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PLD 1971 Karachi 266

HASAN RAZAQI AND 2 OTHERS vs Mst. MEHRUN NISA MEHR AND ANOTHER

CitationPLD 1971 Karachi 266
CourtSindh High Court
Case No.Criminal Miscellaneous Application No, 461 of 1969
Date1970-12-08
Judge(s)Ghulam Rasool K. Shaikh
ResultPetition dismissed

This is an application under section 561-A, Cr. P. C. to quash the proceedings pending against the applicants under section 500, P. P. C. in the Court of A. C. M., Karachi.

2. Mst. Mehr Seema alias Fouzia is a grown-up educated girl and she is working as Air Hostess in P. I.

A. The respondent No, 1 Mst. Mehrun Nisa Mehr is her mother. The applicant No, 1 Hasan Razaqi is son of the other two applicants Mst. Shakila and Matin Ahmed Razaki.

3. In July 1969 Mst. Mehr Seema alias Fouzia was engaged with the applicant Hasan Razaqi and the betrothal was taken place in a large gathering and a feast was also held. Subsequently the applicants started making serious allegations against character and conduct of the girl, as well as the parents and the other girls of the house. These oral allegations were also communicated by a letter written by applicant No, 2 in conspiracy with the other two applicants and the engagement was cancelled.

4. Aggrieved by the imputation made orally as well as by the letter the complainant who is the mother of Mst. Mehr Seema alias Fouzia filed a complaint under section 50), P. P. C. against the applicant. After preliminary inquiry process was issued. So the present application was made to quash the proceedings.

5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties as well as the State and I find no ground to quash the proceedings.

6. The case of the prosecution in respect of the vilification has been set up in paras. 5 and 6 of the complaint filed by respondent No,

1. In para. 5 it is stated that the applicants made serious imputations about the daughter of the respondent that she was of immoral character and her family maintained very low moral standard and their girls were not fit for marital relationship. Para. 6 makes mention of the letter which was received from the applicants breaking the engagement for the reasons stated in the letter. The libellous communication made through the letter may not amount to publication which is a necessary ingredient of an offence of defamation but the reference to the letter has been found necessary as it is stated that the violent imputations which formed the basis of the propaganda against the entire family reiterated in the letter. The relevant portion of the letter reads as under : "But after their engagement they were going out together and it became the talk of our family and people started taking objections to it. Cursory whispers took the shape of violent objections. I could not shut the mouth of anybody. I had thought that your family's atmosphere will also be oriental as that of other family members. But I came to know afterwards that you are found of Western environments due to which the girls are quite free. Due to such wrong freedom, our family members do not like Fouzia. The result was obvious. No one in the family was happy over this engage-ment. I cannot ignore my family. During this period I heard many strange things. All of them cannot be false. The most sad thing which I heard was that Fouzia had married a son of Jagirdar during her stay in Hyderabad Deccan and she lived with him for three to four years and then due to his stern behaviour she got separated. Some say she obtained divorce from him while some say that no divorce has yet taken place, and she has come here. I got this investigated and came to know from a reliable source that this is true. I am sorry that such thing did not come to our notice before. Fouzia also never told about this Nikah or Talaq to Hasan. Bilquis sister also never told us about it. This has upset the entire family. Hasan is also aggrieved. Now I also feel that my family members will never respect Fouzia. I cannot tolerate that these people should not respect my daughter-in-law, and should look down upon her. Keeping in view all these things I feel that this marriage cannot prove a success."

7. The learned counsel for the applicants did not dispute the communication by the aforesaid letter nor it was contended that the girl who was engaged was indicated but it was urged that the applicants had never resorted to defamatory utterances as alleged in para. 5 of the complaint and a false case was filed to avenge the cancellation of the engagement. It was further emphasised that the mother against whom there was no slander was not an aggrieved person and, therefore, the complaint by her for any alleged indictment of her daughter was barred by virtue of the provisions of section 198, Cr. P. C.

8. On the other hand, it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent No, 1 and supported by the learned State counsel that in these proceedings the truth or falsity of the complaint could not be determined and further not only the girl was indicted but the imputations were defamatory of the entire family including the mother and in any case mother could be said to be the aggrieved person for the indictment of her unmarried daughters.

9. On consideration of the contentions put forth by the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that at this stage it is neither possible nor desirable to embark upon the investigation of the truth or falsity of the complaint. This should be left to be determined by the trial Court after the evidence is recorded.

10.Taking up the competency of the complaint filed by the respondent No, 1, the contention, as already pointed out, is two-fold ; firstly the imputation was not defamatory of the mother and secondly, she could not be treated to be an aggrieved person for the indictment of her daughter in order to entitle her to file the complaint. I find no force in either.

11.The relevant portion of the letter to which exception had been taken has been reproduced above. Prima facie the imputations scathed the parents for adopting western culture and allowing freedom to the girl thereby suggesting that they introduced their daughters to certain objectionable environments and encouraged them to indulge in sexual involvements. Apart from the severe attack against the girl who was engaged, all the girls in family had been criticised for the immorality resulting A from the fondness of the western culture by their parents and the training received from them. Flirting whether before or after engagement is irreconcilable with our religion and culture and the sexual involvement is severely condemned. The girl adopting such a way of life are rarely welcomed or accepted in a respectable society. Scandalysing the parents and their unmarried daughter is the worst type of defamatory imputation. Indeed, a bare suggestion of the fondness of the parents for western culture or mode of life, does not necessarily mean that there is any inherent immorality in that culture or mode of life or thereby they are blemished, but the impact of the suggestion must be considered in the light of what has been stated in entire writing which hardly leaves any room for doubt about the motive for the suggestion. Thus even the mother is not immune from that attack. All allegations had also been made that the previous subsisting marriage had been suppressed by the parents. This was apparently intended to confirm the imputation of immorality prevailing in the family. The mother, having been scathed as directly responsible for immorality of her daughter, is without doubt competent to file the complaint for the defamatory accusations.

12.Apart from this, the law does not restrict the right to file the complaint to the person actually defamed but it allows complaint to be filed by any person aggrieved by the imputation. The word 'aggrieved' has not been defined. It must be taken in its ordinary sense. The parents can be treated to be the persons aggrieved if unmarried daughter who are living with them are defamed. In this view I am supported by the case of Kamal Chand v. Amer Chand . In this some previous authorities were considered and the principle laid down by those authorities was elaborated. The discussion is contained in para. 4 of the judgment and it reads as under : "There are several rulings which lay down that where the wife is defamed by the imputation of unchastity, her husband is a person aggrieved, upon whose complaint the Magistrate can take cognisance of a complaint under section 198, Criminal Procedure Code. These cases are reported in Chhota Lal Lallubhai v. Nathabhai Bechar 25 Bong. 151 and in Chellam Naidu v. Ramesami 14 Mad.

379. In Thakurdas Sar v. Adhar Chandra 32 Cal. 425, where the alleged offence was defamation imputing unchastity to a Hindu widow, it was held, that her brother, with whom she was residing at the time, was a person aggrieved within the terms of section 198, Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Judges considered the case reported in 25 Bom. 151 and expressly disagreed from the view expressed by Ranade, J., the dissenting Judge. In all these cases the principle acted upon appears to be that a Hindu lady residing with her husband, her father, her brother, or her son is a member of his family, and her reputation is bound up with the reputation of the person in whose house she resides. If any imputation is made against her character that would effect as much the relative with whom she is living as herself, and, therefore, where the alleged offence is defamation imputing unchastity, the party `aggrieved' is not necessarily the party directly defamed but includes also the husband or ether relatives whose reputation is also affected and suffers injury. Considering the circum-stances and condition under which people live in India and where the imputation of an unchastity of a female makes the whole family liable to social ostracism the propriety of the application of the principle alluded to above cannot be disputed. In all such cases the defamer's object is always to vilify the relatives and not the female alone. The imputation in such cases is that the relatives knew of the female's unchastity and with that knowledge lived with her."

13 The principle laid down in I L R 1925 Born. 151, I L R 1914 Mad. 379 and I L R 1932 Cal. 425 was also followed in the case of Dwijendra Nath Talukdar and another v. Makhan Lal Pramanik , and it was observed as under : "What the section lays down is that the complaint must be made by some persons aggrieved.

While it excludes complaints by busy bodies and mischief-makers, it does not say that the complaint can only be made by the person defamed. The question therefore is whether the husband is aggrieved when imputations are made upon the chastity of his wife. In view of the1 2 social customs prevailing amongst the community to which the parties belong, there can be question that the husband would suffer very serious social disadvantages on account of these imputations. I should find it very difficult to say that he was not a person aggrieved. There is however ample authority for the view taken by the learned Magistrate: vide the cases in 25 Bom.

151, 5 Lah. 301 and 14 Mad. 379. In 32 Cal. 425, it was held that a brother is a person aggrieved when imputations are made against the chastity of a widowed sister living with him. The case of the husband is clearly stronger."

14. The third is the case of Daem Sardar v. Batu Thali , decided by the Calcutta. High Court. It was observed "it is impossible to lay down any inflexible rule for determining in every case whether the complainant is a person aggrieved by the offence alleged within the meaning of section 198 of the Cr. P. C. it must be determined in each case according to its own circumstances whether the complainant can be said to be in a legal sense a person aggrieved." In that case the complainant was the head of the family and is son, a lunatic and his daughter-in-law were living under his protection and an allegation was made that she was taken to the house of her father and subsequently married to an other person. It was held that the offence, if true, seriously affected the reutation and status in society of the father-in-law and he was a person aggrieved within the meaning of section 198, Cr. P. C. and competent to institute the complaint.

15.Similarly it was held by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Jkaha and others v. State , that in a case where false imputation of unchastity was made against the daughter-in-law, who was living with her father-in-law the reputation of the entire family suffered and if husband of the woman was absent the father-in-law was an equally aggrieved person within the meaning of expression in section 198 and such as he was entitled to initiating proceedings under section 500, P.

P. C 16.Lastly is the case of Surajmal v. Ramnath . It was held that the adopted son was competent to file complaint for the defamation of his adopted mother who was residing with him as he could be treated to be an aggrieved person within the meaning of section 198, Cr. P. C. In this connection it was observed that the party aggrieved was not necessarily limited to the person directly defamed but included also other persons injured such as husband and even the other relatives".

17.The principle laid down by the aforesaid authorities equally applied to the present case. The parents are no less aggrieved by wild allegations against their unmarried daughter living with them.

18.On the other hand the learned counsel for the applicants relied upon four authorities Hussainbhai Ismailji v. Emperor , Sampuran Singh v. State , Ramdhani v. Swamidin and Ghulam Murtaza v. State and others . But it would be clear on the perusal of these authorities that they are not applicable to the present case.

19.In AIR 1934 Sind 188, the imputation was made against the spiritual head of a community as a trustee of waqf property and complaint was filed by one of the followers. It was held that the complainant was not an aggrieved person. Even in this authority some pertinent obtervations had been made. It would be useful to reproduce the bead note which reads as under "The question as to whether a person who files a complaint of defamation is or is not aggrieved by the defamation within the meaning of this section is a question which should be determined with reference to the nature of the accusation, and having regard to the special circumstances of each case. Only such person as has directly or indirectly suffered in his own reputation by the defamation complained of can set the machinery of the law Courts into motion. In short the agreement of the complainant should not merely be the one shared by every member of an organized society."

20.In this authority a clear distinction had been drawn for guidance to invoke the bar imposed by law. The present case is one of those cases to which the bar cannot be extended. In AIR 1953 Pb.3 4 5 6 7 8 9 88, of course it was a case of a daughter against whom imputation were made and the complaint was filed by the father who was held to be not an aggrieved person. But the case is clearly distinguishable as the daughter had deserted her husband and on evidence it was found that she was living separately from the father. The learned Judge proceeded to distinguish the case reported in I L R 1932 Cal 425, on the ground that in that case the sister was a widow who was living with her husband and this fact made a considerable difference. It, however, appears from the trend of the discussion that the learned Judge was inclined to share the view in respect of her unmarried daughter taken in the case of Empress v. Imambux , but with due respect I am not dispose to agree for the reason already stated.

21.In AIR 1953 Vindh. Par. 849, it was a case of sister against whom the allegations had been made and the brother had filed a complaint and it was held that the brother was not an aggrieved person and, therefore, could not file the complaint. However, this authority is also distinguishable as the imputation was made by the husband against whom the complaint was filed and the woman had deserted the husband as a rusult of some domestic quarrel and she started living with her brother. It was observed that thereby the sister was not in brother's guardianship nor the brother was under any obligation to take care of her good name, therefore the Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case made by the brother against her sister's husband who had imputed unchastity to her.

22.In PLD 1966 Kar. 337, a letter was addressed to the father attacking the character of the son. It was held that the complaint by the father could not be entertained ; firstly there was no publication which was necessary ingredient of the offence of defamation, secondly there was no complaint by the son, thirdly the application of exception 8 to section 499, P. P. C. was also of material consequence, fourthly, there was no imputation made against the father urging to commit breach of peace and fifthly the complainant slept over the matter for 10 months before filing the complaint. It is obvious that the facts of the present case are not similar and, therefore, the rule laid down by the authority cannot be applied.

23.In the circumstances I see no reason to quash the proceedings. The application is, therefore, dismissed. AIR 1952 Madh. Bha. 180 AIR 1934 Cal. 564 3 Cr. L J 187 52 Cr. L J 668 AIR 1928 Nag. 58 AIR 1934 Sind 188 AIR 1953 Pb. 882 AIR 1953 Vindh. Par. PLD 1966 Kar. 337 39 Pb. Re. 1887 (C R)

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