As a result of trial in private complaint case titled "Riaz ul Haq v. Muhammad Akram etc. " as well as State case F.I.R. No, 643 dated 30.11.2004 of Police Station Farid Town, Sahiwal Muhammad Afzal, petitioner was convicted under Section 302(b), P.P.C. by the learned Sessions Judge, Sahiwal vide judgment dated 15.1.2010 and sentenced to death and also to pay compensation Rs,50,000/- to legal heirs of Muhammad Ashraf, deceased. The petitioner was also convicted by the learned Sessions Judge, Sahiwal under Section 302(b), P.P.C. vide judgment dated 15.1.2010 in another private complaint titled "Muhammad Ali v. The State etc. " as well as State case bearing F.I.R. No, 644 dated 30.11.2004 of same police station and sentenced to death with a direction to pay compensation of Rs,50,000/- to legal heirs of Mst. Nasreen, deceased. Appeals filed by the petitioner bearing Cr. Appeal Nos, 133 of 2010 and 290-J of 2011 (against conviction in private complaint and State case F.I.R. No, 643/2004) and Cr. Appeal No, '86 of 2010 (against conviction in private complaint and State case F.I.R. No, 644 of 2004) were dismissed by this Court vide separate judgments dated 1.12.2015, however, with modification in the sentences from death to imprisonment for life in each case. As stated at Bar neither the petitioner nor the complainant or the State assailed said judgments of this Court before Apex Court.
2. By filing this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 the petitioner prays for concurrence of both the sentences awarded to him in above said two cases.
3. Relying on the provisions of Section 397 read with Section 85, Cr.P.C. learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that mandates of law required that the Court while awarding sentences of imprisonment ought to have passed appropriate orders for concurrent running of the sentences but the same has not been done as a result of which the petitioner is bound to undergo a sentence of about 50 years which is not intent of the legislature and consequently prays that sentences of imprisonment for life in both the cases be directed to run concurrently.
4. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondents have vehemently opposed the petition on the ground that under Section 397, Cr.P.C. relief sought by the petitioner could be granted only by the trial/appellate Court at the time of passing judgments of conviction and this constitutional petition cannot be substituted for the said forums. Learned counsel for the complainant submits that the petitioner was convicted and sentenced in trials/appeals for the commission of two different offences and as such the sentences awarded to the petitioner should run consecutively.
5. We have given our anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by both sides and relevant law on the subject.
6. Though the sentences of imprisonment for life were awarded on conviction in two different trials/appeals, yet they pertain to one and the same person i,e, the petitioner. Section 397, Cr.P.C. contemplates that sentences awarded to a person in a subsequent trial would commence at the expiration of imprisonment for which he had been previously sentenced, however, discretion has been left with the Court to direct concurrent running of sentence awarded in a subsequent trial. It would be advantageous to reproduce relevant portion of said provision which runs as under:
7. "397. Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence. When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment or imprisonment for life, is sentenced to imprisonment, or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment, or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment, or imprisonment for life to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence."
It is manifest from above, quoted provision of law that command of law for consecutive sentences is general rule while direction for concurrent sentences is discretionary power of the Court.
Although appropriate order within the meaning of Section 397, Cr.P.C. ought to be made at the time of deciding the case or appeal but if, for any reason or due to some inadvertent omission, direction could not be issued at that time there is no embargo that the same cannot be passed afterward. In the safe administration of criminal justice, the Court can exercise discretionary power any time to direct that sentences in two different trials would run concurrently. While expounding this provision of law in the case titled Sajjad Ikram and others v. Sikandar Hayat and others (2016 SCM R 467) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "12. The aggregate .of punishment of imprisonment for several offences at one trial were. deemed to be a single sentence. However, the position of an accused person is different who while already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life, is subsequently convicted and sentenced in another trial. Such subsequent sentence in view of Section 397, Cr.P.C. would commence at the expiration of imprisonment for life for which he had been previously sentenced but even then in such cases, the said provision expressly enables the Court to direct that the subsequent sentence would run concurrently with the previous sentence. It is clear from Section 397, Cr.P.C. that the Court, while analyzing the facts and circumstances of every case, is competent to direct that sentences in two different trials would run concurrently. In that eventuality, the Court has wide power to direct that sentences in one trial would run concurrently. The provision of Section 397, Cr.P.C. confers wide discretion on the Court to extend such benefit to the accused in a case of peculiar nature, like the present one. Thus extending the beneficial provision in favour of the appellant, would clearly meet the ends of justice."
In the present case the petitioner was convicted and sentenced simultaneously and even his appeals were decided at the same time. It appears that while converting sentences of death into imprisonment for life passing appropriate orders for concurrent running of sentences escaped notice of this Court. Thus, to our mind, it would be in the fitness of things that benefit of this provision should be extended in favour of the petitioner in order to meet the ends of justice.
7. Resultantly, this petition is accepted and it is directed that sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to the petitioner by this Court vide judgment dated 1.12.2015 passed in Cr. Appeal No, 86 of 2010 shall run concurrently with the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to the petitioner vide judgment dated 1.12.2015 passed in Cr. Appeals NO. 133 of 2010 and 290-J of 2011.