Raja Saeed Akram Khan, J.-- The titled appeal by leave of the Court has been directed against the judgment of the High Court dated 21.02.2017, whereby , the writ petition filed by the appellant, herein, has been dismissed.
2. The concise facts of the case are that the appellant, herein, filed a writ petition before the High Court, alleging therein, that he is the resident of Neelum Valley. He got his education from the local institutions of Neelum Valley. A special seat is reserved for residents of Neelum Valley in the Ayub Medical College and he applied for admission against the said seat. Initially , the official respondents refused to issue application form to the appellant on the ground that a direction has been issued by the High Court in a case titled Iqra Sajjad v. Azad Government & others decided on 28.06.2016 that only the candidates who hail from village Kail are eligible for nomination against the reserved seat. However , later on, they issued the application form but told him that issuance/submission of application form would be just a futile exercise. It was averred that the appellant participated in the entry test and is the sole successful candidate from Neelum Valley. He prayed that a direction be issued to the concerned authorities to finalize the matter of admission/nomination of the appellant agains t the special seat reserved for Neelum Valley. The learned High Court after necessary proceedings dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant, herein, in limine, hence, this appeal by leave of the Court.
3. Meer Sharafat Hussain, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that the judgment passed by the High Court is based on misinterpretation of law and the facts of the case which is not sustainable in the eye of law.
He submitted that the learned High Court wrongly relied upon its judgment passed in a case titled Iqra Sajjad v.
Azad Govt. & others (writ petition No.2505 of 2015, decided on 28.06.2016) as the said judgment is violative to the pronouncement of the apex Court passed in a case titled Jawaria Maqsood v. Join Admission Committee & others (civil appeal No.396 of 2015, decided on 15.01.2016) through which it has been held that the special seats of Neelum and Leepa Valley are reserved for the students who passed their Intermediate examination from the local institutions of the area. He added that even otherwise the judgment passed in Iqra Sajjad' s case (supra) cannot be relied upon as the same has already been challenged before this Court. He further added that the impugned judgment as well as the judgment passed by the High Court in Iqra Sajjad' s case is also violative of fundamental rights of the students of district Neelum. He contended that the learned High Court passed both the judgments while relying upon a photostat copy of a private letter issued by the Ex-President and ignored the Government policy notification dated 17.04.2014 which has been declared valid by this Cour t. He submitted that preference cannot be given to a private letter over the Government notification. He further contended that the private- respondents, herein, have not got intermediate education from local institutions of district Neelum, therefore, in view of the notification dated 17.04.2014 and the judgment of this Court delivered in Jawaria Maqsood' s case (supra) are not entitled to get the admissi on against the seat reserved for Neelum Valley. He lastly argued that the judgment passed in Iqra Sajjad' s case is discriminatory , vexatious and contrary to the facts as the learned High Court while declaring clause 1 of the notification dated 17.04.2014 as ineffective, observed that there is no institution yielding the science education in or nearby Kail valley , whereas, the matter of fact is that there are many institutions in District Neelum in which science subjects are being taught and it is not possible to open separate science colleges for each and every village of the District.
4. The learned Advocate-General adopted the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant.
5. Miss Bilqees Rashid Minhas, Advocate, the learned counsel for respondents No.5 and 6 strongly controverted the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. She submitted that the judgment passed by the High Court is perfect, legal and in accordance with law which need no interferenc e by this Court. She added that the letter addressed to the Member Legislative Assembly (as he the then was) by President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan of the time clearly postulates that two special seats for medical/engineering had been reserved for village Kail. In pursuance of the order of the President, the Nomination Board of Azad Jammu & Kashmir was duly intimated by the Department of Kashmir and Northern Affairs Division, Islamabad, vide notification dated 10.09.1985, which also clearly shows that the special seats were reserved only for Kail. The learned counsel contended that since 1985, the seat is reserved for Kail area and not for whole of District Neelum. Two seats in the medical colleges were basically reserved; one for Kail and the other for Leepa. At that time, the said areas were part of the district Muzaf farabad. Now, two new districts have been established from the territory of district Muzaf farabad i.e. Hattian Bala and Neelum. The reserved seat remained for Leepa not for Hattian Bala, therefore, the controversy created regarding the reserved seat of Kail is against facts and the spirit of the original notification.
She further contended that there are 10 seats reserved for District Neelum and one special seat is for Kail valley upon which respondent No.6 has rightly been nominated for admission in Ayub Medical College, Abbottabad. A valuable right has been accrued in favour of respondent No.6 which cannot be snatched away . She added that in Jawairia Maqsood' s case, the nomination against the special seat reserved for Kail was not a matter in dispute; therefore, the referred judgment has no nexus with the case in hand. She further added that respondent No.5 who was not party before the High Court has been arrayed as party by the appellant in the instant appeal which is not permissible under rules. In continuation of the arguments, she submitted that the judgment passed in Iqra Sajjad' s case has been challenged before this Court. This Court dismissed the appeal, hence, the judgment of the High Court has attained finality . She added that there are no institutions yielding pre-medical or pre-engineering intermediate education in or nearby Kail, therefore, respondent No.6 was constrained to get admission in the intermediate classes outside the Neelum Valley. She lastly argued that the relief claimed by the appellant is not same as claimed before the High Court and under law he cannot solicit the relief beyond his pleadings.
6. Sardar Shoukat Hussain, Advocate, the learned counsel for respondent No.2, only stated that the nomination of respondent No.6 has been made in the light of the judgment of the learned High Court delivered in Iqra Sajjad' s case.
7. Mr. Maqsood Ahmed Sulehria, Advocate, the learned counsel for proforma respondent submitted that the proforma respondent was not arrayed as party in the writ petition and now he has been arrayed as party with mala fide intention. He contended that the proforma respondent after nomination got admission in the MBBS for the session 2015-16 and he has no concern with the instant litigation. He prayed for dismissal of appeal to the extent of proforma respondent.
8. We have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record along with the impugned judgment. The case of the appellant is that a special seat (for admission in medical colleges) has been reserved for residents of Neelum Valley and he is the only candidate who comple ted his education from the local institutions of the area, therefore, in the light of the policy notification dated 17.04 .2014 and the judgment of this Court delivered in Jawaria Maqsood' s case he is eligible to be nominated again st the special seat. To appreciate the stance taken by the appellant, we have scrutinized the record. It is obvious from the record that the Government vide notification dated 17.04.2014, introduced a policy regarding the nomination against the special seats reserved for Neelum and Leepa Valleys. It has been provided in the said policy that only those candidates will be eligible for nomination against the seats reserved for Neelum and Leepa Valleys, who completed their Intermediate education as a regular student from the local institutions of the areas. The said notification was challenged before the High Court in a case titled Anas Mumtaz & others v. Joint Admission Committee & others (writ petition No.2164 of 2014, decided on 10.11.2014). The learned High Court declared the said notification as valid. Later on, the same proposition came under consideration of this Court in Jawaria Maqsood' s case (supra), wherein, this Court approved the policy notification and held that no one can be nominated in violation of the conditions imposed in the policy notification. The relevant paragraph of the judgment reads as under:- "In the notification dated 17.04.2014, a condition has been imposed that only those candidates will be eligible for nomination against the seats reserved for Neelum and Leepa Valley, who completed their Intermediate education as a regular student from the local institutions of the areas. For better appreciation the relevant portion of the notification (supra) is reproduced here which reads as under: {{URDU TEXT}} The learned counsel for respondent No.4 has forcefully submitted that the notification dated 17.04.2014, is prospective in nature, therefore, the same is not applicable in the case of respondent as she passed her F.Sc.
Exam. in the year 2013. We agree with the argument of the learned counsel that a notification or an executive order can only operate prospectively and not retrospectively unless specifically provided otherwise. In this regard, reliance may be placed on the case reported as Hashwani Hotels Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others [PLD 1997 S.C 315 ], wherein it has been held that: '16. Reverting to the question, whether such a direction can affect the load agreements which were already concluded prior to such direction, it may be observed that it is a well-settled principle of interpretation of a notification and/or an executive order that the same can operate prospectively and not retrospectively . This principle is equally applicable to a statute in the absence of any express or implied intendment contrary to it.'
Similarly , in a case reported as Abdul Shakoor v. Mrs. Shamim Khalid and 5 others [2003 SCR 351], this Court observed as under:
11. It follows that the disputed notification which is shown to have been read retrospectively could not be taken into consideration for the above reasons as the process of selection in respect of receiving applications according to qualifications determined for it had already completed. Therefore, it could not be read retrospectively for having not been so provided by law-givers.'
As the learned counsel has himself admitted that the notification dated 17.04.2014, will be operate prospectively , therefore, it can safely be said that notific ation (supra) is fully applicable for session 2015-16, and no one can be nominated in violation of the conditions imposed in that notification."
In another case titled Hammad Mushtaq Janjua v. Joint Admission Committee and others (civil appeal No.47 of 2016, decided on 29.03.2016), one of the candidates got her education from Muzaf farabad and at the end she migrated to Leepa Valley and passed her intermediate examination from the local institute of the area but this Court even has not declared her eligible against the special seat reserved for the area and held that only those candidates will be eligible for nomination against the seats reserved for Neelum and Leepa Valleys, who completed their Intermediate education as a regular student from the local institutions of the areas. The relevant findings of the judgment supra read as under:- "The record shows that the appellant, Sundas Ashraf, was the regular student of Al-Razi College of Science Upper Chatter , Muzaf farabad and passed Intermediate Part-I as a regular student of that College. Thereafter , she migrated to Leepa and passed Intermediate Part-II, from Government Degree College, Leepa. It is evident from the record that the appellant, Sundas Ashraf got her education throughout from Muzaf farabad District and at the end, she migrated to Leepa just to cover her case under condition No.1, imposed in policy notification dated 17.04.2014, that only those candidates will be eligible for nomination against the seats reserved for Neelum and Leepa Valley, who completed their Intermediate education as a regular student from the local institutions of the areas. As nothing is on record that she remained regular student of the local institutions of Leepa, therefore, in our estimation, the act done by the appellant to get the admission in the Medical Colleges on the seat reserved for the residents of Leepa; amounts to defeat the object of the policy notification dated 17.04.2014, while playing tactics; such like practice cannot be approved."
After going through the policy notification and the dictum laid down by this Court in the referred pronouncements, we are of the view that the stance taken by the appellant has substance. The learned counsel for the private respondents during the course of arguments submitted that since 1985, the seat is reserved for Kail area and not for Neelum Valley as a whole. The details furnished by the Nomination Board on the direction of this Court shows that since 2005 to 2016 the nominations against the special seat have been made from Neelum Valley and not only from Kail, therefore, the argument in this regard appears to be based on misconception. The learned counsel for the private respondents mainly based her claim on a letter written by the Ex-President of Pakistan. It may be stated here that a private letter cannot be given the preference over the notification issue d by the Government. According to the policy notification, special seat has been reserved for Neelum Valley and not only for village Kail. One of the argument of the learned counsel for the private respondents was that there is no institution yielding science education in or nearby Kail Valley, whereas, it divulges from the documents placed on record by the appellant, i.e. result of intermediate examination and institute-wise list of total candidates appeared in the annual examination 2015, prepared by Azad Jammu and Kashmir Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, that in the Inter College Kail all the science subjects are duly included in the syllabus and being taught. The argument of the learned counsel for the private responden ts that in Jawaria Maqsood' s case the matter in dispute was the special seat reserved for Leepa Valley, therefore, that judgment is not applicable in the case in hand, has also no substance as this Court in that judgment endorsed the policy notification dated 17.04.2014, which relates to both the units, i.e. Neelam and Leepa V alley.
9. The contention of the learned counsel for respondent No.5 and 6, that the learned High Court while delivering the judgment in Iqra Sajjad' s case, has held that the special seat is reserved for Kail and not for Neelum Valley, moreover , condition No.1 of the policy notification dated 17.04.2014, regarding obtaining Intermediate education from the local institutions of the area, is ineffective to the extent of the candidates of Kail. The said judgment was challenged before this Court and this Court dismissed the appeal, therefore, the same has attained finality . It may be observed here that the appeal in that case was not decided on merits by this Court, even otherwise, in presence of the plain findings of this Court in the referred judgments that the candidate who did not get the education from the local institutions of the Neelum/Leepa Valley as regular student is not eligible to be nominated against the seats reserved for that areas, the judgment of the High Court passed in conflict with the judgment of this Court losses its validity . Under section 42-A, of the Interim Constitution Act, 1974, the law laid down by this Court is binding upon each and every organ of the State and no deviation from the law laid down by this Court can be made unless the same is altered or overruled by this Court itself. Thus, the judgment of the High Court delivered in Iqra Sajjad' s case being inconsistent with the dictum laid down by this Court in Jawaria Maqsood' s and Hammad Mushtaq Janjua' s cases (supra) is inoperative and the directions issued in that judgment are not binding upon the concerned authorities.
In the light of the above discussion this appeal stands disposed of with the directio n to the concerned authorities to initiate the process of nomination against the special seat reserved for Neelum Valley strictly in accordance with the policy notification dated 17.04.2014. No order as to costs.