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PLD 1982 Lahore 163

MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN vs REGISTRAR OF DISTRICT GUJRANWALA AND 2 Other

CitationPLD 1982 Lahore 163
CourtLahore High Court
Case No.Writ Petition No. 4922 of 1981
Date1981-11-28
Judge(s)Muhammad Ilyas
ResultPetition dismissed

ORDER

The dispute involved in this case relates to a shop. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3, Muhammad Sharif and another, hereinafter referred to as the respondents, claimed to have purchased the shop from the petitioner, Muhammad Hussain, by means of a sale-deed. The petitioner, however, did not have the sale-deed registered whereupon the respondents made an application, under section 73 of the Registration Act, 1908, hereinafter referred to as the said Act, for compulsory registration of the sale-deed. By his order, dated the 29th August, 1981, the Registrar ordered compulsory registration of the sale-deed and that order has been challenged by the petitioner by invoking Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.

2. It was pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner that one Salimullah also claimed to have purchased the shop in dispute from the petitioner. According to him, Salimullah had filed a suit seeking declaration of his ownership of the said shop but his suit had been dismissed. I was also informed by the learned counsel that the petitioner too had brought a suit for cancellation of the sale-deed in question (which was registered in pursuance of the impugned order) and his suit is pending decision with a civil Court. Another suit relating to the shop in dispute is said to have been instituted by Khalid and others. Their plea is that the shop was jointly owned by them and the petitioner and, therefore, the petitioner alone could not sell the same. The suit of Khalid and others has also not been decided as yet.

3. Assailing the order of compulsory registration of the sale-deed in question it was contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that before ordering its registration, the Registrar had obtained an inquiry report from the Additional Deputy Commissioner. According to the learned counsel, under section 74 of the said Act, the inquiry was to be held by the Registrar himself and, therefore, he could not delegate his powers to the Additional Deputy Commissioner.- He cited Mala Dayal v.

Queen Empress (1897) 1 L R 24 Cal. 755, to support his contention.

4. I have gone through the impugned order which has made by Mr. Yousaf Kamal as Registrar under the said Act. His predecessor was Mr. Salim Akbtar Rana. It was Mr. Rana who bad asked the Additional Deputy Commissioner to hold inquiry. His order in this behalf was, however, not approved of by Mr. Yousaf Kamal who has made the order under challenge. He had reproduced- the finding of the Additional Deputy Commissioner in the order under review for the sake of reference and had not blindly endorsed his conclusion. The Registrar had himself held inquiry before making the order in question. Therefore, the inquiry conducted by the Additional Deputy Commissioner in pursuance of the order made by his predecessor is of little consequence.

5. The next point canvassed by the learned counsel was that initiall3 the respondent's application under section 73 of the said Act was dismisses by the then Registrar, Mr. Salim Akhtar Rana, but subsequently the said application was allowed by his successor, Mr. Yousaf Kamal, by means of the impugned order. According to the learned counsel, while making that order Mr. Yousaf Kamal had reviewed the order passed by his predecessor although there was no power of review vesting in the Registrar. In his opinion, therefore, the order of Mr. Yousaf Kamal was without jurisdiction. He cited Abdul Hakim v. Latifunnessa Khatun (1903) 1 L R 30 Cal. 532, to substantiate his argument.

6. A perusal of order made by Mr. Salim Akhtar Rana shows that he had not finally disposed of the application under section 73 of the said Act. He had simply consigned the application, for the time being, with a view to awaiting the result of civil suit brought by Salim Ullah. On an application for temporary injunction made in that suit, it was ordered by the civil Court that there was no bar to the making of any order by the authorities under the said Act. It was in view of that order in the civil suit that the respondents again moved the Registrar to order compulsory registration of the sale- deed and then, after holding necessary inquiry, the Registrar bad ordered accordingly.

7. The argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner was that there was no bar to the making of the impugned order after disposal of the suit filed by Salim Ullah but during the pendency of that suit, the Registrar could not order compulsory registration of the sale-deed. By raising this plea it was impliedly conceded by the learned counsel that despite the order made by Mr. Salim Akhtar Rana, his successor could order compulsory registration of the sale deed after the disposal of the suit. In other words, according to the learned counsel also, the order made by Mr. Salim Akhtar Rana was of interim nature which was to be followed by a final order. In this view of the matter, the order made by Mr. Yusaf Kamal does not involve review of the order of his predecessor.

8. As for the aforesaid case of Abdul Hakirn, cited by learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his plea that the Registrar had no power of review, it has not been clearly laid down in that case that the Registrar cannot review his order dismissing an application for compulsory registration of a document. Even if it is assumed that such a view was taken in the case under report, it is distinguishable on facts inasmuch as the order made in that case was a final order and not an interim order like the one involved in the present case. Abdul Hakim's case is, therefore, of no help to the petitioner.

9. Another reason for which I am not inclined to entertain this constitutional petition is that the petitioner does not deny his signature on the sale-deed in question but has assailed the-same on the grounds of fraud, etc. He has already filed a suit for cancellation of the sale-deed on these grounds. There is, therefore, hardly any need for his invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court because the relief claimed by him herein can allowed to him in the suit brought by him.

10. Resultantly, this writ petition fails. This dismissed in l1mine.

Cited by 2 cases

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