FAIZ MUHAMMAD KHAN, J.-House No. CB/246-54, situated in Saddar Bazar, Mardan Cantt. Is presently occupied by Mubarik Ahmad and his two. Sisters. Muhammad Ilyas applied to the Rent Controller, having jurisdiction over the area, for their ejectment from the said house on the grounds that they were rent defaulters that the house was sublet by respondent No. 1 to respondents Nos. 2 and 3, that the house was damaged by the respondents and that the house wag required by the applicant for his personal use.
2. The tenants contested the application and the learned Rent Controller after recording such evidence of the parties as they wished to produce, by his order dated 18-11-1981, dismissed the eviction petition filed by Muhammad Ilyas, the landlord. The findings of the learned Rent Controller on the points of controversy were that the respondents before him had not made any default in the payment of rent, that there was no subletting of the disputed house, that the house was not in damaged condition and that the petitioner before him did not genuinely require the disputed house for his personal use.
3. Not satisfied with the order of the Rent Controller, the landlord filed an appeal in the Court of District Judge, Mardan. Before the appellate Court two points were argued by the learned counsel for the appellant --landlord, that the tenants were rent-defaulters and that the landlord required the house for his personal use. The learned Appellate Court, reversing the findings of the learned Rent Controller on the issues relating to these two points, held that the respondents-tenants had made wilful default in the payment of rent and that the disputed house was genuinely required by the appellant--landlord for his personal use. Consequently, the order made by the learned Rent Controller was set aside by the appellate Court, which directed the ejectment of the respondent- tenants from the disputed house.
4. The tenants aforesaid have now filed this constitutional petition against the order of ejectment passed against them by the learned Appellate Court claiming that the said order being illegal and without lawful authority is ineffective as against their rights. '
5. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners argued that the findings of the learned Appellate Court on both the questions of default and personal use are wrong, being not in accordance with the material brought on record. Developing his arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioners argued that since Muhammad Ilyas, respondent No. I herein became owner of the disputed house during the currency of the tenancy, of the petitioners, it was incumbent on him to have served the petitioners with a notice that he had become owner of the disputed house, by purchasing the same .From his previous owner, and that in future rent of the house be paid to him, and only then the petitioners could legally become liable to pay rent to him. He further argued that since no such notice was given by the respondent No. 1, herein to the petitioner, the question of default, alleged to have been made by the petitioners, in the payment of rent, therefore, did not arise. The learned counsel was, however, put a question as to whether there was any provision in the relevant Act for such a notice, to which his reply very frankly was that there was no such provision in the law. That brought to an end his argument about notice.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioners further argued that there was ample evidence on the record to show that the petitioners did make genuine effort to pay the rent to the respondent No. 1, who himself did not accept it, neither in cash nor by money order, whereafter the same was deposited with the Senior Civil Judge, Mardan. He, therefore, suggested that the petitioners were not the defaulters of rent. Besides the fact that the Senior Civil Judge was not the Rent Controller for the area concerned but was a Rent Controller for urban area lying within the municipal limits of Mardan, the finding of the learned Appellate Court, after appraisal of the evidence on record, was that the petitioners had made wilful default in the payment of rent. Such finding, according to section 24 (4) of the relevant Act, is final and according to subsection (5) of this section it cannot be called in question in any court by any suit, appeal or other legal proceeding. The learned counsel for the petitioners, however, argued that this Court in its constitutional jurisdiction can interfere in the finding of the appellate Court, notwithstanding any provision of the law to the contrary.
7. The second ground on which the learned Appellate Court disturbed the finding of the learned Rent Controller was the ground of personal use, on the basis of which respondent No. 1 had sought ejectment of the petitioners herein from the disputed house. The learned counsel for the petitioners also challenged the finding of the learned appellate Court on this point as being contrary to the weight of evidence brought on the record. Such finding, as already observed, is also final and cannot be called in question in any Court.
8. We are conscious of the fact that we are dealing with a constitutional petition, and so was the learned counsel for the petitioners. There is before us a decision of the appellate Court, which is declared by the relevant la to be final on the point. The scope of writ jurisdiction of the High Court in such like matters came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in two cases of Muhammad Sharif and another v. Muhammad Afzal etc. (PLD 1981 SC 246) and Abdur Rehman Bajwa v. Sultan and 9 others (PLD 1981 SC 522) wherein the law laid down by the Supreme Court is : "That a Tribunal having jurisdiction to decide a matter is competent to decide it rightly or wrongly and the mere fact that another conclusion could be arrived at from the evidence does not make it a case for interference in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction; the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere in matters of the kind involved in the present case is very limited one and confined only to ascertaining whether the District Judge has not flouted the provisions of the relevant statute or has failed to follow the law relating thereto as laid down by the superior Courts; that if a Court or Tribunal set up under the ordinary law has the jurisdiction to decide a particular matter then there is jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly and the fact that the decision is incorrect, or is not one at which the High Court would have arrived, does not render decision without jurisdiction."
9. The learned counsel for the petitioners, in order to have refuge behind the authority reported as PLD 1982 Lah. 126, in vain attempted to argue that the decision of the learned appellate Court "lacks the proper impact of the legal exposition on the basic issue". We are afraid, this is no so in the case before us. The learned Appellate Court does not appear to have ignored or flouted the provisions of the relevant statute, nor was any failure to follow the law laid down by the superior Courts pertaining to the relevant statute brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the petitioners.
The mere fact that on the basis of the evidence on record another conclusion could be arrived at is not a ground for interference in the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction.
11. This petition is, therefore, without merits, and is hereby dismissed in limine.