GUL MUHAMMAD KHAN, J.-This Infra-Court Appeal is directed against the order dated 24th March, 1982, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court holding that the write petition became infructuous as the Martial Law authority had taken cognizance of the case for trial by a Military Court.
2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the appellant was transferred a residential plot bearing Khasra No. 830-1 measuring 8 kanals situate in Davisabad, Lahore, under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and a P. T. D. Allegedly issued .In her favour on 19th July, 1965. The Lahore Development Authority instead claimed its own right in the property on the ground that the same had been acquired for it. The appellant, therefore, made an application under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. She also impleaded in it the Chief Settlement Commissioner as a party through the Deputy Settlement Commissioner.
3. During the proceedings before the Tribunal, the record of the Settlement Department was summoned. It was produced by Mr. Nawazish Ali, Court Clerk of the Settlement Department, confirming the transfer in favour of the appellant. It is stated that the Tribunal found on 20th December, 1979, under section 30, that the appellant was a legal and valid transferee of the land and entitled to receive compensation subject to any exemption which may be granted by the L. D.
A.
4. The appellant then produced a copy of the order before the Land Acquisition Collector and got her name substituted in the record. A no-- objection-certificate is also said to have been given to her. The L. D. A., then considered the claim of the appellant and allotted plot No. 47 as an exempted plot. Later, the appellant applied to get another plot instead.
5. While all that was. Going on, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner informed the L. D, A., that the P.
T. D., relied upon by the appellant was forged as it had been issued on the basis of a fictitious compensation book. The L. D. A., then filed a review application before the President, L. D. A., Tribunal in respect of the order dated 20th December, 1979, passed to favour of the appellant previously.
The appellant contested the review application but simultaneously filed a civil suit for a declaration that the appellant was the lawful transferee of the plot on the basis of her P. T. D., issued in her favour on 19th July, 1965. She also challenged in the same suit a letter issued by the Duty Settlement Commissioner to the Director (Land Development), L. D. A., saying that the P. T. D. Was bogus. The serif proceed--ings, however, are not relevant to the matter in hand.
6. On 1st October, 1980, one Faqir Muhammad, Court Clerk of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner appeared before the Tribunal, in review proceedings, and produced the relevant office record. A copy of the review application was ordered to be given to him so that he could file parawise comments and reply. The case was then adjourned to 15th October, 1980, with a direction that Faqir Muhammad shall bring along with him the record.
7. On 15th October, 1980, Mr. Bashir, Land Acquisition Collector (Local Area) L. D. A., submitted an application asking for the withdrawal of the review application. The request was allowed and the review application was dismissed as withdrawn. Faqir Muhammad is said to have presented on that day a written statement averring therein that the P. T. D. In favour of the appellant had been rightly issued.
8. On 18th January, 1982, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner (respon--dent No. 2), sent a letter to the S. H. O., for the registration of a criminal case alleging that Faqir Muhammad had forged his signatures on the written statement filed before the L. D. A., Tribunal. A case, was, therefore, registered and the appellant had challenged the same in this constitutional petition praying that the same was illegal, without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
9. It is contended by the learned counsel that as the complaint of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner was about the written statement filed by Faqir Muhammad before the L. D. A., Tribunal, the saris could be filed only by the Tribunal and not the Deputy Settlement Commissioner.
It is consequently argued that the complaint of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner was in violation of section 195, Cr. P. C. And so the case registered by the 9. H. O., must be quashed. The learned counsel also challenged the factual situation that the case in dispute had been transferred to a Military Court. He, however, has not produced any proof to support his contention whereas the ]earned single Judge has given particulars of the letter by which it was dose. There is thus no merit in this contention.
10. The appellant has no case even otherwise. Section 195(1); Cr. P. C. Requires that `No Court shall take cognizance;
(c) of any offence described in section 463 or punishable under sec--tions 471, 475 or 476 of the same Code, when such offence is allege to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court' in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, except on the complaint in writing of such Court or some other Court to which such Court is subordinate.' .
(Underlining* supplied).
The prerequisites according to the above provisions are :-
(1) There must be a complaint in writing of the Court ;
(2) The offence must be committed under sections 463 punishable under sections 471, 475 or 476, P. P. C. In respect of a document produced or given in evidence in Court ;
(3) The offence must be alleged to be committed by a party to the proceeding.
Admittedly, the matter has not come before a Court up to this time and no Court has taken cognizance so far. .
This petition; therefore, must fail on this short ground.
11. The learned counsel then submitted that even registration of a case with regard to such a transaction as attributed to his clients is vitiated. The learned counsel referred to Bar Association v.
Crown PLD 1953 B J 33, where it was held that the word `complaint' in section 195(1) means a complaint as defined in section 4(1)(h), Cr. P. C. It reads as under :- " `complaint' means the allegations made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, thatsome person whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but it does not include the report of a Police Officer :'
He also relied on Crown v. Wazir Muhammad (1) where a learned Single Judge of this Court referred 'to section 4(l)(h) to hold that the word `complaint' used in section 195 should not have a different meaning from the one given in section 4(1)(h). It was further held ; "In the definition of the complaint as given above, the complaint has got to be made to a Magistrate, it shall not satisfy the provisions of law, if a complaint is made to the Police Officer, who in turn makes a report, or submits a complaint to the Court of the Magistrate concerned."
Reference was also made to the case of Ch. Mohammad Roshan v. State (2) wherein a learned Single Judge of this Court held that a Magistrate can take cognizance of a case in respect of such an offence only upon a complaint made by a Court. All the above precedents only show that if the offence as referred to in section 195(1)(c) is committed by a party to the proceeding the cognizance shall be taken by a competent Court only if a complaint in writing is made by the Court before whom the alleged offence was committed or by some other Court to which such Court is subordinate.
12. The main question arising in this case would be whether any such offence was committed and if so, was the offender a party to the proceeding? The learned counsel. Contended that it is not necessary that the document must be forged immediately before or during the proceeding.
Support was sought by the learned counsel from the case of State v. S. All Hussain (3) holding that the applicability of section 195(1)(c), Cr. P. C., has to be consi--dered not in relation to the time of preparation of the forged document but to the time of its use. Further, that in case the document is used in a Court for any purpose, the private prosecution is forbidden and only the Court before which the document was produced and used or sought to be used could prosecute the document-maker or the person using such document.
13. The facts given by, the learned counsel do show that the complaint, of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, on which the case had been registered, concerned forging of his signature by Faqir Muhammad, on the written statement, filed in the review proceedings before the L. D. A., Tribunal.
Apparently, it was the Tribunal who should have lodged the complaint and not the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. Section 195, Cr. P. C., embodies an exception, to a general rule, entitling every person having knowledge of the commission of a crime to set the law in motion, by lodging a complaint. We, therefore, agree with the learned counsel that as the law creates an exception, it shall also not permit of achieving the same result indirectly, i.e. by getting a case registered.
Reference be also made to Emperor v. Bal Mukand (4). . In Fakir Muhammad v. Emperor (5), it was held that the offences referred to in section 195, Cr. P. C., or the acts constituting those offences shall not be deemed to be any offences at all, except on the complaint to the persons or the Courts therein specified. The wisdom of law is that it is an offence against Court and it is for the presiding officers to uphold the. Prestige of the Courts and not the litigants to achieve gratification of their personal revenge and vindication of Couxt's honour. Also see H. N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi (6).
(1) PLD 1953 Pesh. 21 (2) PLD 1977 Lab. 307
(3) P I, D 1975 Kar. 403 (4) AIR 1928 Lab. 510
(5) AIR 1927 Sind 10(6) AIR 1955 SC 196
14. However, in order to rely on section 195(1)(c), Cr. P. C., there must be lawful proceedings when an offence is alleged to have been committed under section 463 and punishable under section 471, 475 or 476, P. P. C., by a party to that proceedings in any Court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence . . . . Thus when the proceeding by itself was ultra vires or illegal, it was held in Babu Ram v. Emperor (1) and Sumat Prashad v. Emperor (2) that no offence was committed.
Similarly when the declaration was inadmissible in evidence, the offence did not fall under section 195, Cr. P. C., as held in Empreor v. Ram Prasad (3).
15. In the case in hand, the Tribunal was constituted under section 60 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922. It performs the functions of the Court in reference to the acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. No power of review is provided for it though its order is appealable under section 54 of the Land `Acquisition Act. The power of review, on the other hand, is never inherent in a Court or Tribunal and must be conferred by law as held in Mst. Zainab Khatoon v. Ghulam Shabbir (4) and Ghazi Abdul Yawar v. C. S. C. (5). In this view of the matter, the case before the Tribunal stood decided finally on 20th December, 1979, and the review matter was ultra vires. Again, the alleged offensive act would be, at the most, an act, after toe proceeding had concluded by their withdrawal. Consequently, section 195, Cr. P. C. Had no application as held in Subbarayuder. v. Gopayya (6).
16. Section 195(1)-- applies if the offence of forgery is committed by a party to any proceeding.
Faqir Muhammad, in this case was a clerk of the office of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. He was thus not a party to the proceeding. It was held in Emperor v. Rasul Ahmad-(7) that no complaint by a Court was necessary under section 195(1)(c), Cr. P. C. To prosecute Rasul Ahmad under section 467, P. P. C. When he was not a party to the proceeding and was alleged to have scribed the forged document. On a question that whether a guardian ad !Item of a minor is a party to the proceedings, the Madras High Court observed in re Rayalla Ramappa (8) that a guardian is not a party within the meaning of section 195(L)(c), Cr. P. C. In Lala Mathur Prasad v. Pitambar Singh
(9) it was observed that sec--tion 195(1)(c) bars the cognizance of the offence of forgery and certain offences, when the offence is committed by a party to any proceeding in Court but creates no bar if such offence is committed by any person who is not a party to any proceeding in Court.
The same view was taken in Emperor v. Ghansham Singh (10) and John Martin Sequeira v. Luja Bai (11). The case of Kartick Chandra Biswas v. Emperor (12) ended in a compromise between A & B. In these proceedings a certified copy of a municipal plan bad been filed on behalf of B. The copy was .Taken out by a person identified as B by a pleader N. B made an application to the Chief Presidency Magistrate asking for inquiry into the matter, his complaint being that A and others had tampered with the original plan and had taken out the certified copy by giving a false receipt and on false identification by N. The ChiefPresidency Magistrate, after examining B, issued warrant against A under sections 417, 419 and 430, 109, Penal Code. The Court held ;.-
(1) 111 C 14.1 .(2) AIR 1942 All. 11
(3) I L R 35 All. 58(4) PLD 1965 SC 55
(5) PLJ 1935 Lab. 232(6) AIR 1932 Mad. 290
(7) A 1 R 1947 All. 173(8) AIR 1944 Mad. 528
(9) AIR 1945 Pat. 362(10) 32 1 L R 74
(11) 25 1 L R 671(12) AIR 1930 Cal. 278 " . . . . It is quite clear on the facts of this case that the offences were not committed by parties to any proceedings in Court while the said proceeding was pending in respect of documents produced or given in evidence in such proceeding . . . . . The offences were committed long after the proceedings in Court had come to a termination."
In view of the above, it is quite clear that the allegations against Faqir Muhammad and the co- accused did not fall under section 195(1'(c), Cr. P. C. And so no illegality was committed by the S. H.
O., in receiving the complaint of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to register the case. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed in limine.