SHAFI-UR-RAHMAN, J.-The petitioner, a tenant, seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 3-11-1981 whereby a constitutional appeal filed by him challenging his eviction was dismissed.
2. It is said that there was a plot of land in Faisalabad, which was transferred to Tahir Basharat for raising a construction. Muhammad Tufail, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner and some of the respondents were inducted as tenants in it. In 1978, respondents 1 and 2 served a notice of transfer under section 13-A of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance calling upon the heirs of Muhammad Tufail including the petitioner to pay him rent. The petitioner and other heirs of Tufail started depositing the rent with the Rent Controller in the name of the heirs of Tahir Basharat from whom their predecessor-in-interest had received the property as tenant. The application for their eviction was instituted on the grounds of default in the payment of rent and personal need of the property. The petitioner contested the validity of the notice and the transfer of interest by Tahir Basharat in favour of respondents 1 and 2, denied his ability to pay them the rent and also challenged their personal need. The Rent Controller held the petitioner to be a tenant of the property under the two respondents, found their personal need and the ground of default established and ordered the eviction of the tenants. Their appeal to the appellate authority failed.
In the constitutional petition, they tried to raise a number of legal grounds but with no success.
3. The learned counsel has taken before us three main grounds. Firstly, it is stated that the transfer from Tahir Basharat in favour of respondents I and 2 could not be said to be legal and proper as it was not by registered instrument and the deed itself was executed long after the institution of the petition. As regards their discharging of the obligation to pay the rent the deposits with the Rent Controller in the name of the heirs of Tahir Basharat was put forward as defence, secondly, it was said that this being a case of tenancy in common, the service of notice under section 13-A had to be on each heir individually and separately and not in the fashion it had taken place. In support reliance has been placed on the decision in Anwarali Bepari and others v. Jamini Lal Roy Chaudhry and others (AIR 1940 Cal. 89). Finally, it has been said that there was evidence on the record which showed that the landlords were possessed of alternate accommodation suitable for their needs and the ground of personal need was not at all tenable.
4. According to the case put forward by the petitioner himself, his predecessor-in-interest had entered as a tenant when only allottees rights were conferred on Tahir Basharat. The transfer of same or similar rights was claimed by respondents 1 and 2 and a formal notice to that effect had been served, a copy of which was also sent to the transferee. Even if the petitioner had a doubt with regard to the competing claims of the two allottees, he could have ascertained it from the authorities sanctioning the transfer or made a deposit before the Rent Controller with his own reserva--tions. He could not in good faith deposit the amount in the name of landlord about whom he was informed formally that he had ceased to have interest in the property thereby depriving the claimant landlord to prove his entitlement before the Rent Controller and get the rent deposited.
Such a conduct on the part of the tenant has always been considered contumacious. Without being himself interested in title, the tenant looks upon himself to challenge the title of the transferee. On this view of the conduct of the petitioner, the decision of the Controller and the appellate authority would appear to be amply justified and beyond interference in the constitutional jurisdiction.
5. Disposal as above of the first ground put forward by the learned counsel should ordinarily suffice for refusing leave to appeal. His objections with regard to personal need would mean a review of the finding of fact recording on the material before the Tribunal having exclusive jurisdiction in the matter, which ordinarily is not done. The petitioner cannot dispute the" manner of service of notice under section 13-A because the deposits that were made followed the notice and were a reaction to it. Having so reacted to the notice, the petitioner cannot be heard saying that it was not properly served on him when it comes to facing its consequences.
6. We find no merit in the petition and the leave to appeal is refused. A month's time is allowed to the petitioner to vacate the premises and hand over its vacant possession to the landlords. Till he does so, he will continue to observe all the terms of the tenancy.