The facts giving rise to this writ petition are that respondent No. 3, Mst. Asghari Begum Qureshi, hereinafter referred to as the respondent, owns two adjoining houses with a common passage. The house situated on the main road has been let out by her to the petitioner, Mst. Nasreen Rashid, while the house in the background is occupied by the respondent and her family. The respondent made an application for ejectment of the petitioner inter alia on the ground of nuisance as spelt out in clause (iv) of subsection (2) of section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, hereinafter referred to as the said Ordinance. 1t Was alleged by the respondent that the petitioner was keeping dogs which was a source of nuisance to her (respon--dent) and her family members. It was also urged by her that the petitioner and her husband interfered with their comfort by holding political meetings at the house in their occupation. The plea raised by the respondent fond favour with the Rent Controller, who heard the ejectment application. As a result, the petitioner was directed to vacate the disputed premises. She filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge but without success. She has, therefore, invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court to challenge the orders of the two tribunals below.
2. It was contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the evidence led by the respondent showed that the petitioner had caused nuisance to the respondent alone and since there was no evidence indicating that other occupants of buildings in the neighbourhood were also victims of the nuisance attributed to her, it did not constitute a valid ground for ordering eviction of the petitioner. In this connection, he placed reliance on Munna Tewari and others v. Chandarbali and others (1), K. T. Hing v.
1. N. Silas (2), Rameshwar Narayan Agarwal v. Emperor (3), Abdul Kader v.
The Chairman, Dacca Municipality (4), Maijuddin Laskar and 13 others v. Maulana Nurun--nabi (5) and Inayat Ullah v. Abdul Majid (6).
3. In reply, it was urged by learned counsel for the respondent that even if the nuisance is caused to the occupants of one building in the neighbourhood that was sufficient for ordering ejectment of the tenant. 1t was maintained by him that although in clause (iv) of subsection (2) of section 13 of the said Ordinance the word "buildings" had been used yet it did not mean that if the occupants of one building suffer nuisance they cannot avail of the said provisions of law. He invited my attention in clause (2) of section 12 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956, hereinafter referred to as the General Clauses Act, which provides that the "words in the singular shall include the plural and vice versa". He also cited Mst. Sundar v. Lalta Prasad (7) to support his plea. In regard to the authorities relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, it was submitted by learned counsel for the respondent that they all related to the cases of public nuisance and were, therefore, not relevant to the point in issue.
4. Clause (iv) of subsection (2j of section 13 of the said Ordinance, which is required to be interpreted in the present case, reads as follows :- "(iv) the tenant has been guilty of such acts and conduct as are a nuisance to the occupants of buildings in the neighbourhood."
(1) AIR 1928 All. 627 (2) (1929) I L R 57 Cal. 849
(3) AIR 1939 Bom. 92 (4) PLD 1958 Dacca 425
(5) PLD 1965 Dacca 421(6) 1969 P Cr. L J 300
(7) AIR 1956 All. 211
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner laid emphasis on the word "build--ings" used in clause (iv) to urge that since there was no evidence showing that occupants of buildings in the neighbourhood of the disputed building, other than the occupants of the building lived in by the respondent, were effected by the nuisance ascribed to the petitioner the said nuisance did not justify the passing of an order of eviction against the petitioner. He was of the view that the provisions of clause (iv) are not attracted unless the occupants of at least two buildings in the neighbourhood are victims of the nuisance.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the proposition put forth by learned counsel for the petitioner but has not been able to pursuade myself to agree with him. The fact that in clause (iv) the word "buildings" I has been used would, by itself, not justify a conclusion that if the occupants of only one building in the neighbourhood are troubled by the nuisance generated by the tenant he cannot be proceeded against under clause (iv). According to subsection (2) of section 12 of the General Clauses Act, the words in the plural include the singular. Therefore, on the strength of the said provisions of the General Clauses Act the word "buildings" can be inter--preted as one building also.
7. This view finds support from another word used in clause (iii) of subsection (2) of section 13 of the said Ordinance. By this I mean the word "acts" used in clause (iii), which reads as follows :- "The tenant has committed such acts as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the building or rented land."
If the tenant commits one act only which impairs materially the value of the building, such as setting on fire or pulling down a major part of it, can it be said that the landlord will be unable to press into service the provisions of clause (iii) for throwing out the tenant because the act attributed to him is one and not more? The answer would, obviously, be in the negative. Similarly, if the nuisance created by a tenant is a source of constant discom--fort to occupants of one building in his neighbourhood he should not escape the consequences of his conduct simply because the other persons in the neighbourhood are, for the time being, safe at his hands.
8. It is also to be noted that the possibility of there being only one building in the neighbourhood can also not be ruled out, especially in the residential colonies .Which are under construction. In such a case there will be no occupants of any building in the neighbourhood other than those of one such building and if the interpretation of learned counsel for the petitioner is adopted it would not be possible for the landlord to come to their rescue by having recourse to the provisions of clause (iv). The law has to cater for all sorts of situations and this object would not be achieved if the view expressed by learned counsel for the petitioner is adopted. I am, therefore, not inclined to accept it.
9. As for the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner they are in respect of "nuisance" to "public" or "nuisance" is connection with "any public place" as contemplated by section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or in regard to "public nuisance" as envisaged by section 268 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The word used in clause (iv) of subsection (2) of section 13 of the said Ordinance is "nuisance" and the word "public" does not occur therein. The said authorities have, therefore, little bearing on the point in issue.
10. As against this, the case of Mst. Sundar, relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent, relates to an ejectment matter and it supports the view taken by me, namely, that a, tenant can be evicted from the premises in his occupation if the nuisance caused by him affects the occupants of even one building in tile neighbourhood. Relevant observations made in that case read as follows :- "The question is whether the acts of ill-treating, abusing and beating the landlord who happens to be an old lady and who is residing in a part of the house constitute a nuisance or not. The learned Judge appears to think that creating a nuisance means using the accommodation in such a manner as to make it unfit for human occupation or keeping it extremely dirty or putting it to a use which might have the effect of depreciating the value of the property in future.
I think the words 'creating a nuisance' are capable of a wider inter--pretation. They include, on the part of the tenant in my opinion, acts and behaviours which make it extremely inconvenient for the landlord or any other tenant occupying a portion of the house to live in it in a peaceful manner.
A person who abuses his position as a tenant by resorting to acts of violence against his landlord who is occupying a portion of the house creates, in my opinion, a nuisance such as would entitle the landlord to go to a Court of law and seek his ejectment without the permission of the District Magistrate under section 3 of the Act.
To put any other interpretation upon . The words 'creating a nuisance' would be to put a premium on gross misbehaviour on the part of a tenant occupying a house in a portion of which his landlord also happens to be staying."
In the instant case also it is alleged that when the respondent and her husband objected to nuisance on the part of the petitioner, they were abused by the petitioner and her husband and that her (respondent's) husband was also given beating.
11. What emerges from the foregoing discussion is that since the respon--dent has been guilty of causing nuisance to the respondent and her family, who live in the neigbbourhood of the house occupied by the petitioner, she (petitioner) was liable to be evicted from the said house. The order o ejectment made against her by the learned Rent Controller and upheld by the learned appellate authority, therefore, does not call for any interference.
12. Resultantly, this constitutional petition fails. It is, therefore, dismissed, but there shall be no order as to costs.
13. The order of ejectment shall not be executed against the petitioner for two months if she, pays or deposits rent for each month before the 15th day of the next month. In case of any default, the order of ejectment shall become executable forthwith.