' This is a petition under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The petitioner Muhammad Sarwar alleges therein and seeks thereby decision of this Court accordingly that his dismissal ordered by the Manager of the Spencer & Company Ltd. Respondent on 30th April, 1980 is illegal and consequently he is entitled to re-instatement alongwith back benefits. The facts are affirmed by the Petitioner in the petition itself that he was served with a charge sheer, and the charges embodied therein having been denied by means of his reply thereto, inquiry was conducted against him and the offence held proved by the inquiry officer and this was followed by usual second show-cause notice and his reply thereto and then the dismissal order. This too is a common ground that the said inquiry was conducted against the petitioner and his colleague Muhammad Siddique jointly. The dismissal has been challenged on the ground alleged in the petition inter alia that the charge sheet was time barred that the joint inquiry violated rules of natural justice and actually caused prejudice to the petitioner and that Dost Muhammad Branch Manager the main P. W. Against the petitioner acted as a judge of his own cause when he himself issued the dismissal order. The dismissal is however proper and legal according to the respondent's written statement which raises objections inter alia that the petitioner is not a workman. The petitioner himself on the one side and the aforesaid Dost Muhammad alongwith the inquiry officer Liaquat Ali on the other, are the witnesses respectively examined in support of, and against the petitioner.
2. The facts as under are conclusively proved on record. The petitioner worked as Salesman in the employment of the respondent. The charges against the petitioner will be apparent from the charge sheet (Exh. P. 1) dated 28th October, 1979 operative part whereof is reproduced below :- "It has been brought to our notice that you cave been indulging in large scale irregularities by fraudulently claiming sales commission on direct orders received in this office from various institutions and in some cases booked by Principal's representative by reproducing such orders on your Order Book as if such business was booked by you. You have also indulged in booking fictitious orders in the name of some institutions and according to our information stocks against such invoices have never been supplied to the institutions in whose names the invoices were made but have been disposed of somewhere else and that settlement of such bills has been made by cash payments after a lapse of several months."
' The charge sheet gives a list of various connections under reference. This charge sheet was served in pursuance of audit, made by aforesaid Dost Muhammad R Was Auditor. His evidence before this Court is to the effect that the said audit was made on 17th October, 1979, the second part of the same having been of 23rd October, 1979 (whereas the charge sheet is dated 28th October, 1919), and the irregularities under reference did not come to the knowledge of the respondent until the audit. The charge sheet was issued by the then Manager Aziz-ud-Din. The inquiry was conducted by the then Branch Manager Liaquat Ali R W whose report is Exh. R-3. The inquiry Officer stated in his report that he examined Muhammad Shard' Store Keeper, and Fazal Hussain, Haqdad and Jalal-ud-Din, Deliverymen besides aforesaid Aziz ud-Din, and Dost Muhammad in support of the charge sheet ; some other P. Ws. Were also examined. The aforesaid Aziz-ud-Din was succeeded by Dost Muhammad as Branch Manager on 2nd February, 1980. The inquiry officer then examined the petitioner and Muharimad Siddique as accused in the joint inquiry. The report of the inquiry officer was also joint. This was followed by second show cause notice Exh. R-2 and its reply. A proforma of dismissal order Exh. R-6 was then received by Dost Muhammad Manager from the Head Office under the forwarding letter dated 22nd April, 1980 Exh.
R-5 for being used after the inquiry which was to be held on 26th April, 1980 the same having been issued with the approval of the Managing Director. The dismissal order Exh. P-2 was accordingly issued in the aforesaid proforma under the signatures of Dost Muhammad, stating therein that the decision of the Management had been made with the concurrence of the Managing Director. The petition embodies a long list of grounds of alleged illegality of the dismissal order. Out of them three grounds have been specifically pointed to above. How far the petitioner was advised to reiterate or abandon anyone of these grounds will be apparent from his examination-in-chief reproduced below :- "I was charge sheeted by the respondent on 28th April, 1976. The original charge sheet which was given to me is Exh. P.
9. I give its a reply to the respondent. Inquiry was conducted alongwith another person Muhammad Siddique. We were charge sheeted separately. I was not given an opportunity to produce defence. I was given second show-cause notice. I sent reply to the second show-cause notice. The Branch Manager Dost Muhammad appeared as witness in the inquiry against me. The order of dismissal Exh. P-2 was passed by him."
' It will be seen that the three grounds pointed to above and taken inter alia in the petition were abandoned by the petitioner and instead new ground was introduced that he was not given opportunity to produce defence. Now I proceed to decide the case.
3. The evidence of Dost Muhammad R. W. Clearly proves that the charge-sheet was served within one month of the knowledge of the irregularity. The audit which led to the was made by the R. W.
Himself. His evidence in this behalf is worthy of credit and there is nothing to rebut the same. I rule out the objection that the charge sheet was time barred. The audit was made by Dost Muhammad R. W. He was moreover examined by the inquiry officer as P. W. The contention is however without basis that he acted as judge in his own cause. The finding of guilt was recorded by the inquiry officer and not by this R. W. The dismissal order was made by him on the authorisation of the head office. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show what prejudice was caused by reason of the joint inquiry, which was moreover not against principles of natural justice. The petitioner was punished for his own doings and not those of the other worker dealt with in the inquiry jointly with him. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is, therefore, without force that joint inquiry magnified the offence. Needless to add that the objection that the petitioner was not afforded opportunity of defence introduced during the evidence is without substance in view of the report of the inquiry officer.
4. Having considered all the aspects of the case I am left with little doubt in. My mind that the petitioner failed to make out a case for interference by this Court. The impugned order is correct.
The respondent counsel did not press the preliminary objections which are therefore, ruled out. I decide the petition against the petitioner.