IBAD-UR-REHMAN LODHI, J. --- The preset-it petitioner-State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan, filed a suit on 27.07.2007 against the present respondent-M/s. Co-operative Insurance Society of Pakistan, seeking a declaration, injunction and recovery of damages. When Life Insurance (Nationalization) Order, 1972, President's Order No.10 of 1972 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Order') was promulgated, it was provided in Article 15 thereof that all the assets and liabilities pertaining to the life insurance business in Pakistan of all insurers shall, on the appointed date, stand transferred to, and vested in the Corporation to be constituted in view of Article 11 of the said Order. By virtue of clause (2) of Article 15 of the said Order, it was provided that the assets pertaining to the life insurance business of an insurer shall be deemed to include all rights and powers, and all property, whether movable or immovable.
2. The property having No. S-19-R-23, located at 23-Shahrah-e-Quaid-e-Azam, Lahore, was partly purchased by the respondent from the Settlement Department vide PTD dated 24.12.1964, and according to the defendant-respondent, on such purchase, funds of General Insurance Department of the respondent-Society were invested, whereas, remaining part was purchased from an individual owner vide registered sale-deed dated 18.03.1964, and the funds required for such sale, were also paid out from the funds of the respondent-defendant of its General Insurance Department. Notwithstanding such purchase, the said building was ordered to be taken over for the petitioner under the order of sub-trustee by means of order dated 27.03.1972 in exercise of the powers under Article 5 of the Order.
3. The respondent, feeling aggrieved of said order of sub-trustee, challenged the same before this Court in Writ Petition No. 819 of 1972, which was allowed on 03.11.1992, and after declaring the order of sub-trustee as illegal and without lawful authority; the questions raised in the writ petition were referred for decision by the Insurance Appellate Tribunal, constituted under Section 110 of the Insurance Act, 1938. The order passed by this Court was never further challenged and, thus, the order of sub-trustee dated 27.03.1972 was not holding the field any more after 03.11.1992.
4. The Insurance Appellate Tribunal, as a consequence of remand order by this Court, taken up the matter, but refused to adjudicate upon the same by holding that said Tribunal had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter. This was done vide order dated 07.10.1997. Thereafter, the respondent-defendant sent notices to the occupants of different parts of the building, in question, requiring them to pay rent to the respondent, whereas, some of the occupants were being taken as tenant by the petitioner-Corporation. The respondent also filed a suit seeking possession of the part of the building taken over by the petitioner-Corporation. All such litigation is stated to be pending. The present suit is one of such suits filed in series, after once the-order of sub-trustee was set at naught.
5. The plaint, as noted herein-above, was filed in the suit on 27.07.2007 and on behalf of the respondent defendant-Corporation, a contesting written-statement was filed in February, 2008, and after framing of issues, the evidence of the petitioner-Corporation was being called for.
6. Instead of producing the evidence, on 12.11.2011, an application under the provisions of Order VI, Rule 17, CPC was moved, seeking some amendment in the plaint, by mentioning the financial statements of the defendant-respondent, covering a period from 1964 to 1972, alongwith some stated liability evidence.
7. Such plea was contested by the respondent and it was objected to being vague and evasive and an attempt to avoid the closure of the evidence of the plaintiff-petitioner.
8. The learned Trial Court by means of impugned order dated 10.09.2013, proceeded to dismiss the application moved under the provisions of Order VI, Rule 17, CPC; hence, this revision petition before this Court.
9. In support of the petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Courts are supposed to be liberal in granting the amendments and amendment in the pleadings can be asked, at any stage, and that, right of any party cannot be restricted on technical grounds 10.The learned counsel appearing for the respondent has defended the impugned order.
11.The provisions of Order VI,. Rule 17; CPC empower any party to a suit to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner as may be just.
12.From the above requirement of law, it is, but clear that any party to a litigation, is supposed to be clear and categoric in what he is praying to be inserted in already filed pleadings by way of amendment. For such, an applicant under Order VI Rule 17 CPC is required to indicate in clear terms as to at which part of the pleadings, he intended to add or delete some version and in case of addition, proposed addition must b- provided in unequivocal terms. The proposed amendment must not be vague or evasive.
13. When on such touchstone, the application moved by the present petitioner seeking amendment is adjudged, one found it difficult to ascertain, with some exactitude, as to what is required to be added in the already filed plaint and at which part of the plaint. The wording used in Rule 17 of Order VI, CPC, as noted herein-above, clearly suggests that relevant portions of the pleadings must be pointed out by the person, intending to cause any amendment in the pleadings, and the portion, which is to be inserted as a result of alteration or amendment is concerned, be specifically provided.
14. The application moved by the petitioner is lacking completely in this regard. Nowhere in the application, any proposed amendment, in clear terms, has been provided and similarly, it is not mentioned as to at which part of the already filed plaint, the proposed amendment is to be added or altered.
15. The High Court of Azad Jammu & Kashmir in case titled Matwali Khan v. Shah Zaman and others (PLD 1965 Azad J&K 26) has held that general prayer for amendment cannot be made or allowed and that proposed amendment should be in writing and in explicit form and in the same way, order if allowing amendment should also be specific and clear showing nature and extent of amendment allowed.
16.The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Muhammad Akram and another v. Altaf Ahmed (PLD 2003 Supreme Court 688), on the point of amendment, has held that the Court cannot shut its eyes to a glaring fact that the amendment, itself, was sought more than seven years, after the institution of the first written-statement. The delay in making such plea cannot, of course, be barred by any limitation, but the factual aspect thereof cannot be ignored and the factual inferences cannot be avoided.
17.I have seen the impugned order, passed by the learned Trial Court on 10.09.2013, which clearly speaks that the proposed amendment would not be of any avail to the petitioner to establish the version taken in the plaint and that yet the petitioner has to produce its evidence and it would be at liberty to produce in evidence any-material, it required.
18.I found no illegality or irregularity on the part of the learned Trial Court, while dismissing the application, moved by the present petitioner, seeking amendment in the plaint.
19.The petitioner has not made out its case for amendment in the already filed plaint and also failed to point out as to how the financial statements of the respondent would be relevant with regard to the issues involved in the suit, seeking declaration as to the title of the property, recovery of damages, etc. 20.The impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or irregularity, so as to warrant interference by this Court in revisional jurisdiction.
21.The petition, having no force, is dismissed.