MUJAHID MUSTAQEEM AHMED, J.---By filing instant civil revision in terms of section 115, C.P.C. the petitioners have assailed concurrent judgments and decrees dated 30A1.1995 and 23.01.2001 passed by learned Senior Civil Judge, Vehari and learned Additional District Judge, Vehari respectively, by which the suit as well appeal filed by the petitioners stood dismissed.
2. Brief facts of litigation between the parties, culminating into this civil revision are that on the application of Muhammad Rafique and Muhammad Ramzan petitioners, (real brothers), the Assistant Commissioner, Burewala, vide order dated 20.02.1986, allotted them Ahata No,120 (Western) measuring 10-Marla situated in Chak No,213/EB, Tehsil Burewala District Vehari. The petitioners deposited price of plot and consequently mutation No,129 (Exh.P-3) was attested in their favour on 29.12.1988. Muhammad Hussain (since dead, now represented by his legal heirs/respondents) filed an appeal against the allotment order before the learned Additional Commissioner (Revenue), Multan Division, Multan, which was allowed vide impugned order dated 02.11.1988 (Exh.P-7), whereby the order of the Assistant Commissioner was set aside and learned Additional Commissioner allotted the same "Ahata" to respondent No,2. On 04.10.1990, Muhammad Rafique (since dead and represented by L.Rs) and Muhammad Ramzan petitioners filed a suit for declaration to the effect that they were owner in possession of suit property (Ahata measuring 10- Marla), validly allotted in their favour by the Assistant Commissioner and assailed the impugned order dated 02.11.1988 passed by the learned Additional Commissioner being against facts, law, without notice and affording opportunity of fair hearing and as such ineffective upon their rights.
The suit has been resisted by the respondents by filing separate written statements, mainly on legal premises that Assistant Commissioner/ Collector Burewala had no jurisdiction to allot the suit property to the petitioners.
3. To resolve the controversy between the parties, the learned Senior Civil Judge framed following issues:-- "1. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction? OPD.
2. Whether the suit is barred by time? OPD.
3. Whether the plaintiff is estopped to file this suit? OPD.
4. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus-standi or cause of action? OPD.
5. Whether the suit is vexatious, and the defendants are entitled to special costs? OPD.
6. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD.
7. Whether the disputed order dated 2.11.1988 was illegal and void? OPP.
8. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to relief prayed for? OPP.
9. Relief"
4. After recording of evidence of the parties and hearing arguments, the learned Senior Civil Judge. dismissed the suit of the petitioners. Thereafter the petitioners filed an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Vehari, which too stood dismissed. (As noticed supra in para No,1 of the judgment).
5. Feeling dissatisfied with the impugned concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the learned courts below, the petitioners have filed the instant civil revision, mainly on the grounds that the same are based on mis-reading and non-reading of evidence and the learned courts below have not exercised jurisdiction vested with them.
6. Arguments heard. Record perused.
7. The legal question for determination before this Court is (i) whether the impugned order passed by the learned Additional Commissioner is correct one or not and (ii) whether the suit has been filed within period of limitation provided under The Limitation Act, 1908. To substantiate the plea of petitioners, Muhammad Rafique, (one of the petitioners), appeared as PW-1 and deposed that the suit property was allotted to the petitioners by the Assistant Commissioner, Burewala and price determined by the Assistant Commissioner was deposited in treasury. He further deposed that the petitioners are in possession of suit property for last ten years and have constructed residential house over it. Muhammad Hussain, respondent filed an appeal before the learned Additional Commissioner, but neither any notice was issued to the petitioners nor they were afforded an opportunity of hearing. He further added that they came to know about the impugned order just one and half year back and then assailed the same by filing suit. During the course of mss- examination, he conceded that both the petitioners have no landed property in chak No,213/EB (where the suit property is situated).
8. In its rebuttal, Muhammad Siddique/DW-1 deposed that the suit property (Ahata in Attia Dari) was lying vacant for last 8/9 years and none was in its possession. Muhammad Rafique, petitioner is residing with his father, whereas Muhammad Ramzan, petitioner is serving in Pakistan Army.
Muhammad Hussain/ DW-2, predecessor in interest of present respondents, deposed that the petitioners are not owning any property in Chak No,213/EB. Both the petitioners were not in possession of the suit property. Muhammad Ramzan, one of the petitioners, has not even moved any application for allotment of "Ahata". He further deposed that he filed an appeal against the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Burewala and present petitioners were represented by their counsel Ch. Muhammad Jaffar Javed and the learned Additional Commissioner passed the impugned order after hearing both the parties, in the light of report of Naib Tehsildar prepared after spot inspection. Muhammad Azeem/ DW-3, revenue patwari of Chak No,213,/EB deposed that the plot in dispute was allotted to the petitioners and in this regard mutation was attested on 29.12.1988. He further deposed that the land in dispute was included in "atiyadaran" line and only owners of landed property in the village were entitled to its allotment. He showed his lack of knowledge that price of "Ahata" was deposited by the petitioners or not. During the course of cross- examination, he conceded that the petitioners have constructed residential house over the suit property and are residing in it.
9. From the above discussed evidence, it is fully established that the impugned order Exh.P-7 has been passed by the learned Additional Commissioner after due notice to'the petitioners and they were represented before him by their counsel. After taking into consideration the plea of the petitioners that they were occupying the "Ahata" in dispute, the learned Additional Commissioner obtained report of Colony Naib Tehsildar Gaggo, who after spot inspection submitted report Ex.C-1, according to which the petitioners were not in possession of suit property before March, 1982 and as such the possession of the petitioners was not established on the crucial date (condition precedent for allotment) and the Assistant Commissioner/Collector had wrongly passed the order.
Even in the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner. Burewala Exh.P-4, it has been observed that the petitioners are not in physical possession of suit property and as such presuming them illegal occupant of the plot, allotment has been made in their favour.
10. Both the learned courts below have thoroughly scanned the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the parties and have come to the conclusion that the petitioners were not in possession of disputed "Ahata" before March, 1982 and as such they were not entitled to the allotment under notification issued by the Board of Revenue and the Assistant Commissioner was not competent to allot "Ahata" to the petitioners. The learned Additional Commissioner, after hearing .both the parties and thereafter dilating upon their respective versions, passed the order dated 02.11.1988 and set aside the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner. The plea of the petitioners that they were not afforded opportunity of hearing, is devoid of any merits. Moreover, the petitioners have not assailed the order passed by the learned Additional Commissioner before the Board of Revenue and they have not exhausted the departmental remedy. On this sole ground, their suit is liable to be dismissed. Reliance is placed on case law "Administrator, Thal Development through EACO Bhakkar and others v. Ali Muhammad" (2012 SCM R 730).
11. In view of the above noted facts and circumstances of the case, as rightly concluded by both the learned courts below, the civil court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the suit. Under Section 36 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, (the Act) the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been barred and for convenience sake, it is reproduced here under: "36. Jurisdiction of Civil Court barred as regards matter arising under the Act.---A Civil Court shall not have jurisdiction in any matter of which the Collector is empowered by this Act to dispose and shall not take cognizance of the matter in which the Provincial Government, Board of Revenue or Collector or any other Revenue Officer exercises any power vested in it or in him by or under this Act.
There can be no second opinion that the matters of allotment, determination of terms and conditions of allotment, delivery of possession of allotted land, cancellation of allotment for violation of terms and conditions of allotment or grant of proprietary rights of state land to the allottees exclusively fall within jurisdiction of revenue hierarchy. In precedent "Muhammad Shaft v.
Punjab Province through Collector, Vehari and another 1982 CLC 55 (Lahore). question of allotment of "Ehata" was involved and it was held that such matter fell within exclusive jurisdiction of Special Tribunal under the Act ibid and jurisdiction of Civil Court has been ousted and Civil Court will have jurisdiction only when orders passed by the authorities under the Act ibid are not within jurisdiction.
In "Abdul Ghafar and others v. Government of West Pakistan and others" PLD 1963 (W.P.) Karachi 215 it was held that question to whom lands should have been allotted was within exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue authorities. In "Muhammad Ishaq v. Abdul Ghani and 3 others" 2000 SCM R 1083, it has been laid down that Civil Court has no jurisdiction in matters of allotment of State land or its cancellation due to clear ouster of jurisdiction clause embodied in Section 36 of Act ibid. In case reported as "Province of Punjab, through District Collector, Vehari v. Rana son of Sardar" 1989 M LD 1009 (Multan Bench), it has been laid down that order passed by Collector can be challenged before Commissioner and thereafter before Board of Revenue and even if order of Collector was bad in law, forum for its correction was Commissioner and Board of Revenue and without having recourse to them in first instance civil suit was barred under law.
12. Of course after passing any order by the Board of Revenue, Civil Court is empowered to examine its legality or propriety and jurisdiction of civil court is not barred where acts of revenue authorities are ultra vires or without jurisdiction, collusive or bad in law or void or in excess of their jurisdiction or passed in absence of aggrieved party or based on fraud. If any action or order of executive officer is ultra vires, it can be struck down by civil court irrespective of bar under Section 36 of Act ibid, so civil court is competent to examine whether or not act purported to have been done under Act ibid could be validly done. If the order passed by colony authorities is within four corners of their jurisdiction, would be immuned to interference by civil court in view of bar under Section 36 of Act ibid. In respect of this legal question of jurisdiction of civil court, the privy council in "Secretary of State v. Mask and Company", (AIR 1940 PC 105) has laid down the following principle:-- "The exclusion jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure."
It is worth mentioning that different statutes have provided that an order made by the authority acting under it shall not be challenged in any Court. The intentions of the legislature in their wisdom qua, Section 36 of Act ibid are that the officers working under the Act shall exercise their powers freely and should not be interrupted unnecessarily to administer colony land according to the terms and conditions issued by the competent authority from time to time but this provision does not give unfettered/ unchecked power. The ambit of jurisdiction of revenue courts has been laid down by the Act and the officers functioning thereunder cannot be allowed to act beyond their scope of jurisdiction or exceed their jurisdiction. The Civil Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction has the authority/power to interfere, if the orders of revenue hierarchy are found without jurisdiction, mala fide, excessive or in violation of law. Under Section 9 of Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) civil court is competent to check usurpation of power made by revenue courts, but it cannot check errors of judgment of revenue court on the plea of mis-appreciation of evidence.
13. The impugned order was passed by the learned Additional Commissioner on 02.11.1988, but on 04.10.1990 the petitioners have assailed the same by filing civil suit. The version of the petitioners that they came to know about the impugned order just six months prior to the institution of suit is devoid of merits. The impugned order has been passed in presence of their counsel and was in their knowledge, but they kept mum for a long period for the reasons best known to them. Article 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908 provides one year limitation to assail order passed by an government officer. As such the suit is hopelessly time barred. Now it is well settled that law favours the vigilant and not the indolent. I am fortified on this point by case "State Bank of Pakistan through Governor and another v. Imtiaz Ali Khan and others" (2012 SCM R 280), "Lahore Development Authority v. Mst.
Sharifan Bibi and another" (PLD 2010 Supreme Court 705), "Rehmat Din and others v. Mirza Nasir Abbas and others" (2007 SCM R 1560), "Nazakat Ali v. WAPDA through Manager and others" (2004 SCM R 145), "Ghulam Sarwar v. Amir Hussain and 3 others" (2004 SCM R 944). In landmark case "Khushi Muhammad through L. Rs, and others v. Mst. Fazal Bibi and others" (PLD 2016 Supreme Court 872) following principle was laid down while interpreting Limitation Act (V of 1908):-- "The law of limitation is a statute of repose, designed to quieten title and to bar stale and water- logged disputes and is to be strictly complied with. Statutes of limitation by their very nature are strict and inflexible. The Act does not confer a right; it only regulates the rights of the parties. Such a regulatory enactment cannot be allowed to extinguish vested rights or curtail remedies, unless all the conditions for extinguishment of rights and curtailment of remedies are fully complied with in letter and spirit. There is no scope in limitation law for any equitable or ethical construction to get over them. Justice, equity and good conscience do not override the law of limitation. Their object is to prevent stale demands and so they ought to be construed strictly;"
14. The pith and substance of above deliberations is that the learned courts below, after properly appreciating the evidence on record, have passed the impugned judgments and decrees and as such the same do not suffer from mis-reading and non-reading of evidence. Learned counsel for the petitioners has failed to point out any mis-reading or non-reading of evidence or illegality or material irregularity in these judgments.
15. It is well settled law that concurrent findings of learned courts below cannot be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction of this Court, when the same are based on proper appreciation of evidence on record. Reliance is placed on "Ghulam Qadir and others v. Sh. Abdul Wadood and others" (PLD 2016 SC 712), wherein following dictum has been laid down:-- "The function of the revisional court is to ensure the proper administration of justice through the proper exercise of jurisdiction, procedural accuracy, correctness of the decision and legality thereof by subordinate court. If the revisional court is satisfied that the subordinate court has not erred in this regard and the decision is sound in law, then it will not reverse or modify the decision solely on the basis that the subordinate court could have reached a different conclusion on merits."
Similar view has been taken in precedents reported as "Mst. Zaitoon Begum v. Nazar Hussain and another" (2014 SCM R 1469), "Noor Muhammad and others v. Mst. Azmat-e-Babi" (2012 SCM R 1373), "Administrator, Thal Development through EACO Bhakkar and others v. All Muhammad" (2012 SCM R 730) and "Shari Muhammad and others v. Khanzada Gul and others" (2007 SCM R 368).
16. As a sequel to above discussion, to my view the learned Additional Commissioner has passed the impugned order in accordance with law, after affording full opportunity of hearing to the parties and the petitioners have not assailed the same before. Board of Revenue and have directly approached the civil court and as such findings of learned courts below that civil court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the suit and that suit of the petitioners is hopelessly time barred are based on correct appreciation of evidence on record and application of relevant law and do not call for any interference by this Court in its revisional jurisdiction. Consequently, the instant civil revision, being devoid of merits, is dismissed.