1. NASIR ASLAM ZAHID, J.---This appeal under section 410, Cr. P. C. Has been filed by Muhammad Akram son of Muhammad Khashkeli who has been convicted under sections 302 and 323, P. P. C. By judgment dated 31st March, 1980 of the II Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, in Sessions Case No. 1789/76. For causing the death of Suleman son of Doroo, the appellant has been sentenced to death and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000 or in default to suffer R. I. For 2 years. For causing simple injuries to the complainant, Muhammad Umar (brother of the deceased), the appellant convicted under section 323, P. P. C. Has been further sentenced to suffer R. I. For 6 months and to pay a fine of Rs.
2. 200 or in default of payment of fine to suffer R. I. For one month. The sentences have been ordered to run concurrently by the Additional Sessions Judge.
3. The F. I. R. In this case was lodged by Muhammad Umar on 10th July, 1975, the day of the incident, at 6-30 p. m. At Police. Tando Muhammad Khan, District Hyderabad, which is at a distance of 6 miles from the scene of occurrence. According to the F. I. R. 5-6 months prior to the incident, the complainant and his deceased brother Suleman along--with their family members shifted from their village in Thatta to the village Baqar Nizamani in Taluka Tando Muhammad Khan, District Hyderabad and used to work in the Banana garden of Lai Muhammad (P. W. 6). They were living in a hut constructed in the uncultivated land of Khair Muhammad Nizamani. On 9th June, 1975, a day earlier to the incident, when the two brothers and the complainant's son Noor Muhammad (P. W. 5) came back to their but from their work, Mst. Parsan (P. W. 4), wife of the complainant, informed them that the appellant had made gestures at her whilst standing in front of their but, where-- upon she had asked the appellant to behave properly and to go away from there, but the appellant stood there for sometime and then went away with his cattle. According to the F. I. R., the next day, that is on 10th June, 1975, at 4.00 p. m. When they were working in the Banana garden, Mst.
4. Parsan came and told them that the appellant had again come with his cattle and was standing near their but and had made gestures at her. On this information, the complainant went running to his but with his hatchet in his hand, with the deceased Suleman, Noor Muhammad and Mst. Parsan following him. The complainant saw the, appellant standing near-their but armed with a hatchet.
5. The complainant told the appellant to behave. Upon this the appellant abused the complainant and inflicted blows with sharp-side of the hatchet on his left arm and also inflicted other hatchet blows on different parts of the body of the complainant. The deceased, Noor Muhammad and Mst.
6. Parsan also arrived there at that time, and according to the F. I. R., the appellant struck the deceased on the chest and arm with the hatchet and the deceased fell down. The com--plainant party raised cries which attracted Lai Muhammad and Bachal and the appellant seeing them started running but Lai Muhammad and Bachal caught hold of him. (Bachal has not been examined as a prosecu--tion witness). On account of the injuries, Suleman died. The complainant leaving Bachal, Lai Muhammad, Noor Muhammad and Mst. Parsan to look after the dead body and the appellant, went to the Police Station and lodged the F. I. R.
7. In this case, the ocular evidence consists of the testimony of the com--plainant, Mst. Parsan and Noor Muhammad. Lai Muhammad has also been examined as a prosecution witness but he is not an eye-witness as in his evidence he has stated that when he reached the scene of occurrence, he found the complainant holding the appellant from his -shalwar' with the deceased lying injured on the ground. He has stated that he had not seen the fight and that he had also not seen anything in the hand of the appel--lant. Prosecution has relied upon the evidence of Lal Muhammad for corroboration purposes. As regards the recoveries, two hatchets have been produced. P. W. Lal Muhammad produced the blood-stained hatchet of the appellant and the complainant produced his own hatchet which was not blood-stained. P. W. 9 Munir A. S. I., the Investigating Officer, had, also produced the chemical analyser's report which is positive as regards the appellant's hatchet.
8. Apparently, as the hatchet of the complainant was not blood-stained, it was not sent for examination by the Chemical Ana--lyser. Medical evidence has been given by Dr. Muhammad Shamsuddin (P. W. 1) who not only performed the autopsy but also examined the complainant as well as the appellant. According to his medical certificate in relation to the injuries on the person of the appellant (Exh. 5), four injuries were suffered by the appellant out of which two injuries were simple and two injuries being grievous Exh. 6 is the medical certificate in relation to 4 injuries suffered by the complainant which are all termed as `simple' by the Medical Officer.
9. The appellant led no evidence in defence but in his statement under section 34.2, Cr. P. C. He admitted that a fight had taken place but he denied the motive alleged against him. His case has been that he acted in self-defence. According to him, the incident had happened in the follow--ing way :- "I used to graze my goats on the land of Ghulam Hyder Nizamani of which land my uncle Alam and my cousin Gulab are haris since long. Occasionally my goats used to enter the adjoining Banana plantation of P. W. Lal Muhammad and off and on there used to be exchange of harsh words between me and deceased Suleman and Lal Muhammad. Suleman was the servant of P. W. Lal Muhammad.
10. On the day of incident also my goats entered the Banana plantation deceased Suleman filthily abused me. I also abused him in reply. Whereupon Suleman deceased inflicted me blows of hatchet. I wanted to run away and in that process I received two sharp-sided hatchet blows on my back. Ultimately when I was unable to run I had no way to save my life. I also struck Suleman with my hatchet in my self-defence. I had struck in the last as is evident from all the statements of P. Ws.
11. I am innocent. As the complainant happened to be a man of Rais Khair Muhammad Nizamani, I have been implicated wrongly in a murder case although I acted in self--defence."
12. We have heard Mr. Azizullah Shaikh, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. S. Murtaza Husain, learned counsel for the State. It was first contended by Mr. Azizullah Shaikh that there is delay in the filing of the F. I. R. The incident is alleged to have taken place at about 4.00 p. m. On 10th June, 1975 and the F. I. R. Is lodged at 6.30 p m. The same day, that is, about 2-- hours after the incident. The distance from the place of occurrence to the Police Station is 6 miles and this delay of about 2-- hours by itself would not appear to be such delay as to cause a significant dent in the prosecution case. Mr. Azizullah, however, contended that in the present case this delay of 2-- hours is, significant. According to him, P. W. 9 the Investigating Officer, had reached the place of occurrence within a matter of about half an hour of the report having been lodged and prior to that he bad prepared the mashirnama of injuries of the com--plainant as also of his blood-stained shirt.
13. According to Mr. Azizullah, the preparation of this mashirnama would have taken sometime but in spite of that the Investigating Officer was able to reach the place of occurrence by 7.00 p. m. Which means that it had taken the Investigating Officer about 15-20 minutes to reach the scene of occurrence from the Police Station. It was contended that if the Investigating Officer had taken 15- 20 minutes to reach the place of occurrence from the Police Station, the time of 2-- hours taken by the complainant to lodge the F. I. R. Seems to be a delay which must be, noted with caution by the Court. We are, however, not impressed by this contention: The Investigating Officer might have had a conveyance available or arranged for a conveyance, in which case he would have covered the distance of 6 miles in a matter of 20 minutes or so. On the other band, if the incident had taken place around 4.00 p. m. And the complainant had started for the Police Station around 4.30 p. m. Or so, he would have taken about 1-- hours to 2 hours to reach the Police Station on foot as the distance to covet was about 6 miles. Nothing was asked in the cross-examination of the complainant whether he went in a bus or some vehicle to the Police Station and in the circumstances it is not unsafe to assume that he had walked the distance of 6 miles to the Police Station.
14. Mr. Azizullah Shaikh then contended that in this case the motive alleg--ed against the appellant is false and in any case it has not been establish--ed. It was contended that Mst. Parsan's presence at the scene of incident is doubtful and if she was not there, the motive alleged would be false.
15. According to learned counsel, if a motive advanced by the prosecution is found to be false, it reacts on the prosecution case and in such a case the rule that is to be followed is the rule of prudence and which is that the prosecution testimony is to be examined with great caution. In this connection learned counsel referred to the reported judgments in PLD 1974 Kar. 274 and PLD 1969 SC 127.
16. Connected with the contention that the motive is false or has not been proved, the other contention raised was that the statement of Mst. Parsan was not recorded by the Investigating Officer on 10th June, 1975 but had been recorded on the next day. It is an admitted position that all the mashirnamas and the statements of all the witnesses (except P. W. 7 Police Constable Yaqoob, whose statement was recorded at the Police Station when he deposited the blood-stained shirt of the deceased) were recorded by the Investigating Officer on 10th June, 1975, but the statement of Mst. Parsan was recorded on the next day at the scene of occurrence. On account of delay in the recording of statement of Mst. Parsan, a very important witness, according to Mr. Azizullah, her testimony is to be discarded and in support of his contention learned counsel relied upon the following reported judgments :- PLD 1960 Kar. 697 ; PLD 1963 SC 17 ; 1974 Cr. L J 400.
17. Learned counsel also relied in this regard upon an unreported judgment in Confirmation Case No. 43/80 decided by this Court, where on account of delay of 8 days in the recording of the statement of a prosecution witness the evidence of such prosecution witness was discarded.
18. On the other hand Mr. S. Murtaza Hussain, learned counsel for the State had contended that there was nothing unnatural about the statement of Mst. Parsan having been recorded on 11 June, 1975.
19. According to learned counsel there is no requirement of any law of procedure that the statements of all the witnesses must be recorded by the Investigating Officer on the same day. In this case, according to learned counsel for the State, the Investigating Officer on 10th June, 1975 had recorded the state--ments of several witnesses, prepared the mashirnama, sent the dead body for post-mortem, referred the complainant and the appellant to the Medical Officer for examination, and perhaps having decided to record the state--ment of Mst. Parsan the next day, he did not record her statement on the same day and in this he has not committed any illegality or irregularity. In any case it was submitted by learned counsel for the State, that in the F. I. R. The presence' of Mst. Parsan is clearly mentioned and in the circumstances, it would be unnatural to draw an inference that as the Police statement of Mst. Parsan had not been recorded on the same day but on the next day, the presence of Mst. Parsan on the scene of the inci--dent is doubtful.
20. According to learned counsel, the presence of Mst. Parsan at the scene of incident is not subject to any doubt. It was further urged that on account of recording of her statement by the Investi-- gating Officer on the next day, no ground is furnished to the appellant for making an argument that Mst. Parsan was not present on the scene of the incident and that she was not residing there and the entire evidence relating to motive should be disbelieved.
21. In this case it is an admitted position that the Investigating Officer had prepared all the mashirnamas on the same day, recorded the statements of all the prosecution witnesses including the statement of Lai Muhammad and Bachal, who are not eye-witnesses; in fact it is an admitted position that but for the statement of Mst. Parsan the entire investigation was completed by the Investigating Officer on the same day. It was also pointed out to us that in the evidence 9f P. W. 9, the Investigating Officer, it was stated by him in cross-examination that when he arrived at the `wardat' (on the day of the incident), he did not see Mst. Parsan sitting there. According to the prosecution case Mst. Parsan is alleged to have witnessed the entire incident and further the incident was actually triggered by the appellant making gustures at her. It is, therefore, obvious that Mst. Parsan's statement was very important for the investigation as well as prosecution point of view. We do not find any plausible reason, in fact no reason at all, on the record for her statement not being recorded on the same day by the Investigating Officer. If he had recorded 'the statements of all witnesses including Lai Muhammad and Bachal, who were not eye-witnesses,' it appears to be odd and unnatural for the Investigating Officer in failing to record the statement of Mst. Parsan at the time when he recorded statement of all other witnesses. The Investigating Officer has also not given any reason or explanation for not recording the statement of Mst. Parsan on 10th June, 1981 and coming back again, to the scene of incident on 11 June, 1975, and then recording only her statement there.
22. As observed earlier, the prosecution case has been that the appellant had made gestures at her initially on 9th June, 1975, and then this was repeated by him on the day of incident i. e. 10th June, 1975. However, in the 164 Cr. P. C: statements of Mst. Parsan as well as of her son P. W. 5 Noor Muhammad, there is no mention at all of the previous days' incident. Further in the F. I. R. The complainant had stated that he and his deceased brother Sulaiman with their families had shifted from their village in Thatta to the place of the incident 5/6 months earlier but the evidence shows that deceased Sulaiman, who was married, had not brought his wife who was still 'living, in their village. The following facts, therefore raise some doubt on the prosecution case that Mst. Parsan was in fact the cause of the incident and that she was present throughtout :--
(a) Mst. Parsan though a very important witness and the cause of the alleged incident is neither examined nor her statement recorded on 10th June, 1975, by the Investigating Officer ;th th
(b) Statements of all other eye-witnesses and also of Lai Muhammad and Bachal, who are not eye-witnesses are recorded on 10th June, 1975. All mashirnamas are prepared on 10th June, 1975 and the body is sent by the Investigating Officer for autopsy and the two injured, the complainant and the appellant, are also sent for medical examination on the same day, but Mst. Parsan is not examined on that day;
(c) The statement in his cross-examination by the Investigating Officer that when he went to the scene of the wardat, he did not see Mst. Pasan there. If Mst. Parsan had been there, it is natural to assume that she would have been seen by the Investigating Officer who should have been anxious to record -her statement. P. W. 5 Noor Muhammad had stated in his deposition that ---I, my mother Mst. Parsan, Lai Muhammad and Bachal remained over the wardat with the dead body and kept the accused and the hatchet secured from him in our custody till the Police arrived there."
23. According to the prosecution case, therefore, Mst. Parsan is there at the scene of the accident near the accused till the Police came,but according to the Investigating Officer Mst. Parsan was not seen there;
(d) No mention is made at all of the previous day's incident of the appellant making gestures to Mst. Parsan in the 164, Cr. P. C. State--ments of Mst. Parsan and P. W. Noor Muhammad;
(e) Although it is stated in the F. I. R. That the families of two brothers had shifted to the place of the incident, it later came in evidence that Sulleman's wife had not shifted.
24. The above circumstances, in our view, cast a doubt as to whether Mst. Parsan was present during the incident and was at all involved in the incident. We, therefore, find that the prosecution have not proved or established the motive alleged against the appellant. We also discard the testimony of Mst. Parsan as for the aforesaid reasons, we consider it unsafe to rely upon the same.
25. In this case it is not a disputed fact that a fight had taken place in which the appellant and the two brothers namely complainant Umer and his deceased 'brother Sulleman were involved. The version of the prosecution has already been referred to above and the way in which, according to the appellant, the incident had taken place is given in the appellant's statement before the trial Court on 19th January, 1980, rele--vant portion whereof has been reproduced in para. 4 of this judgment.
26. The present is not a case of mistaken identity or that the injuries had not been caused to the deceased by the accused. It is an admitted position that injuries had been caused by the appellant to deceased Sulleman and it: has also been established that the deceased succumbed to these injuries. The question for determination in this case is whether the trial Court was correct in rejecting the plea of self-defence advanced by the appellant, and if the appellant was acting in self-defence, whether he exceeded his right of self-defence We have already come to the conclusion that the motive advanced by the prosecution relating to the gestures and actions via-a-via Mst. Parsan .Has not been established, and that the very presence of Mst. Parsan at the scene of the incidention 10th June, 1975 is subject to doubt, and further for reasons recorded by us, it is unsafe to place any reliance on the testi--mony of Mst.
27. Parsan. The natural consequence of these conclusions is that the portions of testimony of the complainant Omar and his son P. W. 5 Noor Muhammad relating to the cause for the incident or to be ignored. In these circumstances the statement given by, the appellant under section 342, Cr. P.
28. C. Giving the reasons for the happening of the incident appears to be plausible. According 'to the appellant, prior to the day of incident, there had been exchanges of harsh words between the appellant on the one side and deceased Sulleman and P. W. 6 Lal Muhammad on the other. It may be observed here that deceased Sulleman and complai--nant Umar were working on the land taken on lease by P. W. 6 Lal Muhammad. These harsh words used to be exchanged on account of appellent's goats entering the banana plantation of P. W. Lal Muhammad. According to the appellant, on the day of the incident his goat had entered the Banana plantation on which he was abused by deceased Sulleman, and in reply the appellant had also abused; whereupon the fight started. The reason for the fight given by the, appellant, in the circumstances of this case and in the view of the conclusion already reached by us, appears to be plausible and having come to the conclusion that the motive advanced by the prosecution had not been estab--lished, we do not find any other explanation or reason for the fight between the two parties.
29. The prosecution version is that first the fight took place between the appellant and the complainant Umar in which both caused injuries .To each other and thereafter decesead Sulleman who was bare-banded inter--vened to stop the fight whereupon the appellant caused hatchet injuries to the deceased which resulted in the death of Sulleman. According to the appellant, however, the initial fight was between him and Sulleman wherein Sulleman had inflicted hatchet blows upon the appellant. As noted earlier, one blood-stained hatchet belonging to the appellant had been recovered and another hatchet alleged by the pro--secution to be of the complainant Umar was also recovered but that hatchet did not have any blood stains on it. Now it is an admitted position that two incised wounds were caused on the person of the, appellant and if the prosecution story is to be accepted these two incised wounds, which had been termed by the Medical Officer as "grievous" would have left bloodstains on the hatchet used by the complainant Umar but this hatchet did not have any blood-stains. Prosecution's version further is that as far as the complainant party was concerned they had only one hatchet which was used by complainant Umar, and Sulleman deceased was bare handed. It is also the prosecution version that Sualeman, Umar and the appellant were involved in the fight. If, however, the hatchet used by the complainant did not have any blood on it, this hatchet would not have caused the incised injuries upon the person of the appellant. In the circumstances it is not unreasonable to assume that there was one other hatchet in this case which had caused the grievous injuries to the appel--lant, and if this was so, the other hatchet would be with deceased Sulleman .
30. The plea of the appellant is of self-defence and under section 105 of the Evidence Act, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing his case within any of the general exceptions, in the Pakistan Penal Code is upon the accused anal the Court is to presume the absence of such circumstances. However, the burden of proof on the accused in g such cases is not of such a high degree as the onus of proof on the pro--secution in a Criminal Case. We may here refer with approval the follow--ing passage from the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Meenhoon v. The State (PLD 1981 Kar. 184), which is to the following effect :- "We are not unmindful of the fact that under section 105 of the Evidence Act, the onus of proof on an accused person that the case falls within general or special exception cannot be equated with the burden of proof on the prosecution in a criminal case. Whereas in the former the accused person need not prove the plea beyond reasonable doubt, whereas in the latter case the prosecution is to prove the commission of offence by the accused person concerned beyond reasonable doubt. But it does not mean that if an accused person raises a plea, which is absurd or is belied by the evidence and the circumstances of the case, it should be held that he has discharged the burden cast on him by sec--tion 105 of the Evidence Act. The Court is to satisfy that the defence plea is such, the possibility of which' cannot be ruled out or in the words of Abdul Rashid, C. J. In Safdar Ali's case (PLD 1953 FC 93) referred to herein below in para. 5 (b), there is a reasonable possibility of the defence plea being true."
31. In the circumstances, although the burden of proving the plea of self--defence is on the appellant, the onus on him is not to, prove the plea beyond reasonable doubt but the question is to be decided whether on the basis of the evidence on record there is a reasonable possibility of the self-defence plea raised by the appellant being true. We are of the view that the hatchet of Umar in the present case could not have caused the two grievous injuries on the person of the appellant without leaving blood-stains on the, hatchet. The prosecution's version therefore, that all the injuries on the person of the appellant had been caused by this clean hatchet of the complainant is, therefore, difficult to accept. In the natural course of events there would be another hatchet with blood stains which had caused at least the two incised injuries to the appellant. In these circumstances therefore, there is reasonable possibility of the defence plea that Sulleman had a hatchet in his hand and that at least the grievous injuries had been caused by deceased Sulleman to the appellant, being correct.
32. Prosecution case is that the appellant was the aggressor whereas the appellant's case has been that the complainant and the deceased were the aggressors and he 'only acted in self-defence to save his life. We consider it necessary to refer here to the injuries suffered by the three participants in the fight, namely, deceased Sulleman, Complainant Umar and appellant Akram :- SULLEMAN'S INJURIES
(a) (1) Incised wound 6----- x 3----- x chest cavity on the Right ----- of the chest, front aspect horizontally cutting 3rd 4th Right carti--lages 2-- of sternum.
(2) Incised wound on the left ----- of the Chest on the region of the left Costal margin 5" x 2----- x chest cavity deep cutting 4th--5tb 6th ribs 2" costal cartilages.
(3) Incised wound on the middle of the left forearm, back aspect 2----- x 1" x cutting the left ulnar bone through and through.
33. REMARKS BY MEDICAL OFFICER "From the external and internal examination of the dead body I am of the opinion that the death is due to shock and haemorrhage consequent upon the injuries, already mentioned. All the injuries are anti-mortem. All the injuries, collectively and injury Nos. 1 and 2 individually are sufficient to cause death.
34. All the injuries are caused by sharp heavy cutting weapon,"
35. UMAR'S INJURIES (b)(1) Pea-sized abrasion on the middle of the left upper eye-lid.
(2) Lacerated wound ----- x ----- x ----- on the back of the left elbow joint.
(3) Contusion 1" x 1" on the left shoulder.
(4) Abrasion 1--- x ----- on the back of the neck horizontally.
36. OPINION OF THE MEDICAL OFFICER "Simple injuries appeared to have been caused by some hard blunt substance."
37. AKRAM'S INJURIES
(c) (1) Lacerated wound on the left parietal emenence 1----- x ----- x Scalp deep. Longitudinally.
(2) Incised wound on the postero outer aspect of the middle of the right fore-arm 3" x 1" x 1".
(3) Incised wound on the lumber region transversally 1----- x ----- x ----- cutting the spine of the first lumber vertebra.
(4) Incised wound on the right shoulder 1----- x ----- x ----- cutting the skin of scapula.
38. OPINION OF THE MEDICAL OFFICER "The nature of injuries Nos. 1 and 2 was simple while injuries Nos. 3 and 4 was grievous. Probable weapon used for causing injuries Nos. 2, 3 and 4 was some heavy sharp cutting weapon such as a hatchet. Injury No. 1 appeared to have been caused by some blunt substance/ weapon such as the back side of a hatchet."
39. The injuries caused to Sulleman deceased are grievous injuries and according to the Medical Officer all the injuries collectively and injuries Nos. 1 and 2, individually were sufficient to cause death. Injuries on complainant Umar are simple injuries and it is evident from the opinion of the Medical Officer that none of these injuries were caused by the sharp side of the hatchet. According to the Medical Officer, the simple injuries on the complainant Umar were caused by some hard blunt substance and this could be by the blunt side of the hatchet. Appellant Akram has four injuries. Out of which injuries Nos. 1 and 2 have been stated by the Medical Officer to be simple whereas injuries Nos. 3 and 4 are termed by him as grievous. Injuries Nos. 2, 3 and 4 caused to the appellant Akram, according to the Medical Officer, were caused by some heavy sharp cutting weapon such as a hatchet.
40. The complainant has given testimony that the appellant had caused him injuries with sharp side of the hatchet also. In the F. I. R. Also, he stated that the appellant had caused him sharp side hatchet blows. According to P. W. 5 Noor Mohammad the appellant had inflicted one sharp-sided hatchet injury to the complainant. It was further deposed by Noor Muhammad that on receipt of injury, the complainant had become unconscious and regained his senses after about half an hour. But, as observed earlier, according to the Medical Officer, all the injuries on the person of the complainant were simple and caused by some hard blunt substance. It follows, therefore, that no injury was caused to the com--plainant by sharp side of the hatchet. This medical evidence has gone unrebutted. Nature of these injuries is also not such that would have resulted in the complainant losing consciousness for half an hour. If, however, it is to be believed that the complainant had in fact lost conciousness on account of the injuries caused to him by the appellant and then remained unsconcious for half an hour, he would not-then have seen the fight between Sulleman and the appellant, as according to the prosecution version, the appellant had struck the deceased after injuring the complainant. These discrepancies and the fact that the hatchet of the complainant was not blood stained, casts doubt on the prosecution story about the manner in which the fight took place.
41. We have already observed that no blood stains were found on the hat--chet of the complainant and, therefore, the incised injuries on the person of the appellant could not have been caused by that hatchet. The injuries caused to deceased Sulleman are such that after having been inflicted such grave injuries, he could neither have had the strength nor the time to inflict the grievous injuries on the person of the appellant. If, therefore, the incised-wounds on the complainant had been inflicted by Sulleman, the said injuries must have been caused prior to the injuries caused by the appellant to the deceased.
42. In these circumstances and for the reason: given hereinabove, it cannot be said beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had struck the complainant and deceased Sulleman first. The version given by the appellant that Sulleman had struck first and then in self-defence he had struck back seems to be a plausible version. In our opinion; in view of the state of evidence on record, the burden of proof under section 105 of the Evidence Act, upon the appellant has been discharged. Further .Two of the injuries caused to the appellant are grievous and in our view, the appellant acting in self-defence to save his life did not exceed right of self-defence in causing the injuries to Sulleman which resulted in his death.
43. The result is that Criminal Appeal No. 94/1980 is allowed and the judgment and sentence dated 31st March, 1980 of the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, in Sessions Case of 1789 of 1976 is set aside. We also do not confirm the sentence of death passed against appellant Mohammad Akram. The, appellant will be released forthwith if not required in any other case.