The petitioners have filed this application under sections 2 and 3 of the Contempt of Court Act, in which they have prayed that action be taken against the opponents for having committed contempt of this Court.
2. The relevant facts which have given rise to this application are that Suit No. 133/68 was filed in this Court by the petitioners, a registered society, in which they prayed that the allotment of land to them by the K. M. C. Was wrongly cancelled by the Commissioner and the petitioners had impleaded opponent No. 1 as defendant along with K. M. C. And the Commissioner. Another Suit No. 2000/68 was filed in the Court of the First Civil Judge, Karachi by seven members of Anjuman-e- Iranian against the office-bearers of the petitioners in which they had prayed for a declaration to the effect that it be declared that the defendants were not the office-bearers of the society, for rendition of accounts and for injunction to restrain them from acting as the office-bearers of the society. In Suit No. 2000/68 an ex parte order for the appointment of a receiver was passed and against that order an appeal -was filed before the District Judge which was dismissed. A revision was then filed in this Court and an application for interim relief was filed under section 151, C. P. C. In which it was prayed that the Anjuman be allowed to hold its religious functions in the Hussainia and that the receiver be prevented from exercising his duties in respect of the management of the Hussainia. An interim order was passed on 10th December 1968 permitting petitioner No.1 to hold religious functions in the Hussainia until further orders and till that the the receiver should refrain from holding any religious functions.
3. After the passing of the interim order pamphlets dated 28th June 1969 and captioned "Jawabnama Aqair Mirza Ibrahim Namazi" were published and circulated, and according to the peti--tioners the said pamphlets contained matter which was disparaging to the learned Judge, who passed the interim order dated 10th December 1968, and also interfered with the course of justice. The relevant passages of the pamphlet in Persian and their translation in English have been reproduced in paras. 25, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the petition. The English translation of the pamphlet is also on record and the learned counsel for the parties admit that it is a correct translation. At the outset' on behalf of the opponents, their learned counsel Mr. Ibadatyar Khan accepted the responsibility for the publication and circulation of the pamphlets. The question now for consideration is whether these passages amount to contempt of Court? The first passage, to which excep--tion has been taken, is in paragraph 25 of the petition; its English translation runs as under "The learned Judge (his Lordship Mr, Justice Noorul Arfin) gave permission and preferential right to the Anjuman in the sense that in holding Majlises the Anjuman will be first and next will be Jamiat."
It is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners that this was not the operative part of the order and that by using the above expression the petitioners have misrepresented the contents of the order factually and that it amounted to contempt.
4. It is true that this is not the operative part of the order and Mr. Ibadatyar Khan has fairly conceded before me that as the expression stands it does amount to a misrepresentation of the order and in effect would amount to contempt. At the same the he has referred me to paragraph 23 of the counter --affidavit of opponent No. 2, the contents of which have been adopted by opponent No. 1, in which it is stated that opponent No. 1 was informed that the order was made in this form and unintentionally he expressed it as such without actually knowing what were the contents of the order. It is urged that the opponents were not parties to those proceedings and under the circumstances it was what they bad heard that they took it for granted and that though it amounted to contempt yet it was committed without any intention to distort or misrepresent the order of the Court.
5. The second passage is reproduced in para. 27 of the petition. It reads as under :- "Where the Jamiat saw that the forbidden has been permitted and unlawful has become lawful."
According to Mr. Munawar Abbas this is an aspersion on the learned Judge for according to opponent No. 1 what he had ordered was something forbidden which could not have been so done under the law and. Further in the context in which this expression occurs this intention becomes clear. If this argument is taken on its face value there cannot be the denying of the fact that it amounts to contempt of the learned Judge who passed the order. Mr. Ibadatyar Khan, however, in reply referred me to the English translation of the pamphlet at pages 15 and 16 and urged that the expression is in the context of the matter discussed therein and the respective cases of the parties before the learned single Judge whether a receiver could hold religious functions or not. The petitioner's case was that it was Haram while that of the opponents that it was Halal and in that context this expression was used. It was accordingly urged that the use of this expression did not, in any manner, cast any aspersion on the integrity of the learned Judge I have considered the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties an I am not satisfied that this expression has been used in the sense in which it is alleged by the counsel for the petitioners, and there is a room for doubt as for what has been stated at pages 15 and 16; the expression, according to the learned counsel for the opponents, could have referred to the contentions of the parties. On this view of the matter I, do not think that this expression was used contemptuously for the learned Judge who passed the interim order dated 10th December 1968.
6. In para. 28 of the petition the petitioners have again relied on a passage which does not appear to me in any manner contemptuous either of the Judge or the order passed ~ by him. The learned counsel for the petitioners argued before me that opponent No. I merely showed disrespect from what is mentioned in that paragraph. I do not see how this conclusion can be inferred from that paragraph, for opponent No. 1 himself referained from holding to the religious functions in the Hussainia. Whether it was out of grace or respect to the order of the Court is altogether irrelevant. If the order had been violated that was so at the instance of the Deputy Inspector General of Police and his subordinates and the opponents cannot be held responsible for that. There is no material on record that what the D. I. G. Did was at the instance of opponent No. 1 for only the word `talk' is mentioned in the objectionable paragraph. In conclusion, the petitioners have failed to make out that the contents of the pamphlet in para. 28 were contemptuous in
7. The last paragraph to which exception has been taken is reproduced in para. 29 of the petition.
On the face of it, its contents amount to contempt of Court and Mr. Ibadatyar` Khan, the learned counsel for the opponents, has fairly conceded that technically it is contempt. However, he has submitted that this was unintentional and not in the least with the intention to interfere with the course of justice. At the most it was uncalled for and a rash at. The petitioner's counsel, lastly stated before me that the paragraph of the pamphlet, reproduced in para. 30 of the petition is innocuous and accordingly he would not press it into service. It is clear from .The above that the opponents are guilty of committing contempt of this Court. Their learned counsel has urged that their unconditional apology be accepted. The learned coun4el for the petitioners however attempted to argue that the apology was not unconditional as the opponents had justified their action in what they have stated in their counter-affidavits. I am unable to agree with this view of the learned counsel for the petitioners for it is clear from the contents of their affidavits that what was stated was not in justification of the contempt but with a view to explain their conduct whether it was deliberate or unintentional.
8. In the result I would accept their apology as sufficient amends and direct, in accordance with the proviso to section 3 of Contempt of Courts Act, that the opponents be discharged.