CH. MUHAMMAD MASOOD JAHANGIR, J.---Undeniably, Riaz Ahmed, father of the petitioner was permanent Lumberdar of the concerned Mauza, after his demise on 14-04-2003, the post of Lumberdar stood vacant, seven candidates including petitioner as well as respondent No,2 applied for it. The Revenue field staff right from Patwari to Revenue Officer recommended the present petitioner being suitable out of the contestants, despite the fact that D.D.O.(R), in disagreement of the reports of his subordinates made commendation in favour of respondent No,2, the District Collector while concurring with the reports of field staff appointed the petitioner against the said vacancy through order dated 24.07.2004, which could not hold the field when his superior i,e, Executive District Officer (Revenue) preferred respondent No,2 over the petitioner for the job of Headman through the order dated 31-05-2005, but the apex Revenue Court/respondent No,1 on 16- 01-2006 while allowing ROR of the petitioner restored his appointment. Not only the writ petition of respondent No,2 was disallowed by this Court through order dated 06-03-2006, but leave to appeal was also refused to him by the august Supreme Court. Portentously, more than three years thereafter, on a review application filed by respondent No,2 the order of his predecessor-in-office, which was maintained upto the level of the apex Court, was recalled by respondent No,1 through the impugned order dated 14-12-2010 whereby the petitioner was removed and the post was awarded to respondent No,2, which has been attacked through the petition in hand.
2. After giving due consideration to the arguments of learned counsel for the parties and making probe of the record, before embarking upon merits of the case, it is noteworthy that while appointing permanent Lumberdar, the controversy of eligibility is to be decided according to law while taking into consideration all the requirements provided under Rule 17 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules, 1968, among other matters which have to be seen conjunctively, those are (i) the hereditary claim of the candidates; (ii) extent of property in the estate, (iii) services rendered to the Government by him or by his family; (iv) his personal influence, character, ability and freedom from indebtedness; (v) the strength and importance of the community from which selection of a headman is to be made and (vi) his ability to undergo training in Civil Defence in the case of headman in Tehsils situated along with the Border. It is purely an administrative post and after the dicta laid down by the apex Court in the judgment reported as Maqbool Ahmad Qureshi v. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan (PLD 1999 SC 484), the revenue authorities are bound to select the best among the candidates.
3. The District Collector, Member, Board of Revenue and even this Court through their comprehensive orders (mentioned in para-1) while considering the credentials of the applicants on the touchstone of Rule ibid considered the petitioner to be the best among all other contestants, the apex Court of the State also fell in agreement with their views, therefore, for all intents and purposes the appointment of the petitioner having attained finality, it became a past and closed chapter. There is no other cavil that a review petition can only be entertained when new and important grounds are advanced, which could not be brought on the record at the time of hearing at earlier stage or there was error apparent on face of record. Some illustrations may be given as to what have been taken to be erroneous apparent on the face of the record. An error, which does not require extraneous matter to show its incorrectness can be treated as being apparent. Such errors are not demonstrated by any process of close reasoning. Any erroneous view of law on a controversial matter, or a wrong exposition of law, or a wrong application of law, or failure to apply correct law has never been treated as a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. If the court applies its mind to a particular fact or law and then comes to a wrong conclusion after conscious reasoning, it can never be assumed that the error is one apparent on the face of record and can be corrected by means of a review. It cannot be converted into instrument of harassment of parties. The scope of review is quite limited which remedy cannot be invoked for reagitating entire case and this power cannot be exercised to undertake re-examination of matters of fact or re-exposition of law. It is only available in certain special circumstances as provided in Section 8 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957. The ground that the court has fallen into error in deciding a particular question, or that a new ground, which could have been urged at the original hearing, is not a ground for review as a review is not an appeal and cannot be allowed to be treated as an appeal. Even if any matter on having been disputed requires an elaborate inquiry for determination, the same cannot possibly be described as a patent fact justifying a review of an opinion already formed. The Member Board of Revenue without considering the scope and mandate of review as provided in section 8 of the Act ibid passed the impugned order, which to me is liable to be quashed on the following grounds: firstly that the petitioner was not given preference over respondent No,2 on the sole score of academic qualification rather he had been given an edge over the latter with distinction in hereditary claim, extent of property, personal influence, strength and importance of his tribe; secondly respondent No,2 during first round of litigation never agitated up to the level of the apex Court that petitioner had introduced a bogus certificate of his academic qualification and in subsequent phase he was neither competent to raise a new plea nor it could be considered by respondent No,1 while entertaining a review as the alleged certificate of Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education was issued subsequent to the orders in earlier round of litigation and as per settled principle, a review cannot be based on happening of subsequent event; thirdly the respondent No,1 apart from his alleged bogus matriculation certificate erred in law while considering the petitioner being absentee from the concerned revenue estate and concluding respondent No,2 being more influential and comparatively fit candidate through the impugned order, whereas these aspects had already been adjudged by this Court while deciding W.P.No,2005 of 2006 through order dated 06.03.2006, moreover the learned Member was not competent to reopen the facets of the case which had already been determined by his predecessor; fourthly, respondent No,1 entertained a badly time barred review application, which was also not accompanied by an application for condonation of delay. There is no cavil with the proposition that any order passed by a Court/Tribunal should be indicative of the fact that it was not only aware and conscious of the question of limitation and the same was to be dealt with diligence and application of mind prior to dilating upon and deciding the controversy on merit because disposal on merit alone would not mean to presume that the delay was condoned, but respondent No,1 through impugned order without attending to the pivotal issue of limitation erroneously passed the impugned order, above all; fifthly; how the learned Member could sit over the orders passed by this Court as well as the apex Court, which being precedent and law were not only to be honoured and respected rather binding upon him. If such a tendency is permitted, then neither the litigation will ever come to an end nor the orders of the superior Courts will have any command or authority. Sequel of the above discussion is that the impugned order being vice of grave and glaring illegality cannot be sustained, therefore, while allowing this writ petition same is declared to be unlawful having passed without legal authority and set aside.
4. Before parting with this judgment, this Court is constrained to observe that Mr. Rizwan Ullah Beg, Member, Board of Revenue was prima facie guilty of gross contempt of court, who in disregard of the orders dated 6-3-2006 and 19.04.2006 of the superior Courts passed the impugned order to review the earlier order dated 16.1.2006 of his predecessor in office in spite of that the same had attained finality, so he shall appear in person before this Court to show cause that why he should not be prosecuted under Article 204 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Notice be issued to him for 05-06-2017. Moreover, from the resume of above conclusion, it is observed that Mr. Rizwan Ullah Beg, Member, Board of Revenue either had no judicial wisdom or he while acting dishonestly passed the impugned order, which has caused grave miscarriage of justice and therefore, the Chief Secretary, Punjab is directed that if said officer is still in service, he should not be assigned judicial work in any capacity.
5. The Registrar of this Court is directed to transmit a copy of this order to the Chief Secretary, Government of the Punjab for further action.