1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLA14 J., Leave to appeal has been sought from order dated 12-9-1981 of the Lahore High Court whereby a writ petition, arising out of an order of ejectment (of the petitioner- tenant) on ground of reconstruction, was dismissed in hi,, ine.
2. The. Tenancy agreement between the petitioner and the respondent/landlord contained a covenant that in ca a the landlord reconstructs the premises in dispute, be would provide specified alternative accommodation to the petitioner. The learned Rent controller while allowing the respondent's application for eviction of the petitioner on ground of reconstruction imposed the said covenant a3 a condition for eviction. Both the parties filed appeals-the landlord against imposition of the condition and the tenant against the order of eviction. The learned District Court allowed the landlord's appeal and while removing the condition upheld the order of eviction of the petitioner. A writ petition was then filed in the High Court by the petitioner which having been dismissed by a learned Single Judge leave to appeal has been sought on the sole ground: that the appellate Court as also the learned Single Judge in the High Court took a wrong view of law in coming to the conclusion, that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to make the order of eviction on ground of reconstruction, conditional on the landlord providing alternative accommodation to the petitioner even prior to the demolition and reconstruction of the property.
3. Learned counsel has contended that the preamble to the Rent Restriction Ordinance indicated that the said law was enacted "to restrict the increase of rent . . . And the eviction of tenants." Therefore, the agreement as in the present case which was favourable to the tenant should have been held to be enforceable by the Rent Controller in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on him under section 13 of the Ordinance. Similar argument was raised in the High Court. The learned Single Judge repelled it with the following observation :- "True, in the preamble of the Ordinance it is said that the enactment is to restrict the increase of rent of certain premises and eviction of tenants. No doubt this protection is there for the benefit of the tenants, but at the same time the Ordinance has not deprived the landlord of the use of his property if his need is genuine and if he wants to reconstruct the building."
4. The approach of the High Court that notwithstanding the preamble, the Ordinance protects and regulates the interests and rights of both the tenants and landlords seems to be unexceptionable.
5. It was next contended by the learned counsel that section 13 does not prohibit the enforcement of the condition involved in this case. According to him if the condition was such as to negate or materially modify the statutory conditions regarding orders of ejectment on ground of reconstruction, contained in subsections (5), (5-A) and (5-B) of section 13, the Rent Controller could not have enforced them, but the provision of alternative accommodation before reconstruction not being contradictory to the said provisions, could be enforced by the Rent Controller. The learned Single Judge repelled similar argument advanced in the High Court with the following observa--tion :- "In the instant case the petitioner is placing responsibility on the landlord for providing him with an alternate accommodation even before he starts the reconstruction of the building which, to my mind, is also against the spirit of the Statute itself because the Ordinance provides for putting a tenant back in possession of the new building, but no provision for alternate accommodation was enacted. What the petitioner is asking would, therefore, be inconsistent with the provisions of the Ordinance. As such the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to enforce such a clause of an agreement."
6. No possible objection can be taken to the above observation made in the impugned order. The Statute itself' in subsections (5), (5-A) and (5-B) of section 13, provides certain conditions with regard to the ejectment of a tenant on the application of the landlord on ground of reconstruction.
7. The law- maker did not consider it necessary to further restrict the power of the Rent Controller that in case the landlord failed to provide alternative accommodation to the tenant prior to the reconstruction of the building, an order of ejectment would not be passed. The question involved is not whether the agreement between the parties in this case is lawful or not. The precise controversy is whether the Rent Controller has, while making an order under section 13 any power to enforce such an agreement. Sub--section (1) of section 13 provides that a tenant shall not be evicted, inter alia in pursuance of any decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of section 13. If all orders of eviction are to be controlled by the provisions of section 13 itself and by no other consideration then unless the agreement relied upon from the petitioner's side is enforceable under section 13, the Rent Controller could not 1lave imposed the condition in question. Undoubtedly none of the provisions of section 13 empowered the Rent Controller to make the order of ejectment of the petitioner conditional on the respondent providing him with alternative accommodation immediately on eviction and prior to the reconstruction of the building.
8. Learned counsel also raised the -question as to whether the petition would have a remedy before a Court of general jurisdiction to enforce the disputed covenant between the parties. This question does not arise in the proceedings. We, therefore, refrain from making any observation of determinative character in this behalf.
9. After hearing the learned counsel at some length, we find no justification for interference with the impugned order. This petition accordingly is dismissed. Request for further time to vacate, is allowed conditional on voluntary surrender of possession and payment of rent-period one month.