' K. M. A. SAMDANI, J.-This case relates to the land which belonged to the late Col. Sardar Hariiid Hassan Khan the father of petitioner No, 5, Mst. Shah Khanam. He also had a son Sardar Ahmad Khan by name I who predeceased him leaving behind a widow and three children. Petitioner. No, 1 is the widow, petitioner No, 2 the son and petitioners Nos. 3 and 4 the dauthers of the said Sardar Ahmad Khan. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3, also claim to be the issues of the late Colonel from a different wife. Their paternity, however. Is disputed by the petitioners while respondents Nos. 2 and 3, admit that the late Colonel was also the father of petitioner No, 5, and the grandfather of petitioners Nos. 2 to 4. The said Colonel owned considerable landed property. According to the petitioners he made a gift in 1969, of his entire land measuring 6193 kanals 13 marlas in favour of his daughter and grandchildren, i. e. Petitioners Nos. 2 to 5 and accordingly a mutation of Temleek was entered on the 1st of September, 1969. It may also be mentioned here that his son Sardar Ahmad Khan died in the year 1958 while Col. Hamid Hassan Khan died on the 31st of March, 1974. In the year 1972, when Martial , Law Regulation 11.5 was promulgated, Col. Hamid Hassan Khan failed to file the declaration required thereunder. In his life time he asserted in the first place that his land did not exceed the limit of twelve thousand produce index units as it was, according to him, not more than 10 thousand produce index units and in the second that he had transferred his land in the year 1969 to his daughter and grand children and as such was not the owner of the land in question His pleas do not appear to have been accepted and criminal proceedings were initiated against him under the Land Reforms Regulation.
' After the death of the Colonel, however, Mst. Tayyiba Khanam, his widowed daughter-in-law, who is petitioner No, 1 in the present case, moved the Chief Land Commissioner, Punjab for declaring the alleged gift valid. It must also be mentioned here that the mutation of tamleek entered on the 1st of September, 1969 was never presented to any Revenue Officer for attestation before the introduction of the Land Reforms, and subsequent to the promulgation of the Land Reforms Regulation, the Revenue Officer hesitated to sanction it as it appeared to be hit by the provisions of the said Regulation. So, petitioner No, 1 prayed before the Chief Land Commissioner that the said mutation be also directed to be sanctioned. The learned Chief Land Commissioner accordingly directed the mutation to be sanctioned, declared the gift to be valid for the purposes of the Land Reforms and also dropped the proceedings against the late Colonel and his property. Thereupon respondents Nos. 2 and 3 moved the Federal Land Commission questioning the genuineness of the mutation of gift. According to them it was a device resorted to by the petitioners to deprive respondents Nos. 2 and 3, of their due share in the property of the late Colonel. Before the Federal Land Commission the petitioners questioned the paternity of respondents Nos. 2 and 3, and also challenged their locus standi on that ground. The learned Chairman, Federal Land Commission, however, was satisfied that respondents Nos. 2 and 3, were also the issues of the late Colonel. But independently of his satisfaction on this issue, he decided the question of the validity of the gift in exercise of his suo motu revisional jurisdiction and reversed the finding of the Chief Land Commissioner, Punjab by declaring the gift to be invalid and directing the land in excess of the permissible limit to be resumed leaving the balance to be inherited by the legal heirs of the late Colonel.
' Aggrieved by this order the petitioners have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution questioning the authority of the Chairman, Federal Land Commission to decide the queslion of inheritance and the correctness of his finding with regard to the validity of the disputed gift.
2. A perusal of the impugned order which is dated 8th January,' 1976, will show that the learned Chairman, Federal Land Commission, has not categorically declared respondents Nos, 2 to 3, to be son and daughter of late Col. Hamid Hassan Khan. In fact he was not required to make any such declaration. The observations with regard to the paternity of respondents Nos. 2 and 3, were obviously made for the purpose of disposing of the preliminary objection to their locus standi. The exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the learned Chairman did not depend upon the status of respondents Nos. 2 and 3. He had suo motu jurisdiction under the Land Reforms Regulation and he expressly exercised it. Therefore, the petitioners cannot have any legitimate grievance against the impugned order on that score.
3. We may, however, examine whether the learned Chairman, Federal Land Commission exceeded his authority in scrutinising the alleged gift and declaring it invalid. The gift having allegedly been made in the year 1969 was open to scrutiny by the Land Commission authority under clause (b) of paragraph 7 (1) of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972. In fact since the genuineness of the mutation was being doubted and the charge against the late Colonel was that he had the mutation entered after the promulgation of the Land Reforms Regulation and had it back-dated in order to save his property from resumption and also to save himself from prosecution for his failure to file a declaration, the mutation was open to scrutiny also under clause (b) of paragraph 7 (1) of the Regulation. Since this question was examined in the first place by. The Chief Land Commissioner, the result of the examination was subject to revision by the Federal Land Commission under paragraph 29 of the Regulation.
4. Therefore, all that this Court is required to decide is whether in the exercise of the revision jurisdiction, the learned Chairman Federal Land Commission committed any such error as can be said to have rendered his ' decision legally ineffective. It may be noted here that the learned Chairman has declared the transaction of gift in question to be invalid mainly on two grounds namely-
(i) that the mutation was a forgery, and
(ii) that the declaration of gift, if any, was not followed by delivery of possession.
5. We need not comment upon all the reasons given by the learned Chairman in support of his finding that the mutation which appears to have been entered on the 1st of September, 1969, was a forgery. There can certainly be no two opinions on this issue. But simply because a contrary opinion is also possible, the finding of the Federal Land Commission cannot necessarily be held to be without lawful authority as laid down by the Supreme Court in Muhammad Hussain Munir v.
Sikandar and others (1). But apart from the question of genuineness of the mutation which, at best can serve only as evidence of gift, there, is ample indication on record that the late Colonel remained in possession of and managed the land in question right uptil his last days. For example, the application submitted to the Tehsildar/Inquiry Officer by the late Colonel on the 9th of September, 1972, a copy (annexure 'A') of which has been placed on record by the petitioners themselves clearly shows that the Colonel was himself managing the land in question and exercising full proprietary rights over it. The argument that the donees being minors and wards of the donor, there was no necessity of delivery of possession to complete the gift, can be of no avail to the petitioners because neither all the donees were minors nor all of them were wards. It is an admitted fact in this case that petitioner No, 5, who is the daughter of the late Colonel and who according to the petitioners is one of the donees was a married woman when the gift was made there is nothing on the record to show that either she accepted the gift or on her behalf, her husband took delivery of possession. Similarly there. Is nothing on the record to show that the grand daughters of the donor were minors when the gift was made. It appears that only the grand son Adnan (petitioner No, 2) was a minor. But even in his case as also in the case of the grand daughters their mother could have taken possession and the names of the donees could have been recorded in the revenue records as the owners in possession of the land in question. It is however understandable that since the mutation had not been sanctioned, the donees were not recorded as owners. But if they had taken possession there was no reasons why khasra girdawaris should not have indicated their possession.
6. In view of this state of evidence, no fault can be found with the finding of the learned Chairman, Federal Land Commission that even if the late Colonel had the intention of making a gift of his landed property to petitioners Nos. 2 to 5, that intention was never carried out to the hilt and the gift remained incomplete. And for the proper enforce-' meat of the Land Reforms Regulation the Land Commission authorities have the authority to go into the question of validity and genuineness of the trans actions which appear to defeat the purposes of the Regulation.
7. In our opinion therefore, the order of the Federal Land Commission declaring the gift in question allegedly made by the late Col. Hamid Hassan Khan in favour of petitioners Nos. 2 to 5, to be invalid for the purposes of the Regulation, is neither without lawful authority nor without legal effect. Since the late Colonel failed to submit the declaration in respect of his land, it is open to the Land Commission authorities to resume the land he owned in excess of the permissible limit. It goes without saying that the remaining land has devolved upon his heirs whosoever they may be. It is not for the Land Commission to distribute it amongst the heirs as directed by the learned Chairman, Federal Land Commission. It is open to the petitioners and respondents Nos. 2 and 3, to fight out the question of inheritence in the Civil Court with regard to the un resumed land.
8. With these observations we dismiss the writ petition leaving the parties, in the circumstances of the case, to bear their own costs.