NASIR A. ZAHID, J.-This Second Rent Appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution by order dated 23- 9-1979 of this Court, as neither the appellants nor their counsel were present on that date, of hearing. C. M. A. No., 2108/79 is an application under Order XLI, rule 19 and section 151. . P. C. Read with section 13 of the 1959 Ordinance, filed by the appellants/occupants praying. Drat 0f:~ order of dismissal of appeal for non-prosecution dated 23-9-1979 may be set aside and the appeal readmitted to be decided on merits. This application was filed on 20-11-1979 i.e. After the expiry of 30 days of the order dismissing the appeal. Office had raised objection regarding this application not being filed within time prescribed by the Limitation Act to which the learned counsel for the appellants replied that the appellants came to know about the dismissal of this appeal on 18-11- 1979, and, therefore, the period of limitation for filing the application commenced from 18-11-1979 and as such this application was not barred by the law of limitation. In any case the appellants filed C. M. A. 409/80 on 2-2-1980 under section 5 of the Limitation Act, seeking condonation of the delay in filing C. M. A. 2108/79.
2. This Second Rent Appeal was filed by the two appellants, who are the occupants, under section 15(4) of the repealed Rent Ordinance of 1959. The appeal was admitted for regular hearing on 13-6- 1974 and interim stay was granted to the appellants; which stay was confirmed by order dated 29- 10-1974. Thereafter this appeal was fixed for regular hearing for the first time on 23-9-1979, on which date, as observed earlier, the appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution. The affidavits in support of C. M. A. 2108/79 have been filed by learned counsel for the appellants himself, and the ground taken for non-appearance on 23-9-1979 is that the learned counsel for the appellants, on account of bona fide error, had missed the case in the cause list. I have heard Mr. Dewan Bashir Ahmed, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. Sayed inayat Ali, learned counsel for the respondent, on these applications. Mr. Inayat Ali was very fair in stating that he was not challenging the application on merits but contended that application (C. M. A. 2108/79) was barred by limitation as it had been filed beyond 30 days. According to Mr. Inayat Ali Advocate, Article 168 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act is the relevant Article applicable in this case which provides for 30 days as the period of limitation for filing an application for the readmission of an appeal dismissed for want of prosecution with the time beginning to run from the date of dismissal. On the other hand the contention of Mr. Dewan Bashir Ahmed was that the date from which the period begins to run should betaken as the date on which the appellants came to know about the dismissal of the appeal, which in the present case was 18-11-19,'9. It was accordingly urged that C. M. A. 2108 of 1979 having been filed on 20-11-1979, the same was well within time: In the alternative it was urged by learned counsel for the appellant that the present application had also been filed under section 151, C. P. C. Under which section, according to learned counsel, the Court has ample inherent powers to entertain such applications even in cases where these are filed beyond 30 days of date of dismissal of appeals for _ non-prosecution.
3. The general principle of law is that where a specific period of limitation is provided by the Limitation Law, inherent powers are not available to the Court under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to entertain an application beyond the prescribed period of limitation. However, this is not an absolute rule and there might be situations where the Court may exercise powers under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to entertain an application even after the expiry of the period of limitation but such inherent powers are exercised with great caution. An order which is a nullity may be challenged by the affected party even after the period of limitation. I may here refer to a passage from the judgment in the case of Mahmud Alam v. Mehdi Hussain (PLD 1970 Lab. 26).
"There are many other decisions and we find sufficient authority in support of the proposition that an act or an order which is a nullity, has simply to be ignored and proceedings need not be initiated to get it annulled. 1n case, however, the order or action which is a nullity is to be enforced against the person affected by it, that person at that time will be entitled to challenge the same on the basis of it being a nullity. - In such circumstances, the cause of action, in so far as that' person is concerned, will arise only. When the attempt is made to enforce such an action or order against him, and therefore, there will be no question of limitation involved, in the sense, that the date of order, which is a nullity, for the purpose of start of limitation, will become insignificant."
If, therefore, an order is a nullity, the Court will not be powerless to grant relief against such an order on account of any provision of the limitation law. Further the Court will not hesitate in entertaining an application under section 151, C. P. C. And exercising its inherent powers in respect of an order for which the fault lies with the Court itself although the period prescribed under the limitation law for challenging such an order may have expired. I may also with advantage refer to a passage at page 950 of a judgment of a learned single Judge of the Lahore High Court in a case of Fehmida Khatoon v. Additional Deputy Commissioner (PLD 1975 Lab. 942).
The impugned judgment were announced on 2-2-1972 while the review applications in all the four writ petitions have been filed on 6-11-1972. It is in the affidavit of the applicant filed alongwith his applications under section 5 of the Limitation Act that he came to know about the judgments under review on 30---9-1972, when he applied for the supply of certified copies therefore, which were made available to him on 4-10-1972. According to him, he spent a month thereafter in inspecting the relevant records, getting necessary certified copies thereof and preparing the case. The circumstances as explained in the application warrant condonation of the delay in filing the review applications. Even otherwise, according to law an application barred by limitation can be treated as one under section 151, C. P. C. If the Court is satisfied that there has been a flagrant abuse of its own process and removal of an apparent injustice done to the applicant is necessary. Reference in this respect can be made to Kawdu v. - Berar Ginning Company Ltd. (AIR 1929 Nag. 185). In that case the order was obtained in the absence of a person, named Narayan, whose presence was otherwise necessary for the adjudication of the question involved. When Narayan came to know about the order he made an application for review of the same. His application being timed-barred was held to be otherwise liable to be treated as an application under section 151, C. P. C. For removing the apparent injustice done to him on account of his non-impleading as party in the case."
4. The above exceptions to the general principle of law that inherent powers under section 151, C. P.
C. Are not available to a Court after the expiry of the specified period of limitation, are not the only exceptions and there can be other situations where grave injustice might be done to a party, who is not at fault, if powers under section 151, C. P. C. Are not exercised. In my view the present is such a case where in spite of the expiry of the limitation period prescribed by Article 168 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, powers under section 151, C. P. C. Are available to the Court to entertain the application for recalling the order dated 23-9-1979, dismissing this appeal for non- prosecution. In this case, as observed earlier, learned counsel for the respondent did not challenge the application (C. M. A. 2108~ 79) on merits. In the circumstances, I would take the facts as what are stated in the affidavits of learned counsel for the appellants in support of the application. The factual position, therefore, that is to be accepted is the learned counsel for the appellants missed this case in the cause list and did not notice the same and it is for this reason that he could not appear on 23-9-1979: Secondly it is to be accepted that the appellants and their counsel came to know on 18-11-1979 for the first time that this appeal had been dismissed and C. M. A. 2108/79 was filed in this Court without any delay i.e. On 20-11-1979. I have already observed that prior to 23-9- 1979 the last order had been passed in this case on 29-10-1974 when the interim stay was confirmed. It, therefore, follows that after nearly 5 years this appeal was fixed for regular hearing for the first time on 23-9-1979. The appellants and/or their learned counsel may have inquired during this period from the office of this Court about the fixation of this appeal for regular hearing and they must have been informed that its number had not yet reached. Further the fault lay on the counsel for the appellants only and not on the appellants. In the affidavits in support of the application, learned counsel for the appellants has admitted that he had missed the case in the cause list. No fault, therefore, lay on the appellants for the dismissal of this appeal for non- prosecution. On account of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, a great injustice will be done to the appellants, who are not at fault, if the present application is not entertained and the same is dismissed on account of having been filed beyond the period of limitation. - As noted earlier, within 2 days of coming to know of the dismissal of the appeal, the present application was moved in this Court. In my view it is a fit case for exercise of powers under section 151, C. P. C.
5. C. M. A. 2108/79 is accordingly treated as an application under section 151, C. P. C. And I hold the same to be competent. As learned counsel for the respondent has not challenged the application on merits and had only resisted the same on the question of limitation, C. M. A. 2108/79 is allowed and the order dated 23-9-1979 dismissing this appeal for non. Prosecution is recalled and the appeal is re-admitted. - Order dated 29-11-1974 as a consequence stands revived. C. M. A. 409/80 has become infructuous and is dismissed as such., There will be no order as to costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.