1. SHAHID HAMEED DAR, J.---The appellant is aggrieved of order dated 19.03.2013, whereby, learned Special Judge Anti-Corruption (Provincial), Gujranwala Division. Gujranwala has acquitted respondent Khalid Rasheed Kamboh, the TMO/TOR, Narowal of the charge under section 161, P.P.C.
2. Read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 1947. Midway through his trial in case-FIR No,41/2012, dated 29.11.2012 for offences as mentioned above, registered at police station ACE, Narowal, in exercise of powers under section 249-A, Cr.P.C.
2. Precisely the relevant facts leading to this appeal are that Syed Ghulam Jaffar Gillani (not respondent herein) got FIR No,41/2012 (supra) lodged against respondent Khalid Rasheed Kamboh (TMO/TOR Narowal) with the allegation that he moved an application for getting himself listed as nikah Registrar of village Derianwala (Narowal) before the administrator of the said union council, the respondent Khalid Rasheed Kamboh, who demanded Rs,5000/- as illegal gratification from him to allow it; he entreated the administrator not to be unfair with him as he intended to serve inhabitants of the village as a social service, but he did not listen to him; after some bargaining he reduced his demand of bribery to Rs,3000/-; the complainant showed belief that the bribe-giver and recipient thereof would be thrown in hell on the day of resurrection; he lastly contended that he intended to get a raid conducted on the corrupt official as it was a jihad in his eyes. The investigating officer conducted the investigation in the matter and found the respondent official involved in the occurrence; he submitted report under section 173, Cr.P.C. Against him by placing his name in its column No,3. The complainant Syed Ghulam Jaffar Shah Gillani resiled from his previous statement during trial and he disowned the prosecution case, when he tendered evidence as PW-1; the learned trial court acquitted the respondent under section 249-A, Cr.P.C., hence, the instant appeal.
3. Learned counsel has submitted that the learned trial court showed undue haste in acquitting the respondent-official as certain other incriminating pieces of evidence were still available with the prosecution which could connect him with the commission of offence. He further contended that the learned area magistrate who conducted raid and effected recovery of the bribed-amount from the possession of the respondent was still to be examined and his statement along with the statements of certain other police officials could easily bring home the guilt of the respondent beyond any doubt; he also asserted that the complainant merely deposed in his examination-in- chief that he had compounded the offence and forgiven the accused which meant that he still believed in truthfulness of the contents of his application Exh.PA, therefore, learned trial court should have proceeded with the trial, recorded the evidence of rest of the prosecution witnesses and then decided it by taking into account all the attending circumstances hereof. He maintained that the impugned order is gratuitous in nature, which may be set aside.
4. After hearing the learned counsel for the appellant and going through the impugned order, it is observed that the complainant, who has not been rendered a party herein, certainly lodged a complaint against the respondent with the assertion that he demanded and received bribery from him when he presented a written application Exh.PA before him for enlistment of his name as nikah registrar of his village. He stuck to the said stance during the course of investigation and it was why, the investigating officer found the respondent involved in the occurrence and submitted report under section 173, Cr.P.C. Against him before the learned trial court for his trial in accordance with the law. After indictment of the respondent, he (complainant) appeared as PW-1 and hardly said a word in his examination-in-chief as to falsity of the allegation, as contained in his application Exh.PA and confined himself only to the deposition that he had forgiven the accused and dropped the idea of further prosecuting him. Learned Public Prosecutor while cross-examining him (PW-1) adopted such a line of grilling, which virtually brought the prosecution case crashing down to the earth. In reply to almost every question put to him by the public-prosecutor, the complainant not only answered the suggestions in negative but also made it unequivocally clear that the accused had not demanded or taken any illegal gratification from him. He denied to have been won over by .The accused or having twisted real facts of the case being in league with him. He also denied the fact that a raid had been conducted on the accused by a magistrate on his asking or that any amount of tainted-money had been recovered from him. He flatly refused in his evidence that he had been recorded by the learned magistrate before he conducted the raid on the accused, rather he straightaway refuted, if any such raid had been conducted by him. Learned law officer virtually sealed fate of the case when he put a suggestion to the only recorded prosecution witness in terms that he had deposed falsely in his examination-in-chief notwithstanding the fact that he had said nothing, prejudicial to the prosecution case therein. When he was cross-examined by the learned defence counsel he deposed about his written application Exh.PA, as having been presented by him due to some misunderstanding. He maintained that the accused (respondent herein) neither demanded nor received any bribe from him. This is what it is all about, the evidence of the complainant, who happened to be the sole victim of this case.
5. The evidence of the learned magistrate, who had allegedly conducted raid and caught the respondent red-handed being in possession of the tainted currency notes, could have, at the most, been corroboratory in nature, if the complainant had supported the prosecution case. The police officials who allegedly accompanied the learned magistrate at the time of raid could have been beneficial to the prosecution, if the complainant had not taken the U-turn or completely resiled from his previous statement. He (complainant/PW-1) disowned each and every bit of the allegation as contained in his application Exh.PA during his testimony and, thus, damaged the prosecution case irreparably. The only allegation against the respondent, as to demand and receipt of bribery from the complainant was sent down the drain by the complainant himself, hence, no other witness or the evidence could repair the damage or create a situation of bringing home the guilt of the respondent beyond any shadow of doubt. The damage done by the complainant was of immense nature and hard to be stitched by any other circumstance. Learned counsel for the appellant failed to answer the query as to how could the learned magistrate or a couple of other official witnesses, which were simply formal, prove the charge against the respondent, once very basis of the case had been dismantled by the erector thereof. It is not so that the learned trial court could not record acquittal of the respondent prematurely during trial, once it found, that the case wouldn't result in his conviction in the long run. A trial court, dealing with such cases as like herein, has adequately been empowered by the statute to acquit the accused at any stage of the trial under section 249-A, Cr.P.C., once it formulated the opinion that further proceedings of the trial, because of the attending facts, would be meaningless as to awarding conviction or sentence to him. Learned trial court has apparently committed no illegality herein and has rightly observed that rest of the prosecution witnesses were of formal nature and the prosecution case would not advance, in case they were summoned and recorded, after the complainant had disowned his earlier stance and pushed the case in a cul-de-sac. It would have certainly been a situation of sheer wastage of time and energy if learned trial court proceeded with the trial of the respondent, which could lead to any direction but to his conviction herein.
6. An order or judgment of acquittal brings double presumption of innocence to a person after the initial one, that every one is innocent till proved otherwise. No such material exists on the record to interfere with the impugned order. Therefore, this appeal is dismissed in limine.