Briefly stated the facts forming the background of the controversy raised in this constitution petition are that Muhammad Raza Zaidi, respondent sought eviction of the petitioners from the shop in dispute on the pleas of subletting, default and bona fide requirement of the shop for personal use.' The ejectment application was resisted by the petitioners and on the averments of the parties, necessary issues were framed. The learned Rent Controller, after recording the evidence of the parties dismissed, the ejectment application., vide order dated 27-9-1979. The issues on the question of default as `well as subletting were found against the respondent landlord but on the question of personal need, it was held that the requirement of the shop, in dispute for personal use does not appear to be bona hide. The respondent-landlord challenged the order of the learned Rent Controller by filing an appeal and the same was accepted by the learned District Judge, Gujranwala vide judgment dated 14-5-1980. The learned appellate Court, reversed the finding on issue No.4 on the question of requirement of the shop' for' personal use observing as under:------- "No doubt the petitioner appellant retired from Government service about 15-16 years ago and since then till now he has not thought of engaging himself in business but it is difficult to draw an inference or conclusion that in view of his past career as a retired person his asser--tion that he now wants to run his own business in the disputed shop is a mere pretext. There may be a change in his circumstances and thinking at any juncture. Just possible that instead of sitting idle he might have thought of doing some business. The posting of his son at Alipur might have persuaded him to commence business in his own shop. In any case, the fact remains that the appellant has no other shop in the Town than the disputed one and it is difficult to doubt his bona fide of personal need."
2. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued before me that the judg--ment of the learned District Judge is liable to be quashed as the order of eviction was reversed without applying judicial mind to all the relevant circumstances emerging from the record. He argued that determination of a question by ignoring the relevant and material circumstances vitiates the order ultimately passed.
The circumstances which were not taken into con--sideration, as per learned counsel, were :----
(i) The respondent-landlord was an old man of 70 years. Since his retirement in 1956 he was living with his sons and till the filing of the ejectment application on 6-11-1978, did not conduct any business himself and used to reside with his son at his place of posting.
(ii) The circumstances which compelled him to start business at that old age were neither stared in the ejectment application nor explained in the evidence. The pleas with regard to default and subletting were found to be baseless, and this will necessarily reflect adversely on the bona fides and the good faith of the landlord. The "good faith" was lacking as the eviction petition was filed soon after the order passed in writ petition by this Court because of which the efforts to eject the petitioner through Martial Law Authorities did not materialise.
3. Learned counsel for the contesting respondent argued in reply that the constitution petition is not maintainable and that the finding of fact recorded by the learned District Judge was not liable to be interfered with in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction. He relied on Muhammad Hussain Munir and another v. Sikandar and others (P L 1) 1974 5 C 139) and Muhammad Sharif and another v. Muhammad Afial Sohail etc. (PLD 1981 SC 246). The learned Judges of the Supreme Court in the latter case after quoting observation recorded in Muhammad Husssain Munir's case observed that the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere in matters of the kind involved in the present case is a very limited one and confined only to ascertaining whether the District Judge has not flouted the provisions of the relevant statute or has failed to follow the law relating thereto as laid down by the superior Courts. The observations from Muhammad Hussain Munir's case, quoted, read as follows :- ------ "It is wholly wrong to consider that the above constitutional provision was designed to empower the High Court to interfere with the decision of a Court or tribunal of inferior jurisdiction, merely because in its opinion the decision is wrong. In that case, it would make the High Court's jurisdiction indistinguishable from that exercisable in a full-fledged appeal, which plainly is not the intention of the Constitution makers."
The above-quoted observation was made in a consolidation of holdings matter wherein the High Court in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction had interfered with the order passed by the Board of Revenue observing that if the order impugned in writ petition was allowed to remain to the field the people settled in 1957 will again be upset after so many years, which is against equity. It was observed by the learned Judges of the Supreme Court that it must be remembered that what is administered in Courts is justice in accordance with law and considerations of what may appear as fair play and equity however important they may be, must yield to the provisions of law or its well recognised principles. Again as held in the case of Muhammad Sharif interference in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction is to be confined to the question whether any provision of the relevant Statute or any rule laid down by the superior Courts had been flouted.
I may add here that in Muhammad Hussain Munir J case it was also observed by the learned Judges of the Supreme Court that supervisory jurisdiction of High Court under Article 98 (2) (a) (ii) of 1962 Constitution (or for that matter under Article 199 (1) (a) (ii) of the Constitution of 1973) is assimilable to its jurisdiction under section 115, Civil Procedure Code except in two important respects: first the former jurisdiction being a creation of the Constitution stands in a higher pedestal than that under section 115, C. P, C., second ; the former jurisdiction has a wider reach than the jurisdiction under section 115, Civil Procedure Code, which is confined to subordinate Courts. But the aforesaid constitutional provision is not designed to empower the High Court to interfere with the decision of a Court or a tribunal of inferior jurisdiction merely because in its opinion the decision is wrong as in that case High Court's constitutional jurisdiction will no longer remain distinguishable from the jurisdiction exercisable in a full-fledged appeal. However, at the same time it is also well established that the supervisory jurisdiction extends not only to see that the inferior tribunals act within the sphere allotted to them but also to see that they act within jurisdiction and observe law. In Rahim Shah v. The Chief Election Commissioner (PLD1973SC24) a judgment delivered by five learned Judges, it was observed that the scope of interference in the High Court is limited to the inquiry whether the tribunal has in doing the act or undertaking the proceedings acted in accordance with law. If the answer be in the affirmative the High Court will stay its hands and will not substitute its own findings for the findings recorded by the tribunal.
Cases of no evidence, bad faith misdirection, or failure to follow judicial procedure, etc. Are treated as acts dune without lawful authority and vitiate the act done or proceedings undertaken by the tribunal on this ground. It may be added that where an inferior tribunal has failed to determine the question in its true perspective or in other words has failed to consider all the material factors and circumstance, established on record while determining the questions of law and fact arising before it, the resultant order would start vitiated.
4. Keeping the above-stated principles in view, I find that the learned District Judge reversed the finding on the question of bona fide personal need on the basis of assumptions and conjectures.
The bona fide of personal requirement was doubted by the learned Rent Controller as since his retirement from Government service in 1956 the respondent had not thought of engaging himself in business and as admittedly the taking up of the business by him in the shop in dispute was dependent on the posting of his son at Alipur Chatha where the shop is situated. The learned District Judge in appeal observed that it is difficult to draw an inference or conclusion that in view of his past career as a retired person his assertion that he now wants to run his own business in the disputed shop is a mere pretext as there maybe a change in the circumstances and thinking at any juncture. He further observed that it is just possible that instead of sitting idle he might have thought of doing some business and that the posting of his son at Alipur might have persuaded him to commence business in his own shop. Instead of going to the realm of conjectures the appellate Court should have gone into the reason mentioned in the deposition of the respondent- landlord himself. He in his statement Stated that he is aged 70 years and he lives with his children but .Now they have told him that he should maintain himself on his own. Muhammad Akbar (P. W.
2), his witness, deposed in this respect that the respondent wants to conduct his own business as he is financially weak. It would, therefore, be seen that the evidence on record was not gone into by the learned District Judge. It was incumbent upon the learned appellate Court to go into the question of bona fide of the requirement in view of provisions of section 13 (3) (ii) (a), Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. The learned District Judge failed to determine the appeal filed by the respon--dent in accordance with the aforesaid provision and the evidence adduced by the parties on record. The disposal of the appeal on the basis of conjectures was, therefore, not legal. I have not gone into the question myself as in constitutional jurisdiction I am neither called upon to decide the appeal myself nor can I substitute my opinion as against the opinion formed by the appellate Court. In the circumstance there is no alternative but to declare the order dated 14-5- 1980 passed by the learned District Judge as having been passed without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The appeal, therefore, be considered to be pending before the District Judge and the same shall be decided afresh in accordance with law. This constitution petition is, therefore, accepted with costs.