1. DORAB PATEL, J.-This dispute in this petition for leave relates to a house in Lahore which was evacuee property and had been allotted to the private respondents in this petition to whom we will refer as the respondents. It is not disputed that the NCH form of the respondents was allowed. But, in his arguments before us, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that they were the heirs of one Abdul Hamid, the deceased, to whom we will refer as the deceased and that the deceased had filed an NCH form for the house on 26 10-1960. This plea is inconsistent with the averments in para--graph 1 of the petition for leave. Be that as it may, nothing turns on this discrepancy because the petitioners pressed their claim only on a deed of association which according to them had been entered into between the respondents and the deceased. The deed was a very unusual deed, because, according to learned counsel, the respondents had agreed to transfer the house to the deceased, because he was to advance the consideration for it.
2. Next, according to learned counsel, the price for the house was adjusted against the compensation books supplied exclusively by the deceased, therefore, a P. T. O. Was issued in his favour on 10-10- 1960. However, suddenly three years later, the respondents filed an appeal against the issue of the P. T. O. To the deceased. The additional Settlement Commissioner pointed out in his order of 30-6- 1964 that the claim of the respondents was supported by an order allowing their NCH form, but that the P. T. O. Issued to the deceased was not supported by any order whatever, and as these circumstances invited suspicion, he remanded the case to the Deputy Settlement Commis--sioner.
3. On remand, although the deed of association, on which the deceased relied, was not available, and although its execution was denied by the respondent, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner accepted the petitioner's claim that he had entered into a deed of association with the respondents, as claimed by him, and that the P. T. O. Had been issued to him in accordance with this deed, therefore, he rejected the claim of the respondents. The respondents challenged this order in an appeal which was allowed by an Additional Settlement Commissioner on the 20th of April, 1965, but the deceased challenged this order in a revision and by his order dated 10-10-1968, the Settlement Commissioner again remanded the case to the Deputy Settle--ment Commissioner.
4. On this second remand, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner was poorly impressed by the fact that the alleged deed of association on which the petitioner relied was not available. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner then observed that this alleged deed of association had not been approved by the competent authority nor there is any other independent order on the basis of which P. T. O. Was issued to the petitioner". Accordingly, by his order dated 23-5-1972, he cancelled the P. T. O. Issued to the deceased and directed the transfer of the house to the respondents.
5. Abdul Hamid having died meanwhile the petitioners filed an appeal against this order which, in the events that happened, was treated as a revision and allowed by an Additional Settlement Commissioner on 10-4-1974. Therefore, the respondents challenged this order in a writ petition in the Lahore High Court, which was allowed on 6-6-1975. Hence this petition for leave.
6. The learned Judge, who heard the writ petition, allowed the writ on several grounds. The first was that the P. T. O. Issued to the deceased was not supported by any order of the Settlement Department. The second was that the deed of association was not available, and although the petitioners relied on a copy, it was proved that the Department had never, given its approval to the deed of association. In this connection; the learned Judge observed "Merely filing of an agreement of association along with NCH form by a party or its production before the Settlement Authorities by the person in whose favour it was executed is not sufficient unless both the parties appear before the proper authority and admit the deed. If they admit the deed, the authority has to accept it and after that an order is passed accordingly. Learned counsel for the respondents has not been able to show that the petitioners, ever appeared before the competent Settlement authority and admitted the deed of association. He has also failed to show that any competent authority had ever accepted the agreement."
7. Accordingly, he allowed the writ petition. Hence this petition for leave.
8. Learned counsel was not available to explain how a P. T. O. Was issued to the deceased without any order by the Settlement Department. He, however, submitted that the learned Judge had erred in setting aside the Additional Settlement Commissioner's order on the ground that the deed of association had not been approved by the authorities. In this connection, the submission of the learned counsel was that the view of learned Judge was against the rules and supported by any authority. As we were certain that the point was covered by the authority and that the view taken by the learned Judge was in consonance of the settled practice of the Settlement Department, we reserved orders in order to examine the law.
9. The view taken by the learned Judge is amply supported by authority and we would only refer here to a judgment of Muhammad Afzal Zullah, J. When our learned brother was a Judge of the High Court at Lahore in Haji Ghulam Hussain v. Hamid Hassan Khan (PLD 1969 Lah. 147). M. A. Zullah, J., observed at page 156 :- "It does not, however, mean that the Settlement Authorities were in all cases, bound to accept the association. In proper cases, they could refuse to accept or act upon an association e.g., in case when the transferee is a widow, or an invalid and the association agreement is silent or is tricky about the consideration the Settlement Authorities may refuse to accept such an association.
10. There are many cases where the Settlement Authorities refused to accept the association.
11. Admittedly, the normal practice is that an association is not acted upon, unless it is formally accepted by the Settlement Authorities."
12. We agree with these observations, and, in the instant case, the fact that the Settlement Authorities had not given their approval to the deed of association together with the other circumstances relied upon by the learned, Judge, makes it impossible for us to believe the petitioner's claim about the alleged deed of association. Therefore, we are unable to accept learned counsel's submission that the High Court exceeded its limited Constitutional jurisdiction in allowing the writ petition of the respondents.
13. The petition is without merit and is dismissed.