ASLAM RIAZ HUSSAIN, J.-The petitioner seeks Leave to Appeal against the dismissal of her writ petition filed before the Lahore High Court challenging the order of ejectment passed against her on 1-7-1981 by the Rent Controller which was affirmed on appeal by the Additional District Judge, Lahore, on 5-12-1981.
2. The petitioner was a tenant under the respondents in 1/2 portion of the latter's bungalow in Gulberg, Lahore. The ground on which the ejectment was ordered was of `nuisance' within the meaning of clause (iv) of subsection (2) of section 13 of the Punjab Rent Restriction Ordi--nance, 1959. The nuisance, according to the landlords had been caused by keeping vicious dogs by the petitioner; (ii) indulging in political activities by the petitioner and her husband at the premises; and (iii) clashes between the parties as a result of above-mentioned reasons, in which the petitioner and her husband had abused and manhandled the landlady and her husband. The Controller did not accept the allegation as regards holding of public meetings but he was satisfied that the keeping of dogs had become a bone of contention between the parties; that there was positive evidence to show that the parties could not avoid clash on certain occasions and that' the tenancy had created such problems for the landlady and her family members as had disturbed their peace and tranquillity. The Controller, thus, found the issue in favour of the landlady and directed the petitioner's ejectment.
The appellate Court not only agreed with the Controller's finding but also found that there was evidence to support the holding of public meetings at the disputed premises.
3. The main contention before the High Court was that the allegations made, even if established do not constitute nuisance within the meaning of clause (iv) of section 13(2), because nuisance contemplated therein was essentially one of a public nature affecting the occupants of more than one -building in the neighbourhood and trot the occupants 'of a single house, specially when if is a part of the very house occupied by the tenant. This contention, however, did not prevail with the learned Judge in Chamber and the writ petition was dismissed by a lengthy and well reasoned judgment.
4, Learned counsel for the petitioner raised the same contention before us, namely, that the allegations made by the landlady do not constitute nuisance within the meaning of S. 13(2)(iv) of the Rent Ordinance, which reads as follows :- "(iv) the tenant has been guilty of such acts and conduct as area nuisance to the occupants of buildings in the neighbourhood."
As already mentioned the High Court bad examined this point at some length and discussed the relevant case-law before repelling the contention Mr. Hakam Qureshi, Advocate, who was present on behalf of the respondent informed the Court, that the petitioner had already vacated the premises and that on account of her absence, the electricity, gas and water connec--tions had also been disconnected. This was not denied by learned counsel for the petitioner but he explained that the petitioner had not relinquished her possession but had only temporarily shifted to another place in order to avoid inconvenience in case the . Ejectment order were executed without sufficient notice.
5. The argument of the petitioner's counsel is based on the words `buildings in the neighbourbood', occurring in the afore-mentioned provision: In the first place he laid emphasis on the word `buildings' and submitted that nuisance-- must be caused to occupants of more than one building. He contended next that these buildings should be situated in the `neighbourhood' and as such the clause in question does not apply to nuisance, if cause, to persons living in the same building.
6. .Having given our anxious consideration to these contentions we are not persuaded to agree with the same and, are of the opinion that the view taken by the learned Judge in Chamber, namely, that, even if the- occupants of only one building suffered from nuisance generated by the tenant the landlord can proceed against him under clause (iv), because according to section 12(2) of the General Clauses Act the `plural' also included the `single'. As such the word `buildings' can, in the context, be also read as one building. As pointed out by the learned Judge in Chamber, this view finds support from the word `acts' used in clause (iii) of section 13(2) of the Rent Ordinance.
This clause reads as follows :-
(M) The tenant has committed such acts as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the building or rented land." , Now if a tenant commits a single act which materially impairs the value of the building, for example, setting it on fire or pulling down a major part thereof, it cannot be argued that the landlord cannot invoke the provisions of clause (iii) for seeking tenant's ejectment because only a single act had been attributed to him.
It may be clarified here, that the expression `buildings in the neighbour--hood' as used in clause
(iv) of section 13(2) was obviously meant, in the B context, to also include a portion of the same building, adjacent to the portion rented out to a tenant,
7. The learned counsel also submitted that the acts mentioned by the landlady, namely, that the tenant keeps dogs and that he manhandled the husband of the landlady, do not constitute `nuisance' within the meaning of the word as used in clause (ill). We are, however, of the view that this contention has no force, because majority of Pakistanis (being Muslims) do not, usually like to keep dogs as they consider them to be unclean animals and certainly do not cherish dogs sniffing around their living quarters and specially if they are prone to be ferocious and are likely to bite, as C in the present case. Since the respondent/landlady and her husband live in a portion of the same house as the petitioner/tenant, the keeping of the dogs, who have the run of the house must be an intolerable nuisance for the old couple. But being manhandled by one's own tenant certainly constitutes a greater nuisance within the meaning of the aforementioned provisions of the Rent Ordinance. The same view was taken by a Court in the Indian jurisdiction in the case of Mst. Sunder (AIR 1956 All. 211), wherein it was held that .- "The question is whether the acts of ill-treating, abusing and beating the landlord who happened to be an old lady and who is residing in a part of the house constitute a nuisance or not. The learned Judge appears to think that creating a nuisance means using the accommo--dation in such a manner as to make it unfit for human occupation or keeping it extremely dirty or putting it to a use which might have the effect of depreciating the value of the property in future.
I think the words `creating a nuisance' are capable of a wider inter pretation. They include on the part of the tenant in my opinion acts and behaviours which make it extremely inconvenient for the landlord or any other tenant occupying a portion of the house to live in it in peaceful manner.
A person who abuses his position as a tenant by resorting to acts of violence against his landlord who is occupying a portion of the house creates, in my opinion, a nuisance such as would entitle the landlord to go into a Court of law and seek his ejectment without the permission of the District Magistrate under section 3 of the Act.
To put any other interpretation upon the words `creating a nuisance' would be to put a premium on gross misbehaviour on the part of a tenant occupying a house in a portion of which his landlord also happents to be staying."
For the foregoing reasons we uphold the view taken by the learned Rent Controller and refuse leave to appeal.