JUDGEMENT: MR. JUSTICE IJAZ UL AHSAN.--(1). Through this common judgment, I intend to decide this and other constitutional petitions mentioned in Annexure "A" to this judgment. All these petitions raise common questions of law and facts.
2. The petitioners have challenged the validity of notices issued by the Commissioner Inland Revenue for audit of their income tax affairs under Section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ("ITO") for tax year 2009. Their case, as put forth by their learned counsels, is that proceedings to conduct audit of their income tax affairs have been commenced by the Revenue Authority without allowing them an opportunity of being heard. Resultantly, they have been deprived of their right to file their defence against the intended proceedings which is violative of the principles of natural justice. It has further been contended that the Commissioner Inland Revenue was under a legal obligation to disclose to the taxpayer the basis of selection for audit, confront him with such basis, invite objections from him and finally to pass a speaking order to justify such action. The main argument is that the Commissioner has not followed the aforenoted requirements of law.
Consequently, the notices, the selection of cases for audit and the related proceedings are malafide and utterly illegal. It is further argued that the selection of cases of the petitioners for audit is unlawful, illegal and without jurisdiction insofar as provisions of Section 177 of ITO relating to selection of cases for audit have been substituted through Finance Act, 2010 and a new Section 214-C has been inserted in the ITO. It is submitted that perusal of the substituted section 177 and newly inserted Section 214-C shows that the Commissioner Inland Revenue is no longer vested with the authority to select a person to conduct audit of Income Tax affairs of such person. His power is limited to conducting audit after selection has been made by the Federal Board of Revenue in terms of Section 214-C.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioners have argued that after the aforenoted amendments brought about by way of Finance Act, 2010, power of the Commissioner to select a person for audit has been taken away and the same has been vested exclusively in the Federal Board of Revenue ("FBR"). Therefore, having no power to select under Section 177, the notices issued by the Commissioner calling for record for the purpose of audit are without lawful authority, illegal, and void ab-intio.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioners have further argued that Section 214-C has been inserted while Section 177 has been substituted through Finance Act, 2010. Both new sections are prospective and cannot be applied retrospectively. It is maintained that the tax year 2009 had already come to close on 30.06.2009 and die income tax returns for the said tax year stood filed and had attained the status of assessment orders on the date of filing, by operation of law in terms of Section 120 of the ITO. Consequently, a vested right had accrued in favour of the assessee which could not be taken away. The amendment in the law cannot be applied retrospectively unless the legislature has specifically given it retrospective effect. It is maintained that the notices addressed to the petitioners constitute a fishing expedition to look for evidence from the records and books of the petitioners. Such expeditions are not warranted by law. It is pointed out that respondent No, 2 in any event was under a legal obligation firstly to disclose the basis of selection to the concerned person, secondly to confront him with such basis and finally after inviting objections from the concerned person, pass a speaking order so as to justify such selection. The Commissioner has not followed the aforenoted procedure in consequence of which, notices and proceedings emanating from such notices have lost their legal sanctity.
5. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand have argued that reasons were recorded by the Commissioners and the conditions of Section 177 were fulfilled in issuing such notices to the petitioners. They submit that even if in some instances reasons have not been communicated, no prejudice has been caused to the Petitioners.
The have merely been summoned by the Commissioner. Once they appear before him and prior to commencement of audit proceedings (if necessary), they would be confronted with the reasons for issuance of the notice and given full opportunity to meet such reasons and defend their position. As such no prejudice has been caused to the Petitioners. It is pointed out that after examining the record and confronting the taxpayers with the discrepancies, if any, in case the Commissioner is dis-satisfied with the response, he may proceed to conduct audit of the income tax affairs of the assessee in accordance with law.
6. The learned counsel for the Respondents emphasize that the said audit is qualitatively different insofar as it is record based and on every step reasons are required to be recorded and such reasons are required to be disclosed to the assessee, who on being confronted has an opportunity to respond to the same and defend his position.
7. The learned counsels submit that selection of an assessee for audit by the Federal Board Revenue under Section 214-C is a totally different and independent power which is not record based. It is in the form of computerized balloting which may either be random or parametric. Ones the Board undertakes such selection in exercise of its powers under Section 214-C and no reasons for such selection need be disclosed because there are none (except that the computer has picked up a name like a lottery), it may direct a Commissioner to conduct an audit in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section 177 or appoint a firm of Cost and Management Accounts to conduct an audit on his behalf. It is, however, clarified that there cannot be overlapping audit in that a person cannot be subjected to two audits, one on the basis of power exercised by the Commissioner under Section 177 and the other on the basis of selection by the Board under Section 214C of the ITO.
8. It is further submitted that in 2013, the position was further clarified and explained by the legislature by declaring that powers of Commissioner under Section 177 were independent of the powers of the Board under Section 214-C and that the provisions of Section 214-C did not restrict the independent power of the Commissioner to call for the record or documents including books of accounts of a taxpayer for audit and to conduct audit under Section 177. They submit that simultaneously, a corresponding amendment was inserted in Section 177 to re-affirm the independent powers of the Commissioner to call for record under Section 177 and conduct audit under the said provisions. They further maintain that the amendments inserted in Section 177 and 214-C in 2013 clarified and explained the meaning, scope and intent of the legislature with regard to Section 177 and 214-C of the ITO.
9. Notwithstanding the above, it is submitted that even in the year-2009, the Commissioner enjoyed an independent power to call for the record of a person or classes of persons and upon being satisfied that there were valid reasons to probe the matter, conduct audit having regard to the criteria given in Section 177(4)(a) to (e). They maintain that notices sent to the petitioners meet the criteria of the original as-well as the amended section 177 ITO and therefore, cannot be struck down on the basis of technical objections.
10. The learned counsels for the respondents have vehemently argued that the audit provisions contained in Section 177 and 214-C are admittedly machinery provisions. It is settled law that such provisions are required to be construed liberally in order to facilitate the respondent department to perform its regulatory functions. It is pointed out that the exercise of powers by the Commissioner have been subjected to checks and balances at every level insofar as he is not only required to record reasons but also communicate such reasons to the assesses, who may contest the same and defend himself. Further, such decisions are justiciable before the appropriate fora in the hierarchy provided in the Income Tax Ordinance. It is, therefore, argued that the objections raised by the petitioners against the notices in question are not only premature but also an effort to obstruct and delay a lawful process, which is required to be undertaken by the regulator to ensure that the trust reposed in the taxpayer by the law maker under the Universal Self-Assessment System ("USAS") introduced by the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is not abused or violated.
11.The Attorney General for Pakistan was put to notice under Order XXVII-A CPC. The learned Deputy Attorney General has made submissions on his behalf. He has adopted the arguments advanced by the learned counsels for the Respondents. He has, however, pointed out that having been given an independent power in terms of the amendments inserted in the Income Tax Ordinance. 2001 through Finance Act, 2010, the Commissioner has not been granted unbridled and unstructured discretion to select taxpayers for audit. He maintains that the power of the Commissioner to call for the record of any taxpayer for die purpose of conducting audit was always available to the Commissioner and continues to he available in view of the fact that the exercise of discretion by the Commissioner has already been defined and structured through cases reported as Messrs Syed Bhais (Pvt.) Ltd through Director vs. Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad through Chairman (old another (2007 PTD 239) and Ch. Muhammad Hussain and others vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (2005 PTD 152). He points out that certain observations made in the 2005 judgment ibid were struck down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in its judgment reported as Commissioner of Income Tax and others. vs Fatima Sharif Textile, Kasur and others (2009 PT!) 37). However. at page 40 of the judgment, it was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan that the Commissioner may issue notice in terms of Section 177 disclosing reasons for selecting a person for audit on the criteria laid down in Chaudhry Muhammad Hussain's case ibid. He submits that the criteria laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan still holds field and is binding on the Commissioner who is obliged to disclose reasons for calling the record, give an opportunity to the taxpayer of being heard and in case he is dissatisfied with the explanation offered, he can proceed further to conduct an audit. He further maintains that even thereafter, opportunity of hearing to the taxpayer is available under Section 177(6) after completion of audit and Section 122(9) before an assessm ent is amended. He further submits that the intention of legislature has clearly and unambiguously been incorporated in the explanation inserted through Finance Act, 2013. After the said explanation, there can be no two views about the fact that the power of the Commissioner under Section 177 is independent of the powers of the Board under Section 214C and nothing contained in the said Section restricts the powers of the Commissioner to call for record or documents for audit and to conduct audit under Section 177.
12. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and examined the record.
13. The following questions emerge from die arguments made at the bar:
(i) Whether the impugned notices under Section 177 of the ITO were required to contain reasons for summoning the record to conduct audit of the taxpayers and non-disclosure of reasons should automatically lead to such notices being struck down?
(ii) Whether the Commissioner could have issued notices under Section 177 of the ITO as substituted by Finance Act, 2010 for the tax year 2009?
(iii) Whether notices under Section 177 of the ITO could be issued by the Commissioner without selection of the case of the taxpayer for audit by the Federal Board of Revenue in terms of Section 214-C of the ITO?
14. Before I proceed to address the aforenoted issues, I consider it necessary to trace the changes that Section 177 of the ITO has undergone over the past few years. The contents of Section 177 of the ITO remained unchanged except for minor changes between 2002 to 2008, which are neither material nor relevant to the cases in hand. However, in the years 2009, 2010 and 2013 changes/additions were introduced. These being relevant for the purpose of deciding the lis are being reproduced below for ease of reference: Finance Act, 2009: "177. Audit.--(1) The Board may lay down criteria for selection of any person or classes of persons for an audit of such person's income tax affairs by the Commissioner.
(2)The Commissioner shall select a person or classes of persons for audit in accordance with the criteria laid down by the Board under sub-section (1).
(3)The Board shall keep the criteria confidential.
(4) In addition to the selection referred to in sub-section (2), the Commissioner may also select a person or classes of persons for an audit of the person's income tax affairs having regard to--
(a) the person's history of compliance or non-compliance with this Ordinance;
(b) the amount of tax payable by the person;
(c) the class of business conducted by the person; and
(4) Any other matter which in the opinion of Commissioner is material for determination of correct income.(5) After selection of a person or classes of persons for audit under sub-section (2) or (4), the Commissioner shall conduct an audit of the income tax affairs (including examination of accounts and records, enquiry into expenditure, assets and liabilities) of such person or classes of persons.
(6) After completion of the audit under subsection (5) or subsection (8), the Commissioner may, if considered necessary after obtaining taxpayer's explanation on all the issues raised in the audit, amend the assessm ent under subsection (1) or subsection (4) or section 122, as the case may be.
(7) The fact that a person has been audited in a year shall not preclude the person from being audited again in the next and following years where there are reasonable grounds for such audits, particularly having regard to the factors in subsection (4).
(8) The Board may appoint a firm of Chartered Accountants as defined under the Chartered Accountants Ordinance, 1961 (X of 1961), to conduct an audit of the income tax affairs of any person or classes of persons selected for audit by the Commissioner or by the Board and the scope of such audit shall be as determined by the Board on a case to case basis.
(9) Any person employed by a firm referred to in sub-section (8) may be authorized by the Commissioner, in writing, to exercise the powers in sections 175 and 176 for the purposes of conducting an audit under that sub-section."
Finance Act, 2010: "177. Audit.--(1) The Commissioner may call for any record or documents including books of accounts maintained under this Ordinance or any other law for the time being in force for conducting audit of the income tax affairs of the person and where such record or documents have been kept on electronic data, the person shall allow access to the Commissioner or the officer authorized by the Commissioner for use of machine and software on which such data is kept and the Commissioner or the officer may have access to the required information and data and duly attested hard copies of such information or data for the purpose of investigation and proceedings under this Ordinance in respect of such person or any other person: Provided that--
(a) the Commissioner may, after recording reasons in writing call for record or documents including books of accounts of the taxpayer; and
(b) the reasons shall be communicated to the taxpayer while calling record or documents including books of accounts of the taxpayer: Provided further that the Commissioner shall not call for record or documents of the taxpayer after expiry of six years from the end of the tax year to which they relate.
(2) After obtaining the record of a person under sub-section (1) or where necessary record is not maintained, the Commissioner shall conduct an audit of the income tax affairs (including examination of accounts and records, enquiry into expenditure, assets and liabilities) of that person or any other person and may call for such other information and documents as he may deem appropriate.
[Subsections (3) to (5) were omitted]
(6) After completion of the audit, the Commissioner may, if considered necessary, after obtaining taxpayer's explanation on all the issues raised in the audit, amend the assessment under sub- section (1) or sub-section (4) of section 122, as the case may be.
(7) The fact that a person has been audited in a year shall not preclude the person from being audited again in the next and following years where there are reasonable grounds for such audits.
(8) The Board or the Commissioner may appoint a firm of Chartered Accountants as defined under the Chartered Accountants Ordinance, 1961 (X of 1961) or a firm of Cost and Management Accountants as defined under the Cost and Management Accountants Act, 1966 (XIV of 1966), or a firm of Cost and Management Accountants as defined under the Cost and Management Accountants Act, 1966 (XIV of 1966) to conduct an audit of the income tax affairs or any person or classes of persons and the scope of such audit shall be as determined by the Board or the Commissioner on a case to case basis.
(9) Any person employed by a firm referred to in sub- section (8) may be authorized by the Commissioner, in writing, to exercise the powers in sections 175 and 176 for the purposes of conducting an audit under that sub-section.
(10) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (2) and (6) where a person fails to produce before the Commissioner or a firm of Chartered Accountants or a firm of Cost and Management Accountants appointed by the Board or the Commissioner under sub-section (8) to conduct an audit, any accounts, documents and records, required to be maintained under section 174 or any other relevant document, electronically kept record, electronic machine or any other evidence that may be required by the Commissioner or the firm of Chartered Accountants or the firm of Cost and Management Accountants for the purpose of audit or determination of income and tax due thereon, the Commissioner may proceed to make best judgment assessment under section 121 of this Ordinance and the assessment treated to have been made on the basis of return or revised return filed by the taxpayer shall be of no legal effect."
15. Through Finance Act, 2010, Section 214C was also inserted in the Income Tax Ordinance which provide as follows: "214C. Selection for audit by the Board.--(1) The Board may select persons or classes of persons for audit of Income Tex affairs through computer ballot which may be random or parametric as the Board may deem fit.
(1A) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Ordinance or any other law, for the time being in force, the Board shall keep the parameters confidential.
(2) Audit of Income Tax affairs of persons selected under sub-section (1) shall be conducted as per procedure given in section 177 and all the provisions of the Ordinance, except the first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 177 shall apply accordingly.
(3) For the removal of doubt it is hereby declared that Board shall be deemed always to have had the power to select any persons or classes of persons for audit of Income Tax affairs."
16. In 2013 further amendments were incorporated in Section 214C through Finance Act, 2013.
However, these amendments are not material for the decision of the matters before this Court, therefore, the same need not be discussed. However, an explanation inserted in Section 214C through Finance Act, 2013 is of considerable significance and has direct bearing on the matters before this Court. The same is reproduced below for ease of reference: "For the removal of doubt, it is declared that the powers of the Commissioner under section 177 are independent of the powers of the Board under this section and nothing contained in this section restricts the powers of the Commissioner to call for the record or documents including books of accounts of taxpayer for audit [emphasis added] and to conduct audit under section 177."
17. While examining the provisions of Section 177 ibid, it must be kept in mind that through the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, the old system of preparation and submission of returns by an assessee and framing of assessm ent by income tax officers was discarded. A new scheme of self- assessm ent (USAS) was introduced through Section 120C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 which provides as follows:-- "S.120 Assessments.--(1) Where a taxpayer has furnished a complete return of income (other than a revised return under subsection (6) of section 114 for a tax year ending on or after the 1st day of July, 2002.--
(a) the Commissioner shall be taken to have made an assessment of taxable income for that tax year, and the tax due thereon, equal to those respective amounts specified in the return; and
(b) the return shall be taken for all purposes of this Ordinance to be an assessment order issued to the taxpayer by the Commissioner on the day the return was furnished.
(1A) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-section (1) the Commissioner may conduct audit of the income tax affairs of a person under section 177 and all the provisions of that section shall apply accordingly.
(2) A return of income shall be taken to be complete if it is in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 114.
(3) Where the return of income furnished is not complete, the Commissioner shall issue a notice to the taxpayer informing him of the deficiencies (other than incorrect amount of tax payable on taxable income, as specified in the return, or short payment of tax payable) and directing him to provide such information, particulars, statement or documents by such date specified in the notice.
(4) Where a taxpayer fails to fully comply, by the due date, with the requirements of the notice under sub-section (3), the return furnished shall he treated as an invalid return as if it had not been furnished.
(5) Where, in response to a notice under sub-section (3), the taxpayer has, by the due date, nifty complied with the requirements of the notice, the return furnished shall be treated to be complete on the day it was furnished and the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply accordingly.
(6) No notice under subsection (3) shall be issued after the expiry of one hundred and eighty days from the end of the financial year in which return was furnished and the provisions of sub-section
(1) shall apply accordingly."
From the above, it is quite evident that the law maker reposed trust and confidence in the taxpayer in that if he furnished a complete return, such return would be taken to be an assessment order issued to the taxpayer by the Commissioner. However, the taxpayer could not have been given an unqualified and unquestionable right to file a return which would automatically be treated as deemed assessm ent and an order issued in favour of the taxpayer by the Commissioner. Such a carte blanche would have surely encouraged unscrupulous taxpayers to file erroneous or inaccurate returns to evade tax and thereby cause loss to the revenue of the State. In order to cater for that eventuality and to encourage the taxpayers to file accurate returns, a counterbalance had to be created so that while filing his returns, a taxpayer would be conscious of the fact that his return may be scrutinized by the competent authorities and if upon such scrutiny the return was found incorrect, legal consequences would follow. This caveat/safeguard was inserted in the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 through Section 177 thereof by incorporating the power to conduct audit of the Income Tax affairs of a taxpayer under Section 177 ibid.
18. It may also be noted that this caveat and safeguard to protect the interests of the State has consistently been kept intact, in the form of conferring upon the Commissioner the power to call for records and on finding discrepancies conduct audit. However, such power of the Commissioner is neither unbridled nor unstructured. It has to be exercised in a manner and subject to die conditions provided in the ITO which would be discussed in the later pan of this judgment. Perusal of language of Section 177 from 2003 to 2010 (despite various amendments introduced from time to time) brings out this theme and policy of law clearly and unambiguously.
This scheme of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was discussed in Noble Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Federal Board of Revenue (PTCL 2010 CL. 364) in the following terms: "Before we examine these sections it will be worthwhile to recapitulate the basic theme behind the repeal of 1979 Ordinance and the promulgation of 2001 Ordinance. The theme or concept was summarized in the following words-- "Voluntary compliance backed by strong audit" and with this theme/concept in mind the legislature incorporated and promulgated the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The basis of the voluntary compliance and the trust that the government has in the taxpayer has been incorporated in section 120 whereas the concept of audit and the procedure for selection of the cases have been outlined u/s. 177. Since the return becomes a deemed assessm ent order, therefore, to correct an erroneous order or an order in which definite information of concealment is available section 122 has been incorporated to amend such orders.
19. "The power to conduct audit has been incorporated in order to ensure that there is no tax evasion and taxpayers pay the tax which is lawfully due from them under the law. The underlying theme of the entire concept appears to be that while on the one hand the legislature has reposed trust and confidence in the taxpayer in the expectation that he would file accurate tax returns, disclose all taxable income and pay tax on the same, on the other hand, a mechanism to test the trust through possible selection of a return for audit and thereafter scrutiny of the return for its accuracy and truthfulness has also been built in, so that while filing a return, the taxpayer is mindful of the fact that mere Filing of the return would not be enough and subject to the law, there is a possibility of his return being picked up, audited and scrutinized on the basis of the records and books of the taxpayer, which he is required by law to maintain, to verify its accuracy and truthfulness, to ensure that the trust is not betrayed." (Shahnawaz Limited vs. Pakistan through Secretary of Finance PTCL 2011 CL. 914) .
21. It is to be noticed that presently merely notice has been issued and no adverse action has been taken or order passed against the petitioner. According to the law laid down in several precedents, there is no valid basis for claiming right of hearing at a preliminary stage. In Commissioner of Income Tax and others vs. Messrs Media Network and others (PTCL 2007 CL. 1), sustenance of claim for right of hearing at a preliminary stage on issuance of notices, in relation to self-assessment scheme introduced under Section 59 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, then in vogue fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan. The apex court cited with approval the case of Muhammad Hayat vs. The Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and another (PLD 1970 Lahore 679), in which registration of a criminal case for filing a bogus claim with the Settlement Authorities, on the report of an officer on special duty of the Governor's Inspection Team, without affording an opportunity of hearing to the accused by the said officer, was hold not violative of principles of natural justice. In line with the rule laid down in this case and several other precedents including judgments from foreign jurisdictions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the Revenue's contention that opportunity of hearing was not required to be given to an assessee by the Commissioner Income Tax at a preliminary stage of making recommendation of their cases to the Regional Commissioner for total audit. It may be observed that there is no allegation of unfair treatment or prejudice by Income Tax Authorities except that there is a vague allegation of malafide without any particulars which is liable to be ignored. The other contentions of the petitioners regarding denial of right to file defence, non-passing of a speaking order and other related pleas are offshoots of the claim for right of hearing at the stage of issuing notice which in light of die aforenoted judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has been found to be premature at this stage.
22. There is no cavil with the proposition that power to select and conduct audit of taxpayers is well entrenched in the scheme of the Income Tax Ordinance and is a fundamental part of the system of checks and balances which are inherent in any scheme of self-assessment. The main question which requires to be determined is which authority was vested with the power to select a taxpayer for audit in 2010 when notices were sent by Commissioner to the petitioners and whether the Commissioner was vested, at the relevant time, with the power to issue such notices. In order to answer this question, the language and scope of Section 177 as it stood in 2010 ibid needs to be examined together with Section 214C as amended from time to time.
23. It is common ground between the parties that the impugned notices were issued by the Commissioner under Section 177 of the ITO as substituted vide Finance Act, 2010 in view of the fact that it was the applicable law at the time of issuance of such notices. In my humble opinion, the language of Section 177 clearly confers a power on the Commissioner to call for any record or documents including books of accounts, maintained under the Ordinance for conducting audit of Income Tax affairs of a person. The argument of the learned counsel for the Petitioners that this power of the Commissioner was taken away by virtue of insertion of Section 214C through Finance Act, 2010, is misconceived and not supported by the language of Sections 177 and 214C. If at all there was any ambiguity in the matter, the legislature itself clarified and explained the same by inserting the aforenoted explanation where for removal of doubt it was declared that the powers of the Commissioner under Section 177 were independent of the powers of the Board under Section 214C and nothing contained in Section 214C restricted the power of the Commissioner to call for the record or documents including books of accounts of the taxpayer for audit and to conduct audit under Section 177 of the ITO. It is settled law that where any statutory law is changed, there is a presumption that it affects change in the legal rights to the extent provided by such amendment and the amending provisions have to be read alongwith un-amended provisions as they are part of the same Act. Reliance in this regard is placed on State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan vs. Mercantile Mutual Insurance Company Limited (1993 SCMR 1394).
Even otherwise, powers available to the Commissioner under Section 177 are independent and exercisable subject to a different set of conditions on the basis of record before him as compared to the powers available to FBR in terms of Section 214C, which are not record based, consist of power to select by random or parametric ballot and not subject to the same conditions, checks, balances and an obligation to confront and disclose reasons and provide an opportunity to the taxpayer to defend himself, as have been imposed on the Commissioner. In my view these are two independent powers, fundamentally different in nature, genesis, origin, antecedents and conditions. They can coexist independently and be exercised independent of each other. They are not mutually exclusive and are not meant to be so as clearly and unambiguously declared by the legislature by way of the aforenoted explanation inserted through Finance Act, 2013. I do not find any conflict or inconsistency between Section 177 and Section 214C that may require reconciliation.
25. The above rate needs to be applied in light of the fact that no vested right had accrued in favour of the petitioners. The reason being that under Section 120 of the ITO treating of taxable income declared in the return by the assesses, as an assessment order issued to him by the Commissioner is not absolute and final in view of the fact that under Sub-Section 1(A) it is subject to conduct of audit of his income tax affairs by the Commissioner under Section 177 of the ITO, the provisions whereof fully apply to the case of the petitioners. At page 43 of Salmond's Jurisprudence (12th Edition) vested right has been explained as follows: "vested end contingent rights: A right vests when all the facts have occurred which must by law occur in order for the person in question to have the right. A right is contingent when some but not all of the vestilive facts, as they are termed, have occurred."
In case of Nabi Ahmed and another vs. Home Secretary, Government of West Pakistan, Lahore and 4 others (PLD 1969 S.C. 599 at page 616) it has been laid down as follows: "what is a vested right? According to the Oxford English Dictionary, "vested" means "clothed, robed, dressed especially in ecclesiastical vestments ....
24. Vested rights essentially differ..., from rights which are contingent.... that is completely created....vested interests may perhaps be defined as rights based not..... #TS## It is noteworthy that filing of complete return of income, demonstrative of real and true income of the assesse is the condition precedent for applicability of clauses "a" and "b" of subsection 1 of Section 120 of the ITO. The fulfillment of these conditions is verifiable through the audit under Section 177. As already observed, the right conferred on an assesses by Section 120 is not conclusive and decisive. It is amenable to contingencies and thus does not attain the status of a vested right. Furthermore, the petitioners' case is not a past and closed transaction. It is not the case of the petitioners' that they could not have been selected for audit because their cases constituted past and dosed transactions.
26. Perusal of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 indicates that mere selection of a taxpayer for audit and calling of books of accounts to verify the version declared in his return under the USAS, which is the main theme on which the entire structure of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 has been built, does not cause any injury/prejudice to the taxpayer because of the following reasons: a) Upon selection of a case by the Board for an audit or calling of books of accounts by Commissioner for audit, assessm ent deemed to have been made by the Commissioner under Section 120(1) of the ITO remains undisturbed. b) If correct and true particulars of income have been given in the return and correct tax as per law has been paid, the audit may not result in amendment of assessment under Section 122 of the ITO. c) If the audit of record warrants any action under Section 122, before taking such action, proper opportunity of being heard is required to be provided to the taxpayer. d) The audit itself is not a conclusion of proceedings. It is only a beginning which may or may not lead to assessm ent or increase in liability. e) The main purpose of selection and audit is to verify the correctness of the assessment made by a taxpayer on the basis of the fact that he flies a declaration under Section 114(2)(b) to the effect that the relevant record alongwith other particulars is kept, a true statement in the return has been made P and records are maintained as per declaration, it is, therefore, an exercise to verify compliance of laws for better administration of tax law with the ultimate objective of ensuring that State receives its due share of revenue out of the income of the taxpayers. A reference in this regard may be made to Messers Syed Bhais (Pvt.) Ltd through Director vs. Central Board of Revenue. Islamabad through Chairman and another (2007 PTD 239), Messrs Roots Montessori and High School, Rawalpindi vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (Audit), Rawalpindi and 3 others (2010 PTD 395) and a judgment of this Court rendered in WP No, 16022-2011.
27. I am also of the view that the petitions are premature filed on the basis of apprehensions and without exhausting departmental remedies. The same are not maintainable on this ground also.
Reliance in this regard is placed on Messrs National Beverages (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. Federation of Pakistan and others (PTCL 2001 CL. 25.0), Messers Pak Arab Fertilizers (Pvt.) Ltd, vs. Deputy Commissioner Income Tax and others (PTCL 2000 CL. 220) and Sitara Chemical Industries Ltd and another vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (2003 PTD 1285).
28. It is not the case of the Petitioners that they could not have been selected for audit because their cases constituted past and closed transactions. Their main emphasis is that the mode and manner in which their cases were selected was not sustainable as the Commissioner did not have the requisite powers to do so at the time that lie issued the impugned notices. I do not find any substance in this argument and an unable to subscribe to the same. I have already held that in 2010 (as also previously from 2003 onwards) the Commissioner had the power to summon records of taxpayers (subject to conditions which underwent changes from time to time), to conduct audit, the insertion of Section 214C did not take away the said power and if at all there was any ambiguity the same has been removed by the legislature by inserting an explanation in the form of a declaration which leaves no room for doubt, confusion or ambiguity. Even otherwise, the petitioners have not been able to show how or if any prejudice has been caused to them by virtue of issuance of the impugned notices under amended Finance Act, 2010 as opposed to the un- amended Section 177 as it existed in the year 2009. The provisions relating to issuance of notice fall in the category of procedural law which is invariably treated as retrospective. There is no vested right to be governed by a particular provision regarding notice.
29. Before proceeding further in the matter, I consider it necessary to examine the scope of the explanation which was added to Section 177 as well as Section 214-C through Finance Act, 2013. It appears that the legislature in its own wisdom considered it necessary to remove any doubts and to clarify the law by inserting an explanation through a legislative instrument. Through the explanation, a declaration has been issued by legislature by stating that the powers of the Commissioner under Section 177 are independent of the powers of the Board under Section 214C and nothing combined in Section 214C restricts the powers of the Commissioner to call for the record or documents including books of accounts of a taxpayer for audit and to conduct audit under Section 177.
30. The learned counsels for the petitioners have halfheartedly questioned the validity of the explanation and raised issue with the wisdom behind it. However, I am of the view that judicial restraint needs to be exercised in questioning the wisdom of the legislature in enacting a law or an amendment therein subject to the caveat that it has been made competently and without in any manner transgressing the limitations imposed by the Constitution. The learned counsels for the Petitioners have not been able to show how the explanation in question is ultra-vires or beyond the legislative competence of the legislature.
31. As far as the extent and scope of insertion of an explanation by the legislature is concerned, in case there is a doubt about true interpretation of a provision, it is open to the legislature to clarify its intent by introducing amendments in the law which may also be undertaken by adding an explanation. Such explanation is for all intents and purposes clarificatory and declaratory in nature and due effect must be given to it. Further, such clarificatory/declaratory explanation lawfully inserted into a statute may operate retrospectively. In holding this view, I am fortified by The Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Zone-R, Karachi vs. M/s. Asbestos Cement Industries Limited.
Karachi (1993 SCMR 1276), Messers Rijaz (Pvt.) Ltd through Executive Riaz A. Gal. Lahore vs. The Wealth Tax Officer, Circle-III, Lahore and another (1996 PTD (Trib.) 489), Messrs Dreamland Cinema, Multan vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore (PLD 1977 Lahore 292), Commissioner of Income Tax Zone-B, Lahore vs. Sardar Muhammad (2001 PTD 2877), Mamukanjan Cotton Factory vs. The Punjab Province and others (PLD 1975 SC 50), Sayeed ur Rehman vs. Chief Election Commissioner, Dacca etc. (PLD 1965 SC 157), Muhammad Yusuf vs. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Pakistan Lahore and another (PLD 1968 SC 101), Imtiaz Ahmad Lali vs. Ghulam Muhammad Lali (PLD 2007 SC 369) and Yar Muhammad and 4 others vs. Secretary Finance Department, Government of Punjab and others (2011 SCMR 1537).
32. Having come to the conclusion that the explanation added to Sections 177 and 214C being clarificatory/declaratory in nature and having retrospective effect, I find that the Commissioner was X at the relevant time legally competent and duly authorized to invoke the provisions of Section 177(1) to issue the impugned notices.
33. A careful perusal of the proviso to Section 177, as it has evolved since 2001 to date, indicates that power of selection of a person or a class of persons for audit under Section 177 and to conduct such audit has remained with the Commissioner since promulgation of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The power to select a person for audit has also been conferred on the Federal Board of Revenue relatively recently and such power pertains to selection of persons or classes of persons through computer ballot which may be random or parametric. It may be emphasized that there is a fundamental, qualitative and inherent difference between the two. While the exercise of powers by the Commissioner to call for record is based upon the record filed by a person himself which may have been found lacking on cursory examination necessitating closer scrutiny leading to an audit, the power conferred on the FBR is fundamentally different in nature, scope and genesis. It is not record based, no material is available to the FBR and no reasons need to be disclosed to the person why his name has been selected for audit through ballot. Therefore, the argument that the same power could not have been given to the Commissioner as well as the FBR may appear attractive at first glance but on deeper analysis it is found to be without substance. Both powers are independent, distinguishable, based on different parameters and conditioned upon fundamentally different requirements. I, therefore, find that the two powers do not overlap in any manner. The learned counsel for the Department has correctly pointed out that in an unlikely event of a person receiving a notice from the Commissioner calling for his record for the purposes of audit and at the same time being selected by FBR for computerized, random or parametric balloting, only one audit would be conducted as the procedure for conducting audit would be the same in both instances.
34. The learned counsels for the petitioners have laid great stress on the point that the Commissioner cannot be given unqualified and unbridled powers to issue notices calling for record or documents of any person. It has been pointed out that such wide powers are liable to be used arbitrarily to harass taxpayers which is contrary to the very concept of the universal self- assessm ent which was a foundational concept in enacting Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The powers of the Commissioner under Section 177 are and have been subject to restrictions imposed by statute as well as judgments of superior courts.
The law settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in CIT vs. Fatima Sharif Textile, Kasur (1994 Tax 317) and CT No, 1664-1665/2009 (Pakistan Mobile Communication Limited case) still holds the field. It is therefore held that the Commissioner is not only required to disclose reasons to the taxpayer in writing for calling for his record, documents, books etc. but also grant him an opportunity to defend himself by affording him a hearing. It is only after the objections have been decided through a reasoned order that he may, if necessary, proceed with the audit. The learned counsels for the Respondents on instructions have categorically and emphatically stated that indeed this procedure would be followed by the Commissioners in letter and spirit, which is in line with the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan as noted above.
35. The protection and safeguards provided to the taxpayer do not end here. In terms of Section 177(6) yet another safeguard is available where on completion of the audit and before exercising his power to amend the assessment under sub-section (1) and (4) of Section 122, the Commissioner is required to obtain the taxpayers' explanation on all issues raised in the audit. It is only after the explanation offered is found unsatisfactory that the assessment can be amended.
Likewise, Section 122(9) provides that no assessment shall be amended or further amended unless the taxpayer has been provided with an opportunity of being heard.
36. It is, therefore, clear and obvious that at every stage, the taxpayer is not only required to be confronted with material against him but is also to be given an opportunity to explain his position.
37. I, therefore, find that there are various checks/safeguards available to a taxpayer in Sections 177 and 122(9) on the exercise of powers by Commissioner which put the actions of the Commissioner under continuous scrutiny.
38. It may be noted that provisions relating to audit are not charging provisions. These provide a mechanism to test the validity of a return filed by a taxpayer who has been trusted by the legislature to submit his return on self-assessment basis. In case the return is found to be a correct reflection of the Income Tax affairs of the assessee, honestly, truthfully and accurately disclosed duly supported by books and records, he would have nothing to fear and no further proceedings would be required to be undertaken.
However, in the event that concealment, dishonesty or misstatements are found, then the taxpayer has betrayed the trust reposed in him by the legislature in which event the department must have the requisite powers (subject to the law and safeguards available within the law) to conduct an audit to uncover illegalities and concealment that the taxpayer may have committed and recover what is lawfully due from him under the law.
39. The provisions relating to audit are germane to assessment of taxable income of the assessee and are thus machinery provisions, which us laid down in the case of Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan vs. Controller of Estate Duty (PLD 1961 SC 119) should be construed in a manner which makes the machinery workable. Thus, being machinery provisions, audit provisions should be liberally construed to ensure that regulatory powers which are designed to keep a check on taxpayers and facilitate recovery of the amounts which are lawfully due and payable to the State are paid fairly, honestly and transparently. Such provisions are not to be rendered redundant, ineffective and illusory on the basis of technicalities.
40.It has been pointed out that few of the impugned notices do not disclose reasons on the basis of which records of taxpayers have been summoned. I have asked the learned counsels for the petitioners what prejudice has been caused to them on account of non-disclosure of reasons at this preliminary stage especially so where no further proceedings have been undertaken. The process is at the very initial stage and reasons can be disclosed once the person appears before the Commissioner who would grant him an AC opportunity to meet those reasons and put up his defence before proceeding further in the matter. The learned counsels for the petitioners have not been able to offer any cogent or legally sustainable argument to show any prejudice having been caused in any manner at this stage. Considering the fact that only notices have received so far and no further proceedings have been undertaken, I find that the said lapse in the notices is not fatal and can be cured by disclosing the reasons to the taxpayer for summoning his record when he appears before the Commissioner and granting him an opportunity of being heard. It is only after the explanation given by taxpayer has been found unsatisfactory by the Commissioner through a reasoned order that he may proceed further to conduct the audit in terms of Section 177.
Even otherwise, the said issue could have been raised by the taxpayer before the Commissioner when the notice was received which was admittedly not done and the petitioners approached this Court directly in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction without exhausting departmental remedies. I also find that since no prejudice has been caused to the petitioners on account of nondisclosure of reasons at the initial stage, these can still be disclosed. This would adequately meet the requirements of natural justice and due process guaranteed to the petitioners by the law and the Constitution. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances narrated above, there is no valid reason to strike down the notices as null and void on this ground alone.
41. For reasons recorded above, I find that the impugned notices were validly issued, and the Commissioner had the jurisdiction to issue notices in exercise of his powers under Section 177 of the ITO, without selection of a person for audit by the FBR under Section 214C of the ITO. However, in cases where notices do not disclose reasons for calling the record, I direct the concerned Commissioners, before proceeding further, to disclose and communicate reasons to the taxpayers in writing, provide them an opportunity of hearing, decide the objections through reasoned orders and thereafter proceed further (if necessary) justly, fairly and strictly in accordance with law. In cases where reasons have already been communicated, the Petitioners may file their objections and defences which shall be dealt with in accordance with the law and procedure enunciated above and such adjudication shall precede the audit (if any).
42. For reasons recorded above, I do not find any merit in these petitions. The same are accordingly dismissed.
ANNEXURE-A S.NoW.P. No, Title of the Case.
3774-10M/S. AMIN METAL INDUSTRIES VS. FOP ETC. 732-11MUHAMMAD RAFIQ TAHIR VS. FOP 11245-11KASHIF MEHMOOD VS. FOP ETC. 4195-11MIS. ALFAJAR CLOTH HOUSE VS. FBR ETC. 4196-11M/S. S. R. ENTERPRISES VS. FBR ETC. 3904-11M/S. HAMMAD WASTE COTTON FACTORY VS. FOP ETC. 4890-11M/S. PLYMER TEK ETC. VS. FOP ETC. 2723-11ZAINAB TOWERS VS. COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ETC. 10862-11MULTAN FEEDS VS. FOP ETC. 4371-10HASEEB WAQAS SUGAR MILLS VS. F.O.P. ETC. 3505-11M/S. SAHIR ASSOCIATES PVT. LTD. VS. FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN ETC. 3490-11NOON PAKISTAN LTD VS. COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ETC. 4871-11M/S. AMRITSAR PAINT VS. FOP ETC. 3515-11M/S. SUPER ASIA VS. FBR ETC. 2937-11SOHAIL ANWAR VS. FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE ETC. 3377-11MAULA BAX ICE FACTORY VS. F.O.P. ETC. 3437-11M/S. MAC & RAINS PVT LTD VS. FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN 26405- 10CITOPAK LTD. VS. FOP.
11892-11M/S. G.R. METAL WORKS VS. FOP ETC. 9891-10DESCON ENGINEERING LTD. VS. FOP 11891-11M/S. GONDAL RICE MILLS VS. FOP ETC. 11532-11M/S. NIAM BROTHERS POLY PROPLENE INDUSTRY VS. FOP ETC. 1663-11AMIR TRADING COMPANY VS. FOP.
18878- 10VARIOLINE INTERCOOL PAKISTAN VS. FOP 6786-10RUPALI POLYESTER LTD. VS. FOP. ETC. 1258-11MiS. IBRAR TELECOM VS. FOP.ETC. 2722-11M/S. CREATIVE ELECTRONICS PVT. LTD VS. FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN ETC. 271-11SANPAK ENGINEERING PVT LTD VS. FOP.
14976- 10TAH1R ALI RAZA VS. COMMISSIONER 26239- 10MOAZZAM KHAN KLAIR VS. FOP 6151-10M/S.SHAHTAJ SUGAR MILLS VS. FOP 2099-11DEPILEX PRIVATE LTD. VS. CIR.
19360- 10WIRE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY VS. FOP 4808-11M/S. CHUCHTAI LAHORE LAB VS. FOP ETC. 529-11SANA INDUSTRY VS. FOP.
731-11MEHBOOB ALAM VS. FOP 233-11READ PVT LTD. VS. FOP.
22-11 CHEMITEX (PVT) LTD VS. COMMSSIONER INLAND REVENUE ETC. 25405- 10PEPCO PAKISTAN GUJRANWALA VS. FOP.
272-11A. N. INDUSTRIES PVT LTD. VS. FOP.
4370-10ABDULLAH SUGAR MILLS VS. F.O.P. ETC. 1661-11RIZWAN BROTHERS VS. FOP.
4807-11M/S. REHMAT STEEL MILLS VS. FOP ETC. 249-11FAMOUR BRANDS PVT LTD VS. FOP.
3843-11M/S. CRESCENT SUGAR MILLS AND DISTILLERY LIMITED VS. FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN 26413- 10SHEIKH ARSHAD MAJEED VS. COMMISSIONER 10569- 10PHARMEDIC LABORATORIES PVT LTD VS, FOP 13229- 10SAJJID HUSSAIN VS. COMMISSIONER 10450- 10KAUSAR GHEE MILLS PVT LTD VS. FOP 1660-11REHMAN TEXTILE INDUSTRIES VS. FOP 1662-11COROLLA AGENCIES VS. FOP.
18531-10GHULAM BARI RICE SHELLER VS. FOP 24794- 10PAK CHINA MANUFACTURING PVT LTD. VS. FOP.
16945- 10TOYOTA SHAHEEN MOTORS VS. FOP 238-11F.F. TRADERS VS. FOP.
26995- 10MUHAMMAD ISMAIL VS. FOP.
13128-10M/S. FAZAL BARI RICE MILLS VS. FBR. ETC. 2145-10M/S. IBRAHIM FIBERS LTD. VS. FOP 6562-10HI TECH FEED PVT LTD VS. FOP 14259- 10CH. FABRICS VS. FOP 4905-11M/S. HAIDER ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY VS. FOP ETC. 25686- 10POPULAR CHEMICAL WORKS PVT. LTD. VS. FOP 25908- 10SHAHEEN GRINDING MILLS PVT LTD. VS. FOP.
8685- 10DAMAS TOOMBAN PVT LTD VS. COMMISSIONER 1583-11M.K. SONS PVT. LTD. VS. FOP 6164-11KAMRAN STEEL RE ROLLING VS. FOP.
4191-11MUHAMMAD AZEEM ETC. VS. COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ETC. 4662-11M/S.M.A.PACKAGES LAHORE VS. FOP 4751-11MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH VS. COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ETC. 4809-11M/S. TOYO INTERNATIONAL MOTOR CYCLE VS. FOP ETC. 4826-11M/S. BISMILLAH COLD STORAGE VS. FOP ETC. 3032-11MUGHAL-E-AZAM BANQUET COMPLEX VS. FOP ETC. 2955-11KHALIL AHMAD VS. COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ETC. 3068-11M/S. LAWRENCE PHARMA PVT. LTD. VS. FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN ETC. 8632-i 1TALON SPORTS PVT. LTD. VS. FOP ETC. 2809-11M/S. CREATIVE ENGINEERING PVT. LTD. VS. FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN 25045- 10PUNJAB BEVERGES CO. PVT LTD VS. FOP 21520- 10M/S. SOHAIL AHMAD ZARGAR VS. THE FOP. ETC. 10673- 10SHAHZAD BROTHERS VS. COMMISSIONER 24795- 10MICRONIZER PVT LTD. VS. FOP 26762- 10SALMA NAHEED VS. FBR 14689- 10FAZAL DIN & SONS VS. FOP 8188-10CHAUDHRY SUGAR MILLS LTD VS. FOP 7336-11M/S. QASAR-E-NOOR NAUROZE VS. FOP ETC. 8171-11M/S. M.A.S. ENTERPRISES VS. FOP ETC. 12172-10SH. MUHAMMAD ASLAM VS. FOP 6163-11T.A. CORPORATION PVT LTD VS. FOP 26524- 10FAMILY HOSPITAL LAHORE VS. FBR 22263- 10NASCO INDUSTRIES VS. FOP 273-11PAKISTAN ALCO PRODUCTS PVT LTD. VS. FOP.
1713-11VOLTA DIES & MOULDS VS. FOP 24973- 10FAYYAZ BROTHERS RICE MILLS VS. FOP 12153-10MUHAMMAD MUSHTAQ VS. COMMISSIONER.
2162-11M/S. HUSEIN SUGAR MILLS LTD. VS. FOP. ETC. 4923-10NEWAGE CABLES LTD. VS. FOP ETC. 23382- 10KHALID WAZIR VS. FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN 546-11SADIQ GAS COMPANY VS. SOP 11149-11RUPAFAB LTD. VS. FOP ETC. 13510-10SH. MANZOOR AHMAD VS. FOP 9200-11M/S. ROYAL PALACE BANQUET HALL VS. FOP ETC. 22693- 10FRIENDS ASSOCIATES PVT LTD VS. COMMISSIONER 24547- 10BIGFEED LTD VS. F.O.P. ETC. 1275-11METECCENO PAKISTAN PVT. VS. THE CIR. ETC. 1156-11INDUS JUTE MILLS LTD. VS. FOP.
22141-10MUHAMMAD ANWAR VS. FOP 245-11H1LBRO INTERNATIONAL PVT LTD. VS. COMMISSIONER 1641-11DADA JEED CORPORATION VS. FOP.
26414- 10SHEIKH ABDUL MAJEED VS. COMMISSIONER 24598- 10POPLON & CO. PVT LTD. VS. COMMISSIONER 24696- 10SADIA FABRICS VS. FOP 26192- 10UNIQUE GROUPS OF INSTITUTIONS VS. FOP 1642-11CHISHTIAN FLOUR MILLS PVT. LTD. VS. FOP 3376-11AL-KARIM COLD STORAGE VS. F.O.P. ETC. 3373-11M/S. AMIR TRADERS VS. F.O.P.
3368-11MADINA COLD STORAGE VS. F.O.P.
3367-11PAK COLD STORAGE VS. FOP 3366-11M/S. RANA BROTHERS VS. F.O.P.
3365-11M/S. LAKE CITY HOLDING PVT. LTD. VS. FOP & OTHERS 8796-11SHAMA FOOD PROCUCTS VS. FBR ETC. 3699-11M/S. TOYOTA GARDEN MOTORS PVT. LTD.VS. COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ETC. 3725-11G.R. & SONS VS. FOP ETC. 580-11FAZIL MEMORIAL HOSPITAL VS. FOP.
3786-11M/S. TARIQ BROTHERS VS. FOP ETC. 3788-11M/S. ALRAZ HIGH SCHOOL VS. FOP ETC. 3805-11ALI BHAI ENGINEERS VS. FOP ETC. 3806-11WAHILA COLD STORAGE VS. FOP ETC. 11087-11M/S. AHMAD STRAW BOARD PVT. LTD. VS. FOP ETC. 10912-11M/S. IQBAL BOOK CORNER VS. FOP ETC. 8662-11M/S. AMIN ENTERPRISES VS. FOP ETC. 9306-11M/S. METRO HI-TECH PVT. LTD. VS. COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ETC. 3796-11M/S. REFINE STEELS PVT. LTD. VS. FOP ETC. 10160-10HOSPITALITY ENTERPRISES PVT. LTD. VS. CIR.
9204-11M/S. JUICE PACK INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD. VS. FOP ETC. 16946- 10METALINE ENGINEERING CO. VS. FOP 14230-10M/S. NEW MIAN FLOUR MILLS VS. FOP. ETC. 8114-11M/S. ALMONIA CONTAINER VS. FOP ETC. 789-11GOGA PLASTIC WORKS VS. COMMISSIONER .
25337- 10A.M PLASTIC COMPANY VS. FOP 718-11N.
1. TRADERS VS. FOP.
25403- 10SPELL PETROCHEMICALS PVT LTD. VS. FOP 26207- 10LATIF & BROTI1ERS VS. FOP 26213- 10PRIME SOAP AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES VS. FOP 26272- 10HI TECH INK COLOUR CHEMICAL INDUSTRY VS. FOP 26526- 10TECHNO PLASTIC INDUSTRY VS. FOP.
25433- 10RIAZ HOSPITAL VS. COMMISSIONER 13814-10MUNIR AHMAD SH. ETC. VS. COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ETC. 20059- 10CF. MUHAMMAD SARWAR ALI VS. FOP 26111-10TELETRONICS INDUSTRIES VS. FOP.
3255-11SALMAN PACKAGES VS. FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE ETC. 22351- 10UNEXO LABS PVT LTD VS. FOP 8909-11M/S. SAWA INDUSTRIES VS. FOP ETC. 10396-11AL-NOOR FLOUR MILLS VS. FBR ETC. 15849- 10RAVI FLOUR MILLS VS. FOP 3889-11SITARA SPINNING MILLS LTD VS. FBR ETC. 11795-11DESIGN DEVELOPMENT FABRICATION CO. VS. FOP ETC. 8170-11M/S. MUGHAL IRON LTD. VS. FOP ETC. 7012-11MAZHAR STEELS (AOP) VS. FOP ETC. 11929-10BAJWA AGRO INDUSTRIES VS. CIR 5196-10NELOFAR AMJAD VS. GOVT. OF PUNJAB ETC. 14973- 10PERAL CNG VS. FOP 11744-11DR. GULZAR AHMAD CH. VS. FOP ETC. 13953- 10M/S. PLASPACK VS. FOP ETC. 1 1759-1 1MIS. HAROON STEEL INDUSTRIES VS. FOP ETC. 8734-11M/S. METRO HIGH TECH PVT. LTD. VS. COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ETC. I 0990- I IM/S. G.P. PVT. LTD. VS. COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ETC. 7418-1 IM/S. ANWAR STEEL & GENERAL MILLS VS. FOP ETC. 4572-11M/S. PAKISTAN CYCLE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATIVE SOCIETY VS. FOP ETC. 3045-11SHARIF BOARD MILLS (AOP) VS. FOP. ETC. 3887-11AS IF BROTHERS LAHORE VS. FBR ETC. 5099-11IFTIKHAR HUSSAIN VS. CHAIRMAN INLAND REVENUE ETC. 4916-11M/S. JANJUA BROTHERS VS. FOP ETC. 7321-11M/S. TAKBEER TRAVELS VS. FOP ETC. 4083-11M/S. PAK SUPER TEXTILE MILLS VS. FOP ETC. 7453-11M/S. HAMZA PLASTIC INDUSTRIES VS. FOP ETC. 5916-11M/S. MULTI WORKS LAHORE VS. FOP 4400-11IIAMID KIIALIL ETC. VS. COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ETC. 7474-11M/S. YASIR IKRAM TEXTILE INDUSTRIES VS. FOP ETC. 5303-11M/S. AKBARI SUPER STORE VS. FOP ETC. 10990-11M/S. G.P. PVT. LTD. VS. COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ETC. 5029-11M/S. SIIAKARGARII BRICKS CO. VS. COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ETC. 11281-10RAHIM BAKHSH VS. FOP 6822-11M/S. HAQ BROTHERS VS. FOP ETC. 2659-11M/S. REET BANQUET HALL VS. FBR 10005- 10ITTEHAD SUGAR MILLS VS. CIR 571-11MUHAMMAD IQBAL MALIK VS. FOP.
11466-10PAK ELEKTRON LTD. VS. FOP 26214- 10STAR INDUSTRIES VS. FOP 11282-10MUHAMMAD ASHRAF VS. FOP 14575- 10DR. FAR000 SAEED VS. FOP 11867-11M/S. IRFAN INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD. VS. FBR ETC. 583-11SIKAANDAR ALl VS. FOP.
27026- 10SUPER ASIA MUHAMMAD DINS SONS PVT LTD. VS. COMMISSIONER 18879- 10UBC CONVERTEC PVT LTD VS. FOP 10137-11M/S. FIVE STAR TEXTILE IND. VS. FBR ETC. 10907-11M/S. SAHAR COLLECTION VS. FOP ETC. 11902-11M/S. K.S.F. PLASTIC INDUSTRY PVT. LTD. VS. FOP ETC. 3674-11HAMID BRICKS COMPANY VS. CIR 11199-10EDEN HOUSING LTD. VS. FOP 1734-11MIRZA ABDUL GHAFOOR VS. FOP 26372- 10SHERANWALA STATE AND BUILDERS VS. FOP 7014-11LADY DR. SAMINA NASIR VS. FOP ETC. 2822-11SH. MAHMOOD UL HASSAN VS. FOP ETC. 4508-11AWAN SPORTS INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD. VS. FOP ETC. 4647-11MUHAMMAD IMRAN BUTT VS. FOP ETC. 846-11MUHAMMAD QASIM VS. FOP.
2821-11MUHAMMAD GOHAR SALMAN VS. FOP ETC. 2661-11M/S.CHENAB BOARD INDUSTRIES VS. FOP 2498-11MUHAMMAD AFZAL VS. COMMISSIONER 20537- 10MUHAMMAD IKRAM VS. FOP 10351-11AHMAD USMAN AMIN VS. COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ETC. 2161-11BABBA SPINNINGS VS. FOP.
357-11NOOR AHMAD VS. FOP ETC. 23381- 10TAHIR WAZIR VS. FOP 12071-11M/S. LUCKY COLD STORAGE VS. FOP ETC. 733-11M/S. LEARNING ALLIANCE LTD. VS. FOP. ETC. 23382- 10KHALID WAZIR VS. FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN 12196-10KHALID MEHMOOD VS. FOP 9635-10M/S. S.H. BROTHER FLOUR MILLS VS. CIR 4177-11MIAN ARIF MEHMOOD VS. COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ETC. 24926- 10CHAWLA FOOTWEAR VS. FOP.
2635-11M/S. MULTI PAK PRINTING PRESS VS. FOP 26277- 10JAVED WORSTED SPINNING MILLS VS. FOP 5069-11M/S. KHAN BHATTA KHUSHI VS. COMMISSIONER INLAND REVNUE ETC. 10880- 10CH. SHAUKAT ALI VS. FOP 12686- 10IKAN ENGINEERING SERVICES VS. FOP 19757- 10NISHAT CHUNIAN LTD VS. FOP 24643- 10CRESCENT FIBRES LTD VS. COMMISSIONER 5070-11M/S. RAHAT BRICKS CO. VS. COMMISSIONER INLAND REVNUE ETC. 332-11M/S. FARAZ FOODS (PVT) LTD. VS. FOP. ETC. 4917-11M/S. JANJUA PLASTIC INDUSTRY VS. FOP ETC. 3980-11M/S. KM STEEL MILLS VS. FOP 9942-11M/S. SARGODHA FOOD PRODUCTS VS. FOP ETC. 9700-11M/S. EDUCATORS VS. FOP ETC. 9965-11LAHORE GRAMMAR SCHOOL VS. FOP ETC. 11829-10RANA MUHAMMAD SHAHZAD VS. FOP 10034- 10KOT ADDU POWER COMPANY LTD VS. FOP.
976-11MALIK USMAN STEEL FURNACE VS. FOP.
6482-11QASAR-E-NOOR GARRISON BANQUET HALL VS. FOP ETC. 6418-11HABIB RUBBANI VS. FOP ETC. 6419-11ALI IMRAN VS. FOP ETC. 9582-11M/S. RANJHA KINNO FACTORY VS. FOP ETC. 1418-11LORDS HOTEL & RESTURENT VS. COMMISSIONER 7193-11M/S. W.W. TEXTILES VS. FOP ETC. 7534-11DR. NADEEM HAYAT MALIK VS. FOP ETC. 8977-11MALIK NAEEM ASLAM AWAN VS. FOP ETC. 9005-11MIAN WALI FLOUR MILLS PVT. LTD. VS. FOP ETC. 9201-11M/S. HARRIS SILICONES & GLASS PVT. LTD. VS. FOP ETC. 9322-11THE EDUCATORS VS. FOP ETC. 9522-11GHAYOOR ENTERPRISES VS. FOP ETC. 9574-11ARIF MEHMOOD UPPAL VS. FOP ETC. 9186-10BUNNIES LTD. VS. CIR.
9130-10M/S. KARACHI FLOUR MILLS VS. FOP 14576- 10MODERNO FABRICS VS. FOP 9634-11M/S. INDUS SUGAR MILLS VS. FOP ETC. 9651-11SH. ZAFAR ULLAH VS. FOP ETC. 4509-11MEHRAN HOTAL SIALKOT VS. FOP ETC. 12003- 10YOUSAF BAIG VS. FOP 13983- 10ALLENORA BEAUTY PARLOUR VS. FOP 13922-10MIRZA YOUNAS & COMPANY VS. COMMISSIONER 7681-11M/S. AQEEL INDUSTRY VS. FOP ETC. 3254-11NAUM TEX FAISALABAD VS. FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE ETC. 27012- 10ANMOL PLASTIC INDUSTRIES VS. FOP.
3257-11NAWAZ AHMED VS. FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE ETC. 3256-11G.M. SONS FAISALABAD VS. FEDERAL BORAD OF REVENUE ETC. 25494- 10METALINE INDUSTRIES PVT LTD VS. FOP.
1399-11SUKH CHAN WELLNESS CLUB PVT. LTD VS. CIR.
13845-11M/S. AL MIRAJ BAKERS VS. FOP ETC. 13632-11M/S. CIVIL METAL WORKS VS. FOP ETC. 13871-11M/S. FINE ART PRESS VS. FBR ETC. 13995-11M/S. SHEIKH ABDULLAH & SONS VS. FOP ETC. 14312-11M/S. INTERNATIONAL VS. FBR ETC. 14313-11M/S. SUPER INDUS ELECTRICAL INDUSTRIES VS. FBR ETC. 14377-11TALIB BROTHERS ENGINEERING WORKS VS. FOP ETC. 14570-11M/S. PURI TEXTILES VS. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN ETC. 14387-11M/S. TEXTILE PACKERS VS. FOP ETC. 13197-11M/S. UNIQUE EMBROIDERY VS. FOP ETC. 13172-11M/S. SAUDAGAR THERMOPOLE VS. FOP ETC. 13631-11DOLLAR EAST EXCHANGE CO. VS. FOP ETC. 13339-11M/S. ASIA RICE MILLS VS. FOP ETC. 13466-11M/S. NASIR MEAT & TIKKA VS. FOP ETC. 13456-11M/S. GHOUSIA TEXTILE WEAVING VS. FBR ETC. 13343-11M/S. KHIZAR HOSPITAL VS. FOP ETC. 13249-11MURAD AMIN VS. COMMISSIONER IR ETC. 12661-11M/S. ADIL ZAFAR MOTORS VS. FOP ETC. 4507-11M/S. HASSAN FABRICS VS. FOP ETC. 17386-10SHAFIQUE SUPREME RICE VS. COMMISSIONER IR ETC. 3774-10M/S. AMIN METAL INDUSTRIES VS. FOP ETC. 732-11MUHAMMAD RAFIQ TAHIR VS. FOP 11245-11KASHIF MEHMOOD VS. FOP ETC. 4195-11M/S. ALFAJAR CLOTH HOUSE VS. FBR ETC. 13518-11M/S. SCIENCE LOCUS SCHOOL VS. FOP ETC. 13558-11M/S. PRINCE TRADERS RICE DEALER VS. FOP ETC. 12796-11M/S. NASEEM PACKAGES VS. FOP ETC. 12822-11UNITED LUBRICANTS PVT. LTD. VS. FOP ETC. 13046-11M/S. FINE PACK VS. FOP ETC. 296,13094-11NEW KHAN COMMISSION SHOP VS. FOP ETC. 12712-11M/S. IG WOOLEN MILLS VS. FOP ETC. 12713-11M/S. RH ROPE INDUSTRIES VS. FOP ETC. 12728-11M/S. MM KNITWEAR PVT LED. VS. FOP ETC. 26525- 10M/S. YASIN INDUSTRIES VS. FOP ETC. 11959-11M/S. SPRING FIELD PUBLIC SCHOOL VS. FOP ETC. 12015-11M/S. BASHIR JALIL ENTERPRISES VS. FOP ETC. 12326-11M/S. MINHAS SERVICES STATION VS. FOP ETC. 12531-11M/S. NEW ASIA WOOLEN MILLS VS. FOP ETC. 12532-11M/S. MADNI DYING & PRINTING MILLS VS. FOP ETC. 13473-10M/S. ESSEM HOTELS PVT. LTD. VS. FOP 25881- 20M/S. AUTOMATE PAKISTAN VS. FOP 12755-11KHUSHI MUHAMMAD COMMISSION SHOP VS. FOP 13972-11M/S. ANMOL STEEL MILLS VS. FOP 12564-11M/S. DYNASEL LTD. VS. FOP 12751-11KHUSHI MUHAMMAD COMMISSION SHOP VS. FOP