SHAHID MUBEEN, J.--- Through this constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 the petitioners have challenged the vires of letter dated 13.01.2017 passed by the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
2. Briefly stated the facts necessary for disposal of this petition are that the petitioners were appointed as Naib Qasid/Security Guards (BS-02) in the office of Administrator Jammu and Kashmir State Property and their services were regularized vide order dated 11.02.2016 issued by Section Officer (K-II), Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan. Through the impugned letter dated 13.01.2017 Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan withdrew the letter dated 11.02.2016. Hence, this petition.
3. Learned counsel for petitioners contends that the impugned letter dated 13.01.2017 is in complete negation of principle of natural justice as the same has been passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners.
4. On the other hand, learned Deputy Attorney General duly assisted by learned counsel for respondent No,2 submits that the writ petition suffers from laches as the impugned letter was issued on 13.01.2017 whereas the writ petition has been filed on 07.08.2017 after lapse of more than six months.
5. Heard. Record perused.
6. From the bare perusal of impugned letter dated 13.01.2017 it is manifestly clear that the same has been issued without hearing the petitioners. Therefore, the same is against the principle of natural justice. When the petitioners' services were regularized by the respondents/department then a vested right has been accrued to them that before passing any adverse order they must be heard.
Even otherwise the impugned letter has been issued without assigning any reason which is also violative of Section 24 of General Clauses Act, 1897. Reliance in this regard is placed on a case reported as Messrs Ahmed Clinic v. Government of Sindh and others (2003 CLC 1196) wherein it has been held that where impugned actions are completely without jurisdiction, mala fide, unlawful and passed in flagrant disregard of the law and principle of natural justice, the same amount to denial of justice. Therefore, it is not necessary to avail alternate remedies in such matters and the aggrieved party can invoke the constitutional jurisdiction.
7. It is well settled principle of law fundamental right cannot be denied, infringed or curtailed on the ground of laches. No Court could dismiss a lis on the ground of laches if it defeated the cause of justice and thereby perpetuated an injustice. Reliance in this regard is placed on a case reported as Umar Baz Khan through Lhrs. v. Syed Jehanzeb and others (PLD 2013 Supreme Court 268). Laches per se is not a bar to the constitutional jurisdiction and question of delay in filing would have to be examined with reference to the facts of each case. Reliance in this regard is placed on a case reported as Jawad Mir Muhammadi v. Haroon Mirza (PLD 2007 Supreme Court 472). The question of lathes in the writ petition is always considered in the light of the conduct of the person invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court and the degree of his negligence if any and that if by grant of relief being sought him no injustice is caused to the opposite party, the constitution petition should not be dismissed merely on the ground of lathes without examining the dictates of justice. Reliance in this regard is placed on a case reported as Farzand Raza Naqvi and 5 others v.
Muhammad Din through Legal Heirs and others (2004 SCM R 400).
8. Sequel to the above, this writ petition is allowed, the impugned letter dated 13.01.2017 is hereby set aside and the case is remanded to the competent authority who issued the impugned letter dated 13.01.2017 to decide the matter afresh after affording an opportunity of hearing to petitioners strictly in accordance with law through a well reasoned speaking order as early as possible preferably within a period of two months after receipt of certified copy of this order. No order as to costs.