DECISION ' The appellant, who was employed as 'Supervisor Erection' by the respondent-Company on the terms and conditions laid down in the order of his appointment, dated 30th September, 1976, was posted in the Saudi Arabian Project of the respondent-Company, on three years contract, vide agreement,. Dated 11th November, 1976. However, before the expiry of the three years' period, presumably in accordance with the provisions of clause (2) of the Agreement, the appellant was transferred from Saudi Arabia to Karachi for posting against Kuwait vacancy, vide letter of the respondent-Company, dated 28th November, 1978. The appellant, however, was not posted to the Kuwait Project but instead his services were terminated with effect from 7th March, 1979 on the ground that he had become redundant and for want of work. The appellant submitted an appeal against the termination of his services to the Chairman of the respondent-Corporation on 27th March, 1979, but as he obtained no redress he served a grievance notice on the respondent Corporation on 31st May, 1979. He ultimately preferred a grievance petition before the learned Fifth Labour Court on 3rd July, 1979, challenging the termination of has services and praying for re- instatement in service with back benefits. The learned Labour Court has dismissed the appellant's grievance petition on the grounds, firstly, that the appellant was not a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders and hence was not entitled to maintain a grievance petition against the termination of his services under clause (3) of Standing Order 12 read with section 25-A, I. R.
0. And secondly, that the appellant's grievance petition was time-barred. The appellant has, accordingly, come up in appeal to this Tribunal.
2. Clause (3) of Standing Order 12 entitles only a workman as defined in the Sind Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, to file a grievance petition against the termination of his services. A person would fall within the definition of "workman" as given in the said Ordinance only if he is employed to do manual or clerical work, whether skilled or unskilled.
The burden of establishing that he is such a workman is upon the person who makes the claim as has been pointed out by this Tribunal in the case of Johnson & Johns v. Zubair Ahmed (1). The sole evidence which Mr. Abdul Majeed, the learned Representative for the appellant, was able to point out in support of his contention that the appellant was a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders, was the appellant's assertion before the learned Labour Court that he had no worker to assist but he has to work with his own hands. He has, however, not explained what was the nature of the work which he \was required to do with his own hands. His mere assertion that he used Co work with his own hands is wholly insufficient to establish that he was employed to do manual work when it is borne in mind that he was employed as Supervisor 'Erection' on a salary of Rs, 615 p.m.
Plus House Rent, Conveyance Allowance, Cost of Living Allowance, Special Dearness Allowance and Additional Dearness Allowance. Reference may also be made to the two certificates produced by the appellant which were given to him by the respondent corporation in respect of his work.
Although these certificates state that his services were utilized on various buildings for erection of steel work, there is nothing to suggest in the certificates that he was required to do work with his hands. It has specifically stated by the Industrial Relations Officer of the respondent corporation.
Syed Hameed Mohsin, in his evidence before the learned Labour Court, that the nature of the duty of the appellant was to supervise the workers engaged on steel erection am, therefore, of opinion that the appellant has failed to establish that he was employed to do manual work and consequently does not falls within the definition of 'workman' as given in the Standing Orders Ordinance.
3. I also find myself in agreement with the finding of the learned Labour Court that the grievance petition of the appellant is time-barred. The services of the appellant were terminated with effect from 7th March, 1979, as already stated. He sent two communications to the respondent corporation against the termination of his services. The first is the appeal to the Chairman of the corporation, which is dated 27th March, 1979, and the second is headed as a grievance notice and is dated 31st May, 1979. It was contended by Mr. A. Majeed that only the second communication, which is headed `grievance notice", should be treated as grievance notice and not the first communication to the Chairman, which is merely an appeal. I regret find no force this contention.
All that sub section (1) of section 25-A, LR.O., requires, is that the worker must bring his grievance to the notice of the employer within three months of the day on which the cause of action arose. No specific form is. Prescribed for {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) 1980 PLC 622 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' bringing the grievance to the notice of the employer. The sole requirements of a valid grievance notice, are firstly, that the grievance must be brought to the notice of the employer in writing, secondly, that it should be so brought by the workman himself or through his shop steward D or collective bargaining agent and, thirdly, it should be made within three months from the date that the cause of the grievance arises. As such, whether the grievance is brought to the notice of the employer by means of an appeal, a representation, an application, a prayer or in any other form it would be a valid notice for the purposes of subsection (1) of section 25-A, I.R.O. The requirement of law is that the grievance petition must be filed within two months of the reply to the grievance s notice by the employer, or if the employer fails to make any reply within fifteen days of the service of notice, within two months of the expiry of the said fifteen days. In the instant case, since no reply was vouchsafed by the respondent-Corporation to the appellant, the grievance petition should have been filed within 2i months of the service of the appeal dated 7th March, 1979, upon the respondent. However, it was filed considerably later on 3rd July, 1979. As such, the grievance petition was clearly filed beyond the period of limitation.
4. On either view of the matter, therefore. I find no force in this appeal and dismiss the same in limine.