This revision calls in question order dated 15th May, 1978, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Gujrat.
2. Briefly stated, the facts are that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 ins--tituted a suit in the Court of the learned Civil Judge First Class, Gujrat for a declaration that they were the owners in possession to the extent of 7/8 share of the suit land as heirs of the last full owner who was their brother. It was asserted that Sardara who was governed by custom in matters of inheritance died issueless in 1932 and on his death the plaintiffs-respondents and their mother Mst. Rabia Bibi inherited the estate but Mst. Rabia Bibi got the total estate mutated in favour of the plaintiffs vide mutation No. 1614 sanctioned on 21st August, 1932. This mutation was challenged by Fazal Din the predecessor-in- interest of the petitioners through a suit to protect his reversionary rights. The suit was decreed and on appeal filed by Mst. Rabia Bibi on behalf of the respondents the matter was compromised whereunder the suit land was to remain in the name of Mst. Rabia Bibi till her death or re-marriage and on her death Fazal Din was held entitled to only 3/4 of the suit property and the remaining 1/4 was to go to the present respondents plaintiffs. Mst. Rabia Bibi died in 1976 whereupon the petitioners got mutation No. 5909 sanctioned on 16th March, 1976 as per the above. Mentioned compromise decree. This mutation was challenged by the respondents-plaintiffs before the Collector and having failed therein they instituted the suit out of which this revision has arisen.
The respondents-plaintiffs further averred that the life estate of Ust. Rabia Bibi their mother terminated on 31st December, 1962, with the enforcement of Muslim Personal Law (Shariat)
Application Act, 1962 and that in accordance with the provisions of the said Act the property reverted to the last male full owner and through him to his legal heirs. The respondents-plaintiffs claimed share as already stated above.
3. Alongwith the suit, an application for temporary injunction was made by the respondents- plaintiffs seeking protection of their possession of the suit land.
4. This application was resisted by the petitioners. In the Reply, or for that matter, in the Written Statement the petitioner, did not specifically assert that they had actual physical possession of any portion of the suit land except a bare denial of the averments in the plaint as regards possession of the suit property. The learned trial Court appointed a Commission as well to ascertain the actual state of possession of the property in dispute. The learned trial Court, accepting the application of the respondents-plaintiffs by its order dated 20th January, 1977 held that they had a prima facie arguable case, that non-issuing of a temporary injunction would result in irreparable loss to them, and that the balance of convenience also lay in their favour.
5. Against the afore mentioned order of the learned trial Court dated 20th January, 1977, the petitioners went up in appeal to the learned Additional District Judge, Gujrat, who by his order dated 15th March, 1978, concurred in the findings of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. Hence the present revision.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the peti--tioners were in possession of a part of the suit land after sanctioning of mutation in their favour which possession was given to them through a Panchayat and was so found by the Local Commissioner. He further argued that the Courts below did not advert to the report of the Local Commissioner and based their finding of possession of the respondents only on the Revenue Record.
It was also urged that the respondents-plaintiffs had not objected to the report of the Local Commissioner in writing and consequently the Courts below should have given effect to the report of the Local Com--missioner and rejected the application for temporary injunction.
7. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the contesting respon--dents argued that the respondents have been in possession of the suit land as is established from the Revenue Record since 1932. He further argued that the actual physical possession of the respondents was never disturbed and the Courts below were justified in relying upon the Revenue Record in this regard.
It was next contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioners never asserted in their Written Statement or the Reply to the application for temporary injunction that they were in possession of any portion of the suit land and only as an afterthought asserted the same before the Local Commissioner appointed by the Court.
As regards the report of the Local Commissioner, the learned counsel submitted that the learned trial Court had discussed the same in detail and for reasons given preferred not to rely upon it. He also sub--mitted that objections were duly filed to the report of the Local Commissioner and it has been misstated on behalf of the petitioners that no objections were raised against the report Referring to section 2 of the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application Removal of Doubts)
Ordinance, 1972, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the effect of the compromise decree stood nullified by the aforesaid provision and that the Courts below had justifiably held that there was a prima facie arguable case existing in favour of the respondents.
8. Having given consideration to the controversy involved I am of the view that the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners have no force. The Revenue record, viz. Khasra-Girdawaris certified copies of which have been placed on record by the contesting respondents today abundantly show that the respondents had been in possession of the suit land throughout. The learned trial Court has in detail discussed the report of the Local Commissioner as is evident from para. 4 of its order dated 20th January, 1977. The reasons given for not adhering to the report are, prima facie, sound and I am of the view that no valid excep--tion could be raised against the said reasoning. The report has also been considered by the first appellate Court and it cannot be said that it was not adverted to.
It may also be observed here that the learned Additional District Judge has given a detailed reasoning for concurring in the conclusions of the learned trial Court as regards possession of the respondents over the land in dispute. I think the reasoning given is logical and could not be objected to on any ground whatsoever.
9. The other contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that the report not having been objected to by the contesting respondents should have been given effect being based on a factually incorrect plane in that it has been specifically asserted on behalf of the contesting respondents that objections were filed against the report which position has not been controverted in reply on behalf of the petitioners, obviously cannot be given any weight.
10. Apart altogether from the above position it may also be obser--ved that there was no objection raised on behalf of the petitioners as to the finding of the Court below regarding the existence of a prima facie arguable case of the contesting respondents.
11. Before me also, nothing has been urged in this respect. I am intentionally not touching any aspect of the case as regards the existence of a prima facie case lest it may touch the merits and the case being pending adjudication before the trial Court observations of whatever tentative nature those may be that may be made by this Court may prejudice either of the parties.
12. For the purposes of the present controversy suffice it to say that the three essential ingredients for grant of injunction were found to be existing conjunctively by the Courts below and they accordingly issued the temporary injunction. The discretion exercised by them, as pointed out above and which is also evident from the detailed speaking orders passed by both the Courts below has been judicially exercised and there appears no justification for interfering therewith by this Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It may be observed that by now it is well-- settled that the discretion exercised by the Courts below judicially is not open to question before this Court in its revisional jurisdiction.
13. In view of the foregoing discussion, I find no merit in this revision and accordingly dismiss the same with costs.