QALANDAR ALI KHAN, J.---The background of the instant revision petition by Syed Naimat Shah (deceased, represented by his legal heirs) and his son Syed Azmat Ali Shah, petitioners, briefly stated, is that Mr. Mushtaq Ali Tahir-Kheli, Advocate, respondent, lodged a suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Ghazi, for recovery of Rs,795000/- against both the petitioners/defendants on account of legal fee for conducting various cases of the petitioners before different Courts including the august Supreme Court of Pakistan, along with 14 % compound interest from the date of institution of the suit up-to the date of payment by the petitioners/defendants. It was averred in the plaint that the petitioners/defendants were implicated in case FIR No,153 dated 30.08.1997 under Sections 324/120-B/34, P.P.C. P.S. Ghazi along with four others and challan in the case was put in Court on 08.10.1997 and that the petitioners/defendants engaged the respondent/plaintiff as their counsel for conducting the said case, which was under trial in the Court of learned Additional District Judge-I, Haripur, and fixed for hearing on 04.09.2002 at the time of institution of the suit on 31.07.2002. It was claimed by the respondent/plaintiff that he also conducted six cases in the Court of Sessions Judge, five cases before the High Court and four cases before the august Supreme Court for the petitioners/defendants arising out of the main case, now under trial and that only one Criminal Appeal No,71/2000 arising out of Cr.PLA No,217/1999 was pending disposal before the august Supreme Court of Pakistan, whereas all other cases stood decided. In addition to the aforementioned cases, two more cases were also being conducted by the respondent/plaintiff for the petitioners/ defendants. A list of such cases along with fee for each of the case and judicial record were attached with 'the plaint. The respondent/plaintiff also claimed that he had allowed special concession to the petitioners/ defendants and had fixed the fee at considerably reduced rates i,e, Rs,75000/- instead of Rs,1,10000/- and Rs,55000/- instead of Rs,75000/- etc; but even then payment of the fee was not made on one or other pretext, including non-receipt of an amount of Rs,40,00,000/- by the petitioners/defendants from Wapda. The respondent/plaintiff was, therefore, constrained to approach the petitioners/defendants through registered AD letter dated 01.03.2002 for payment of the amount outstanding against them on account of legal fee but to no avail; therefore, the respondent/plaintiff served a legal notice through registered AD post on the petitioners/defendants on 12.07.2002 and when received no response from the petitioners/defendants, he lodged the civil suit for recovery of the outstanding legal fee on 31.07.2002.
2.The suit was resisted on several legal and factual grounds by the petitioners/defendants, and in their written statement, they claimed that despite the fact the respondent/plaintiff had made a commitment not to charge any fee for conducting case FIR No, 153 dated 30.08.1997 on their behalf, they had already paid the legal fee to the respondent/ plaintiff even beyond their meagre resources. They alleged that the respondent/plaintiff himself visited Central Jail, Haripur, and had secured Wakalatnama from them as well as other accused involved in the case. They claimed that no fee was fixed at the time of obtaining Wakalatnama from them by the respondent/plaintiff and that he had also declared in his statements in the public meetings and Media that he would be defending the petitioners/defendants without charging any fee from them, but even then more than Rs,95000/- were paid to him as professional fee. While acknowledging the receipt of notice for payment of legal fee by the respondent/plaintiff, the petitioners/defendants claimed that the suit was out come of political rivalry in the area, as the respondent/plaintiff suspected them to be siding with his political opponents.
3.The pleading of the parties were reduced to the following issues:-- "1. Whether the plaintiff has got a cause of action?
2.Whether the plaintiff is stopped to sue?
3.Whether the suit of the plaintiff is within time?
4.Whether this Court has got jurisdiction to entertain the present suit?
5.Whether the suit is bad due to non affixation of proper Court fee?
6.Whether the plaintiff agreed to contest the cases on behalf of the defendants free of cost and in this respect news were published in daily Shamal on 18.09.1997 and the daily Khabarian on 17.09.1997?
7.Whether the defendants have paid Rs,95000/- to the plaintiff as fee for criminal case of FIR No,153 dated 30.08.1997 and the plaintiff admitted the subject amount through letter dated 01.03.2002?
8..Whether the plaintiff has contested the case FIR No,153, dated 30.08.1997 on behalf of defendants on different forums?
9, Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the recovery of Rs,795000/- along with 14 percent compound interest as prayed for?
10. Relief?"
4.After recording evidence of the parties and hearing arguments in the case, the learned trial Court/Civil Judge-I Class, Haripur, granted decree for the recovery of Rs,155000/- in favour of respondent/plaintiff against the petitioners/defendants after deduction of the admitted fee of Rs,95000/-, vide judgment and decree dated 13.05.2006. Feeling aggrieved of the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court, both the petitioners as well as respondent preferred separate appeals, which were simultaneously disposed of by the learned District Judge, Haripur, vide judgment dated 11.01.2007, whereby, the learned appellate Court dismissed appeal of the petitioners and allowed appeal of the respondent and as a result thereof, modified the impugned judgment and decree of the learned trial Court to the extent of payment of amount of Rs,795000/- in favour of the respondent against the petitioners, while dismissing prayer of the former for compound interest at the rate of 14% for the given period. The judgment and decree dated 11.01.2007 of the learned appellate Court/District Judge, Haripur, is impugned herein by the petitioners through the instant revision petition.
5.Arguments of Mr. Iqbal Ahsan Tahir-Kheli, Advocate, on behalf of the petitioners and Mr. Mushtaq Ali Tahir Kheli, Advocate, respondent, heard, and record perused.
6.The perusal of record would show that there was no dispute in respect of registration of a criminal case vide FIR No,153 dated 30.08.1997 under sections 324/120-B/34, P.P.C. in Police Station Ghazi against the petitioners and four others, and also with regard to conducting of cases on behalf of the petitioners by the respondent a senior Advocate Supreme Court, in different Courts up to the august Supreme Court of Pakistan. The list of cases conducted by the respondent on behalf of the petitioners along with Wakalatnama in each case, never disputed by the petitioners throughout the lis, lends further support to the case of the respondent/plaintiff against the petitioners/ defendants. The only defence the petitioners pleaded before the learned trial Court and even afterwards was that the respondent/plaintiff had made commitment not to charge professional fee from them for conducting cases on their behalf even in public meetings and through Media but payment of Rs,95000/- on account of legal fee alleged by the petitioners and also acknowledged by the respondent would itself negate conduct of cases on behalf of the petitioners by the respondent free of legal fee. Assuming for the sake of arguments, without conceding its proof, that the respondent had made a commitment not to charge the petitioners for conducting cases on their behalf, the special agreement/ contract in this behalf was void under Section 28 of the Contract Act, 1872. (AIR 1933 Allahabad 417 (c) (Full Bench)).
7. The learned counsel for the petitioners raised three pertinent issues, namely:-- (I)Limitation; (II)Maintainability of suit of the respondent/plaintiff for recovery of the amount instead of suit for specific performance of the agreement/contract; and (III)Locus Standi of the respondent/plaintiff, as an advocate, to sue the petitioners/defendants for recovery of the legal fee for conducting cases on their behalf.
8. In support of his plea of limitation, the learned counsel referred to AIR. (29) 1942 Calcutta 444, and argued that Article 56 of the Limitation Act, 1908, would be applicable as there was no contract as to payment of fee, and that the period of limitation under Article 56 of the Limitation Act would be three years when the work is done. The learned counsel pointed out that the list provided by the respondent/plaintiff along with the plaint would show that all the cases mentioned in the list, with the exception of one Criminal Appeal No,71/2000 arising out of Cr.P.L.A. No,217/1999 still pending disposal before the august Supreme Court of Pakistan, had been decided either in 1998 or 1999 and one case in 1997, therefore, the suit instituted by the respondent/plaintiff on 31.07.2002 would be barred by limitation, as the 'work' was done long before, in the years 1997, 1998 and 1999.
9. Apart from the fact that one criminal appeal arising out of the same case against the petitioners/defendants, referred to above, is still pending, the relevant Articles of Limitation Act in this case would be Articles 113 and 115, which prescribe a period of three years either from the date fixed for performance of the contract or if no such date was fixed, when the plaintiff had noticed that performance was refused; and under Article 115 for compensation for the breach of an express or implied contract, the period of three years is to be reckoned from the date when the contract is broken. In the instant case, the respondent/plaintiff served letter through registered AD post on the petitioners on 01.03.2002, which has not only been acknowledged by the petitioners/defendants but they also showed their inability to pay the legal fee in their written statement; therefore, the suit instituted by the respondent/plaintiff on 31.07.2002 would be well within time in the light of AIR 1933 Allahabad 417 (Full Bench), earlier in time, which could not be overruled by a Division Bench in the case reported as AIR (29) 1942 Calcutta 444; whereby, it was clearly held that the legal profession could not be called a 'trade', as contemplated in Article 56 of the Limitation Act, rather a contract as envisaged under the Contract Act and the relevant Articles in such a case would be 113 and 115 of the Limitation Act, 1908. In support of this legal proposition the respondent/plaintiff referred to AIR 1930 Madras 132, 2015 YLR 1964 (Lahore), 2006 YLR 711 (Lahore) (b), 2002 YLR 1369 (Lahore) (a), PLD 2008 Lahore 42 (d) and PLD 2012 Sindh 293 (a) (b) (c).
10.Although there was a specific issue No,3 with regard to limitation, and the learned trial Court decided the issue in positive in favour of the respondent/plaintiff; yet in their appeal before the learned lower appellate Court, the petitioners did not challenge findings of the learned trial Court on the issue of limitation against them, which, by no stretch of imagination, can be deemed to have been raised by making a general reference to all the issues in the case. Therefore, the petitioners would, certainly, be precluded from raising the issue of limitation at this belated stage of revision, in the light of judgments in cases reported as 2006 PTD 700 (Karachi High Court), 2006 YLR 729 (Lahore), 2000 SCMR 1126 (c) (d), 2011 CLC 284 (Peshawar) (a) and 2005 SCMR 975.
11. The next two issues raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, namely, form of suit and locus standi of the respondent plaintiff to sue the petitioners/defendants for legal fee, have elaborately been answered in the judgment rendered by a full bench in the case reported as AIR 1933 Allahabad 417 as well as in the case reported as AIR 1930 Madras 132, whereby, the issue of a suit by a legal practitioner against his client for his fees for professional services was laid at rest long ago, even before partition, leaving no room to doubt the right of a pleader to bring a suit for recovery of his fees against his client.
12. Therefore, no illegality or legal infirmity and mis-reading/non-reading of evidence is discernable from the concurrent findings of both the Courts below on facts as well as merits of the case, calling for interference by this Court in its revisional jurisdiction. The revision petition, which appears without substance, is therefore dismissed, with no order as to costs.