The dispute relates to the respondent's eviction from the upper portion of property No. 91 Aminpur Bazar, Faisalabad, occupied by him for residential purposes, as a tenant under the appellants. His- ejectment was sought on a number of grounds but the one covered by issue No. 3. As to the appellants' bona fide requirement for self-use, alone would need determination in this S.A.O. Their this contention was accepted by the learned Rent Controller and an ejectment order passed against the res--pondents. On appeal, the learned Additional District Judge, however, reversed the finding on issue No. 3 and by his order dated 19-9-1975, impugned through this S.A.O,, dismissed the ejectment petition.
2. The appellants examined only two witnesses namely, Muhammad Nazir (P.W. 1) and Zahid Aziz (P.W. 2). The former is the brother and attorney of appellant No. I and whereas the latter is one of the landlords. The learned Additional District Judge held that there was nothing in the testimony of these two witnesses to support the appellant's claim of bona fide personal use. He also referred to the copy of the P.T.O.''s record for the year 1974-76 Exh. R. 6 and the P.T.O: Exh. R. 8 to hold that the appellants also owned other properties but they denied their ownership, In his opinion, their denial of ownership of other properties rendered their bona fide dubious. The learned Rent Controller's reliance on Babu Mal v. Kika Ram alias Reman Das (1973 SCMR 185) in support of the appellant--- s plea that the choice rested with the landlord to earmark any of his property for self-use, was deprecated by the learned Additional Judge on the ground that the landlord's bona fide, was the condition pre--cedent for exercise of such a choice.
3. I have gone through the entire evidence on the record. It is in the evidence of Muhammad Nazir (P.W. 1) that the appellants are resid--ing to the house of one of their relatives namely, Mst. Sardar Begum were of Muhammad Ibrahim who has served a notice Exh. P. 1 on them, to vacate her house and in turn they called upon the respondent to vacate their property but he declined. He also deposed that they do not own any other house. It is correct that Zahid Aziz P. W. 2), in his exami-- nation-in-chief did not say _ anything about the appellants' personal requirement and while under cross-examination he was prompted by his counsel to volunteer a statement that the house in dispute was to be occupied by the appellants. It would be significant to point out, that the respondent whale appearing as his own witness deposed that the house in which the appellants were residing, was owned by Muhammad Ibrahim but added that they were also a co-sharer in it.
The assertion that the appellants are co-owner of the hoarse occupied by them, is belied by Exh. R.
6, which indicates that house No. 71 Mohallah Ghulam Abad is owned by Muhammad Ibrahim alone. The name of the deceased husband of appellant No. 1, however, fins mention in the column relating to the occupant. Obviously, therefore, the appellants are residing in a house of some one else. In Abdul A Biz anti another v. Muhammad Ibrahim (PLD 1977 SC 442) it has been laid down that tire expression Many other such building used in subsection (3) ka) (ii) (b) of section 13 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, does not extend to cover the rented premises. The fact that the appellants fire presently residing in a house of one of their relatives who has called upon them to vacate it, itself is a factor to support the bona fide of their claim. The mere fact that the appellants as owners of other residential properties, the choice to occupy, for self-use, any one of such premises, being open to them, would not militate against their good faith.
4. The learned counsel for the respondent was heavily relied on the reasoning which influenced the decision of tire learned Additional District Judge and further cited on Haji Ghulam Muhammad v.
Abdul Qadir (PLD 1975 Lah. 200) to support his submission. My reading of the entire file has, however, pursuaded me to discard the view taken by the learned Additional District Judge. The statement of Muhammad Nazir (P.W. 1) when read as g whole, coupled with the averments made in the ejectment petition, would lead to the conclusion that the appellants are residing in the house of a relative who is compelling them to vacate it and per necessity they require the demised property for personal use. The ruling cited by the appellants' learned counsel does not in any manner improve the respondent's case. His plea that the ejectment petition is intended to be used as a lever for enhancement of the rent has remained unproved. From the perusal of the record. I am satisfied that the house is needed by the appellants in good faith for personal use. In this respect the view taken by the learned Rent Controller is well-grounded and the learned Additional District Judge was wrong to hold otherwise.
5. For all these reasons this appeal is accepted, impugned order set aside and the order of the learned Rent Controller restored. The respondent is, however, allowed a period of two months to vacate the premises.