JAWAD HASSAN, J.---Through this Intra Court Appeal, the Appellant has assailed the order dated 27.07.2017 passed in Writ Petition No,55445/2017 by the learned Single Judge who dismissed the Appellant's petition seeking direction to the Respondents to initiate legislative process for establishing Tort Tribunals in terms of Article 212 (1)(b) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the "Constitution").
2. The learned counsel for the Appellant inter alia submitted that the impugned order is against law and facts; that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate the grounds taken by the Appellant rather dismissed the petition on technical grounds without touching the merits of the case, as such the impugned order is liable to be set aside and directions be issued the Respondents to do the needful as prayed above. The learned counsel has placed reliance on the cases titled Al-Jehad Trust through Habibul Wahab Al-Khairi, Advocate and 9 others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, Islamabad and 3 others (1999 SCMR 1379), Ghulam Rasool v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division Islamabad and others (PLD 2015 Supreme Court 6) and Amanullah Khan Yousufzai and others v.
Federation of Pakistan through Law Secretary and others (PLD 2011 Kar. 451).
3. We have heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the Appellant and perused the available record.
4. At the outset it is pointed out that the Appellant neither from the record nor from his submissions has satisfied the Court that how he is an aggrieved person and has locus standi to file the petition before this Court. No case relating to tortious act of the Appellant is pending in any Court of law.
The Appellant has only filed the list of six (06) cases, which are reported judgments and have no concern with the Appellant. The Appellant, through the writ petition had invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, therefore, he has to establish that his legal or fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution have been violated. Similarly, the Appellant has to prove his locus standi to seek such direction under the denial of his legal right, if any.
5. It is sine qua non for initiation of proceedings under Article 199 of the Constitution that the Appellant should have a locus standi to institute the proceedings or in other words the Appellant should be an aggrieved party from the action of the Respondents. Pivotal judgment of the apex Court on this issue is Mian Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore (PLD 1969 SC 223), the Lahore High Court titled Montgomery Flour and General Mills Ltd., Montgomery v. Director, Food Purchases, West Pakistan and others (PLD 1957 (W.P) Lahore 914) and Kamran Martin v. Mst. Siera Bibi and 4 others (2017 PLC (C.S.) 597 wherein it was observed that for a person to have locus standi to initiate a petition for issuance of writ, he must have some right in the matter and he need not have a right in that stricto senso of the term which is provided in Article 170 of the Constitution.
In the case titled Dr. Imran Khattak and another v. Ms. Sofia Waqar Khattak, PSO To Chief Justice and others (2014 SCMR 122) the Honble Supreme court of Pakistan held as follows:-- "It would exercise such jurisdiction under Article 199(1) (a) (i), (ii) and (c) on the application of an aggrieved person while under 199 (1) (b) (i) & (ii) on the application of any person whether aggrieved or not, and not on an information or on its own knowledge. In the case of "Tariq Transport Company, Lahore v. Sargodha Bhera Bus Service and others" (PLD 1958 SC (Pak) 437), this Court held that a High Court was not competent merely on an information or on its own knowledge to commence certiorari proceedings or other proceedings of a similar nature under Article 170 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1956. In the case of "Fazl-e-Haq, Accountant General, West Pakistan v. The State" (PLD 1960 SC (Pak) 295), this Court reiterated the view by holding that the extraordinary jurisdiction relating to a writ could only be exercised by the High Court when moved by a party whose legal rights have been denied."
6. To deal with the cases pertaining to the Tort matters, the Courts are established which are already working having exclusive jurisdiction in the matter and nothing bars them to enjoy such jurisdiction, therefore, mere pendency of six (06) cases, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the Appellant on the ground of delay in deciding such like matters, is not a valid reason for establishing Tort Tribunals under Article 212 of the Constitution. So far as the issue of vires of Sections 2(b), 13 and 15 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 are concerned, in this regard it is stated that neither before the learned Single Judge nor before this Division Bench the learned counsel has been able to produce any valid reason or ground for declaring the same ultra vires the Constitution. Moreover, the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the Appellant are not supportive to his case as each and every case has its own facts and circumstances, as such distinguishable from the case in hand, therefore, cannot be relied upon.
7. In view of the above, we agree with the findings of the learned Single Judge and see no illegality or perversity in the impugned order which has been passed in accordance with law and does not warrant any interference by this Court; consequently, the Appeal in hand, being devoid of any merit is hereby dismissed in limine. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.