MUHAMMAD QASIM KHAN, J.---Briefly the facts of the case are that while serving as Member Technical PTCL, proceedings under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 (hereinafter to be called as "NAB, Ordinance") were initiated against him, which culminated into filing of a Reference before the Judge, Accountability Court No,II Rawalpindi/Islamabad (to be referred as "NAB Court") and as shall be seen from the order dated 17.03.2003 the petitioner opted for plea bargain under section 25(b) of NAB Ordinance, which was allowed by the NAB Court and consequently, per force of Section 25(b) read with Section 15 of the Ordinance, ibid, the petitioner was disqualified from holding the public office w,e,f, 17.03.2003 by an order dated 24.03.2005. By avoiding unnecessary details of litigation, it is to be mentioned here that lastly the petitioner filed Writ Petition No,27001/2011 which was allowed by this Court vide judgment dated 18.12.2012 in the terms that the appellate authority/The President of Pakistan was directed to decide the petitioner's representation and the President of Pakistan vide order dated 31.12.2014 dismissed petitioner's representation, hence, this writ petition.
2. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that from the record it is visible that vide order dated 24.03.2015 the petitioner was dismissed from back date i,e, 17.03.2013, whereas, no adverse order could be passed with retrospective effect. Further argued that the petitioner has also been treated discriminately as compared to other two employees namely Khalid Mehmood and Bashir Hussain. The learned counsel while touching the maintainability of this writ petition contended that although subsequently the PTCL was made a company but as earlier the petitioner had served under statutory rules, therefore, in the light of case "Masood Ahmad Bhatti and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, M/O Information Technology and Telecommunication and others"
(2012 SCM R 152), the writ petition is competent against the impugned orders. Lastly prayed that while setting-aside the orders dated 24.03.2005 and 31.12.2014, the order of dismissal from service be converted into an order for compulsory retirement from service.
3. On the other hand, the learned law officer assisted by learned counsel for the respondent department argued that as earlier the petitioner was employed in Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation which was converted into Company having the control over its affairs and also with respect to service of its employees, hence, no writ petition against a company is competent.
Further argued that un section 25 read with section 15 of N Ordinance, after entering into plea bargain the petitioner earned the status of a convict employee, and at the moment plea bargain was accepted, forthwith he ceased to hold public office, as such, no illegality has been committed in the order dated 24.03.2005 whereby the petitioner was dismissed from service w,e,f, 17.03.2003, date of acceptance of his plea bargain. While touching the ground of discrimination it was argued that two wrongs cannot make a right. Lastly, argued although the order passed by the President of Pakistan is not binding on the company but even then in the impugned order each and every aspect has been discussed and the instant writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
4. I have heard the arguments of learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and perused the entire relevant record.
5. So far as the question of maintainability of instant writ petition is concerned, while deducing analogy from the case "Masood Ahmad Bhatti and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, M/O Information Technology and Telecommunication and others" (2012 SCM R 152) it becomes clear that earlier the petitioner was employee of Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation having statutory rules, later-on converted into Company but service of the petitioner still will be governed under the statutory rules, therefore, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the cited case, the instant writ petition is held to be fully competent and maintainable before this court.
6.It is admitted position between the parties that proceedings under NAB, Ordinance were initiated against the petitioner a Reference before the NAB Court was submitted and on 17.03.2003 the petitioner opted for plea bargain under section 25(b) read with section 15(a) of NAB Ordinance, which was allowed. For ready reference sections 15(a) and 25(b) of the NAB Ordinance, are reproduced hereunder:--
15. (a) Where an accused person is convicted of [an offence under section 9 of this Ordinance] he shall forthwith cease to hold public office, if any, held by him and further he shall stand disqualified for a period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date he is released after serving the sentence, for seeking or from being elected, chosen, appointed or nominated as a member or representative of any public body or any statutory or local authority or in service of Pakistan or of any Province; Provided that any accused person who has availed the benefit of [subsection (b) of section] 25 shall also be deemed to have been convicted for an offence under this Ordinance, and shall forthwith cease to hold public office, if any, held by him and further he shall stand disqualified for a period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date he has discharged his liabilities relating to the matter or transaction in issue, for seeking or from being elected, chosen, appointed or nominated as a member or representative of any public body or any statutory or local authority or in service of Pakistan or of any Province,
(b) Any person convicted of an offence [under section 9 of this Ordinance] shall not be allowed to apply for or be granted or allowed any financial facilities in the form of any loan or advances [or other financial accommodation by] any bank or financial institution [owned or controlled by the Government] for a period of 10 years from the date of conviction.
Section 25(b):- "(b) Where at any time after the authorization of investigation, before or after the commencement of the trial or during the pendency of an appeal, the accused offers to return to the NAB the assets or gains acquired or made by him in the course, or as a consequence, of any offence under this Ordinance, the Chairman, NAB, may, in his discretion, after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, accept the offer on such terms and conditions as he may consider necessary, and if the accused agrees to return to the NAB the amount determined by the Chairman, NAB, the Chairman, NAB shall refer the case for the approval of the Court, or as the case may be, the Appellate Court and for the release of the accused."
This court is aware of the fact that provincial and federal public servants when are proceeded under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 or Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974 and convicted they are not automatically dismissed or removed from service by virtue of their conviction and the authority i,e, the departmental authority has to proceed separately under the relevant laws and pass an independent order but the special enactment i,e, NAB Ordinance which provides for effective measures and speedy disposal of cases involving corruption, corrupt practices, misuse or abuse of power or authority and misappropriation of property, provides somewhat different mechanism i,e, when an accused enters into plea bargain during investigation or the trial, by bare reading of Section 25(b) read with Section 15 of the NAB Ordinance, is clear that the legislators have taken note of such eventuality and perhaps considering the seriousness of the charge towards the society as a whole, they not only inserted section 15 in the NAB Ordinance but also used the word "forthwith" in the said provision, it means that sooner/at the moment when plea bargain is opted by an accused and approved by the court, he at once/ immediately/without any further delay ceases to hold the public office.
7. Here in this case, admittedly the plea bargain opted by the petitioner concluded on 17.03.2013, therefore, for all practical purposes the petitioner ceased to remain on job. However, every department is expected to maintain, manage and update the service records of its employees, for various internal purposes like audit, assessment of working strength, creation of new posts, etc. Therefore, despite the fact that petitioner ceased to hold the office on 17.03.2003, the respondent department in order to update its records for departmental intricacies, took up the matter of the petitioner and purely on the basis of his conviction by the NAB, vide Inter Office Memo dated 24.03.2005 the petitioner was dismissed from service w,e,f, 17.03.2003 (the date of conviction by the NAB). The order dated 24.03.2005 though for departmental purposes, yet the same in fact is implementation of specific provision (Section 15) of the NAB Ordinance. In this respect para-5 of the order passed by NAB court against the petitioner is relevant and the same is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:-- "Khalid Habib shall deemed to be convicted under section 9 of the NAB Ordinance and he shall forth with cease to hold public office, i f any, held by him and further he shall stand disqualified for a period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date he has discharged his liabilities relating to the matter or transaction. In issue, for seeking form being elected, chose, appointed or nominated as a member or representative of any public body or any statutory or local authority in the service of Pakistan or any of the Province Reference to the extent of Khalid Habib accused be filed." In the light of above reproduced paragraph, the contention that the order dated 24.03.2005 amounts to passing of an order with retrospective effect, is not well founded. In this respect the case "Muhammad Aslam, Ex-Deputy Director (Audit) District Govt. Lahore Region, Lahore v.
Auditor-General of Pakistan, Islamabad" (2013 SCM R 1904) is referred, wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan held that:-- "The law has provided the penalty in the nature of disqualification on entering to plea bargain. It is not in dispute that the plea bargain as entered into and accepted by the Chairman. NAB and the NAB Court accorded approval in terms of section 26(b) of the Ordinance and ordered release of the appellant. As a consequence of the approval, it entails the penalty in terms of proviso to subsection (a) of section 15 of the Ordinance, by which the appellant stood disqualified."
8. As regards the question of discrimination, although the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan jealously safeguards the citizens from any sort of discrimination but whether any illegal act or order by an authority could be made a ground for another legal act/order. I have given my anxious consideration to this aspect, but feel that as the order/act of any subordinate authority is not precedent and has not binding effect on the courts to be, followed and for considering any case whether discrimination has been meted out or not, the courts have to see:-- i) if the order has been passed by the Supreme Court or the High Court on a principle of law, that must be followed and no other person should be discriminated; ii) However, when an order is passed by an executive authority then the court while issuing a writ on the ground of discrimination must consider whether such order has been passed fairly, impartially, in a transparent manner and strictly within the parameters of law. If the order does not stand to the above touchstone, then such order could not be weighed to issue writ on the ground of discrimination alone.
In this respect the case "PRTC v. Mahmood Ahmad" (2007 PLC 196) is referred, wherein, it has been held that two wrongs do not make a right. Furthermore; the Indian Supreme Court in the case "Chandigarh Administration v. Jagit Singh and another" (AIR 1995 Supreme Court 705) held that:-- "8. We are of the opinion that the basis or the principle, if it can be called one, on which the writ petition has been allowed by the High Court, is unsustainable in law and indefensible in principle.
Since we have come across many such instances, we think it necessary to deal with such pleas at a little length. Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent- authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order.
The extra-ordinary and discretionary, power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent-authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to law- indeed, wherever it is possible, the court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law, but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent authority to repeat the illegality, the court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis of a legitimate complaintof discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interest of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest."
9. For what has been discussed above, I do not see any merit in this writ petition and the same is dismissed.