1. AFTAB AHMED GORAR, J.----Urgency granted.
2. Appellant/Complainant Mehdi Hassan son of Muhammad Khan, being dissatisfied with the acquittal order dated 31.07.2017, passed under section 265-H, Cr.P.G., by XIV Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate, Karachi-East, in J.M No,366 of 2015 (FIR No,01/2015 under sections 489-F/420/34, P.P.C. registered with Police Station Gulistan-e-Jauhar, Karachi) approached this Court by filing the titled appeal under Section 417(2-A) Cr.P.C. with a prayer to set-aside the impugned judgment dated 31.07.2017 and convict the Respondents 1 and 2.
2. Succinct allegations leveled against the Respondents/accused by the appellant are that on accused. Sajid had purchased iron and cement on loan and gave him cheque No,J-7471503 amounting to Rs,15,00,000/- which was signed by the wife of appellant/complainant namely Kausar Bibi, which on its presentation was dishonoured. Learned Counsel argued that respondents Nos.1 and 2 are nominated persons in the above FIR as both are directly involved in the commission of offence. He next argued that the learned judge while passing the impugned judgment did not go through the evidence and material available on record and acquitted the accused persons on technicalities and presumptions without applying his judicial mind.
3. It is not out of context to make here necessary clarification that an appeal against acquittal has distinctive features and the approach to deal with the appeal against conviction is distinguishable from the appeal against the acquittal because presumption of double innocence is attached in the later case. Order of acquittal can only be interfered with if it is found on its face to be capricious, perverse, arbitrary in nature or based on misreading, non-appraisal of evidence or is certified, arbitrary and lead to gross miscarriage of justice. Mere disregard of technicalities in a criminal trial without resulting injustice is not enough for interference. Suffice is to say that an order/judgment of acquittal gives rise to strong presumption of innocence rather double presumption of innocence is attached to such an order. While examining the facts in the order of acquittal, substantial weight should be given to the findings of the lower Courts, whereby accused were exonerated from the commission of crime as held by the Apex Court in the case of Muhammad Ijaz Ahmad v. Fahim Afzal 1998 SCM R 1281 and Jehangir v. Aminullah and others (2010 SCM R 491). It is also Settled principle of law as held in plethora of case law that acquittal would be unquestionable when it could not be said that acquittal was either perverse or that acquittal judgment was improper or incorrect as it is settled that whenever there is doubt about guilt of accused, its benefit must go to him and Court would never come to the rescue of prosecution to fill-up the lacuna appearing in evidence of prosecution case as it would be against established principles of dispensation of criminal justice.
4. The court can only interfere in acquittal to avoid miscarriage of justice and when judgment of acquittal is perverse, capricious or arbitrary (2009 SCM R 237). It would be advantageous to reproduce the criteria laid down in appeal against acquittal as under:- i. Court will not normally interfere in the verdict of acquittal. ii. Court will give due weight and consideration to the finding of the lower court, particularly the trial court which had the occasion of not only recording the evidence but also watching the demeanor of the witnesses and attending to the plea of the person facing trial. iii. What is the view of the trial judge regarding the credibility of witnesses. iv. Verdict of acquittal affirms the initial plea that every person is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty. v. it is not sufficient ground of interference that on reappraisal of the evidence on record a different view might as well be found. vi. whether reappraisal of evidence shows any manifest wrong, perversity or uncalled for conclusion from facts proved on record. vii.Whether the findings arrived at by trial court are wholly artificial, shocking or ridiculous. viii.Whether material evidence has been disregarded. ix. Whether material evidence has been misread blatantly to an extent that miscarriage of justice has been occasioned. x. Whether evidence has been brought on record illegality. xi. There is, however, no bar upon the superior courts to interfere in the acquittal judgment, but the courts exercise extra caution while exercising jurisdiction in appeals against acquittal. xii.the rights of accused to any benefit of doubt and xiii.mere disregard to technicalities in a criminal trial without resulting injustice, is not enough for interference. (2009 PCr.LJ 199).
5. In the present case, admittedly the FIR of the case has been lodged after six months of the incident.
6. Perusal of impugned judgment reveals that after examining the entire evidence, the benefit of doubt has been extended to the accused persons as the appellant/complainant failed to prove its case.
7. Suffice it to say that there is hardly any improbability or infirmity in the impugned judgment of acquittal recorded by the learned trial court, which being based on sound and cogent reasons does not warrant any interference by this Court and is accordingly maintained. Consequently, the captioned appeal having no merits for consideration is hereby dismissed in limine.