court to decide whether in granting such rights the rules framed by the Financial Commissioner were not duly observed.
10. The objection that the plaint could not be rejected while disposing of an application for grant of temporary injunction is also without any merit. Order VII, rule 11, C. P. C. Confers were powers on the Court to reject the plaint at any stage of the proceedings. Indeed, if on examination of the plaint the Court comes to the conclusion that the suit is barred by some provisions of law, it is not only proper rather it is the statutory duty of the Court to reject the plaint.
11. For the foregoing reasons I do not find any merit in this petition, which is hereby dismissed in limine.