MUDASSIR KHALID ABBASI, J.--- Through this constitutional petition, petitioners have challenged the legality of judgment dated 21.03.2014 passed by respondent No.3/learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No.9, Multan and judgment dated 23.02.2016 passed by respondent No.2/Learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal No.II, Multan.
2. Brief facts of the case are that respondent No.1 while posted as Recovery Inspector, Water and Sanitation Agency (WASA), Multan was proceeded under the Punjab Employees Efficiency Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 (herein after called as PEEDA Act, 2006) on the allegation that he prepared a fictitious bill of Rs.44,000/- against Consumer Account No.29/000954, and did not deposit the same in WASA account. He was proceeded under the PEEDA, Act, 2006 and awarded major penalty of removal from service vide order dated 23.04.2013. Feeling aggrieved, the said respondent filed a grievance petition under Section 33 of the Punjab Industrial Act 2010 before respondent No.3/learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No.9, Multan which was contested by the petitioners/Multan Development Authority, Multan (MDA), it was allowed vide judgment dated 23.04.2013, removal order was set aside and respondent No.1 was reinstated into service with all back benefits on the ground that Section 15(2) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Order) Ordinance, 1968 was not complied. Feeling aggrieved petitioners filed an appeal before respondent No.2/learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal No.II, Multan which met with the same fate vide impugned judgment dated 23.02.2016.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that both judgments passed by courts below are not tenable in law. Further contends that PEEDA Act, 2006 is applicable to the employees of the MDA and learned Courts below have wrongly held that proceeding under Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Order) Ordinance, 1968 were not initiated, therefore, punishment is illegal.
Further contends that under Section 1(4) of the Punjab Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Order) Amendment Act, 2012 jurisdiction of the Labour Court stands barred. Argued that respondent No.1 embezzled the state revenue and was proceeded in accordance with law.
Moreover, findings of both the courts below are against the law and facts of the case, therefore, same are liable to be set aside. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on 2015 SCM R 706, 2013 SCM R 1707, 2016 SCM R 931, 2016 SCM R 2146, 2007 SCM R 229 and PLD 2006 SC 602.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.1 opposed the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners and argued that it was specifically held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that establishment which has no statutory rules is to be governed under Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. Moreover, that there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgments passed by the courts below. Argued that the petition is without any substance, therefore, same is liable to be dismissed. Reliance is placed on PLD 2000 SC 207, 1997 SCM R 1368 and PLD 2003 SC 724.
6. I have given my conscious thought to the contentions raised by learned counsel for the parties and the law referred.
7. Primary legal question involved in this case is that as to whether respondent No.1 being employee of a statutory body, Multan Development Authority constituted under an Act having non-statutory rules, in case of his removal under PEEDA Act, 2006 could invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court.
8. While re-instating respondent No.1, learned Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal have relied on a judgment cited as PLD 2000 SC 207 titled as "Lahore Development Authority through its Director General, Lahore and another v. Abdul Shafique and others", wherein it has been held that the functions performed by Lahore Development Authority were such that the authority could be said to be "industry" within the meaning of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and by virtue of functions of Lahore Development Authority, the employees are entitled to protection of labour laws.
Grievance petition by the employees of Lahore Development Authority against their dismissal from service was maintainable before the Labour Court. Moreover, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 being a beneficial ordinance has to be construed liberally and beneficially.
9. Multan Development Authority has been created under Section 4 of the Punjab Development Cities Act, 1976 and according to subsection (3) of Section 4 of the Act ibid. the authority shall be a body corporate. In terms of Section 40 of the Act, employees of the authority shall be deemed to be public servant. In terms of Section 44, Multan Development Authority framed regulations for its employees, Multan Development Authority (Appointment and Conditions of Services) Regulations, 1980 (amended upto 2016) and vide regulation No.22 Punjab Civil Servant (Efficiency and Disciple)
Rules, 1975 were adopted and made applicable to the employees of the authority whereas subsequently, these rules were replaced by E&D Rules, 1999. On 18.09.2000, Punjab Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 was promulgated and this ordinance was made applicable to the employees of the authority. On 17.10.2006, Punjab Employees Efficiency Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 (herein after called PEEDA Act, 2006) was promulgated. Para 22 of the Multan Development Authority (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules 1980 amended in 2016 provides as under:- 22.Subject to the provisions of the Act, these regulations and the schedule, the following laws and rules shall apply mutatis mutandis, to the employees of the Authority:- a. The West Pakistan Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1966. b. The Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975.
10. Irrespective of applicability of labour laws to the employees of Multan Development Authority, respondent No.1 being employee of the A authority could be proceeded under PEEDA Act, 2006, in terms of the a fore-stated regulations and at the strength of judgment passed by the Honorable Supreme Court cited as 2016 SCM R 931 titled "Haroon-urRasheed v. Lahore Development Authority and others" wherein it has been explicitly laid down that: Section 2(h) of PEEDA, Act, 2006 recognizes two sets of employees; one in the government service or those who are members of a civil service of the Province or who hold civil post in connection with affairs of the Province and another set of persons in the employment of corporation, corporate body, autonomous body, authority, statutory body or any other organization or institution set up, established, owned, managed or controlled by the Government by or under any law for the time being in force or a body or organization in which the Government of Punjab has a controlling share or interest and also includes the Chairman and the Chief Executive and the holder of any other office therein. Thus it could be seen that irrespective whether a person is in the Government service or a member of a civil service (per section 2(h)(ii) of PEEDA) or is in employment of corporation or corporate or statutory body (per section 2(h)(i) of PEEDA) could be proceeded departmentally in disciplinary matter under the uniform statutory disciplinary dispensation. Any proceedings taken, penalty imposed in terms of PEEDA, 2006 could be agitated before the departmental hierarchy by way of appeal, review and or revision before the competent authority detailed therein.
It is abundantly clear that the respondent is an employee of Lahore Development Authority, a statutory authority created under section 4 of Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975, proceeded under PEEDA, 2006, which is a statutory intervention in disciplinary matter, therefore, irrespective of the fact that the rules framed under section 45 of the Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975 are non statutory yet the respondents were not proceeded under the Rules, 1978 but under the PEEDA, 2006 which is a statutory enactment and even a level up of the statutory rules. Therefore, High Court has jurisdiction to examine the proprietary of the impugned action taken against the respondents under the PEEDA, 2006."
In another pronouncement cited as 2015 SC MR 706 "Muhammad Amin and another v. Government of Punjab and others" it has been held that: "Section 19 of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006, clearly drew a (distinction) line between civil servants and the employees defined under S. 2(h)(i) of the said Act---Such employees who were covered under the definition of S. 2(h)(i) of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006, if aggrieved by a final order passed by the Departmental authorities under S.16 or 17 of the said Act, could seek redressal of their grievances before the High Court."
Reliance is also placed on "Muhammad Raft and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others"
(2016 SCM R 2146), wherein it has also been held that: "Aggrieved person could invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court against a public authority if he satisfied that the act of the authority was violative of the service regulations even if they were non-statutory."
11. The above stated position of law makes it abundantly clear that respondent No.1 was rightly proceeded under the PEEDA Act, 2006. Now the question remains that what was the legal remedy left with the said respondent after his removal from service. Section 16 of the Act ibid provides that an accused who has been awarded any penalty under this Act may prefer departmental appeal to the appellate authority. Section 16 reads as under:- "16.Departmental appeal and review--- (1) An accused who has been awarded any penalty under this Act may, except where the penalty has been imposed by the Chief Minister, within thirty days from the date of communication of the order, prefer departmental appeal directly to the appellate authority. "
Section 2(h)(i) is reproduced as under:- "2.Definitions.---In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context (h) "employee" means a person---
(i) in the employment of a corporation, corporate body, autonomous body, authority, statutory body or any other organization or institution set up, established, owned, managed or controlled by the Government, by or under any law for the time being in force or a body or organization in which the Government has a controlling share or interest and includes the chairman and the chief executive and the holder of any other office therein."
12. In terms of Subsection (3) of Section 4 of the Punjab Development Cities Act, 1976, the authority shall be a body corporate. The Multan Development Authority falls within the definition of 2(h)(i) of PEEDA Act, 2006, as it is not only a statutory body created under the B Punjab Development of Cities Act, 1976 but also falls within the purview of body corporate as envisaged Section 4 of Act ibid.
13. At the strength of law and citations referred above, case of respondent No.1, being employee of MDA, remedy against his removal from service, lies before the departmental and appellate authority if respondent No.1 would have been proceeded under the labour laws then he could invoke the jurisdiction of High Court. Whereas in the present case since proceedings were initiated under PEEDA Act, 2006, therefore, in such eventuality conclusion can safely be drawn that the powers exercised by the labour court are not lawful and without jurisdiction. Therefore, question of violation of Section 15(2) of Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Order) Ordinance, 1968 does not arise, on the basis for which the removal of respondent No.1 was set aside by the Labour Court/Labour Appellate Court.
"What has been narrated above, this petition is allowed impugned judgments dated 21.03.2014 passed by the Presiding Officer Punjab Labour Court No.9, Multan/Respondent No.2 and the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal No.II, Multan dated 23.02.2016 are set aside. Respondent No.1 may file a departmental appeal as provided under section 16 of PEEDA Act, 2006 for redressal of his grievance, if so desire.