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PLJ 2017 Peshawar 361

MUHAMMAD ISRAR, PET and another vs DISTRICT EDUCATION OFFICER (MALE)

CitationPLJ 2017 Peshawar 361
CourtPeshawar High Court
Judge(s)Rooh-ul-Amin Khan, Qalandar Ali Khan, Syed Muhammad Attique Shah
ResultPetition allowed.

Syed Muhammad Attique Shah, J.--Through instant petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the petitioners have, sought the following relief:-- "It is therefore, humbly prayed that on acceptance of this petition, this Honorable Court may be please to:- (i)Declare the impugned orders dated 28th August 2015 as illegal, without lawful authority, mala fide, of no legal effect and against the principle of natural justice, liable to be set aside.

(ii)Direct the Respondent No, 1 to treat petitioners in accordance with law and they may graciously be reinstated into service with all back benefits.

(iii)Any other relief as deemed appropriate in the circumstances of the case not specifically asked for, may also be granted to petitioners."

2. Brief facts of the case, as averred in the petition, are that the petitioners were appointed in the year 1995 as PET and PST respectively, but, later on in the year 1997, their services were dispensed with. However, the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa enacted "The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sacked Employees (Appointment) Act, 2012" for reinstatement of sacked employees into Government service who were dismissed or terminated from service. After the promulgation of the Act ibid, the petitioners applied to the respondents for their reinstatement and there after the respondents on recommendation of the Departmental Selection Committee appointed the petitioners on merits vide Notification dated 12.08.2013. However, later on, without any rhyme and reason, Respondent No, 1, on 28.08.2015 dispensed with the services of the petitioners. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued with vehemence that the impugned orders dated 28.8.2013 are illegal, based on malice and mala fide, therefore, the same are not sustainable in the eye of law and prayed for acceptance of the instant writ petition by setting aside the impugned orders of Respondent No, 1.

4. Conversely, learned A.A.G. appearing on behalf of the respondents argued that the impugned orders dated 28.8.2015 passed by the Respondent No, 1 are legal and proper. Further urged that the present petitioners, at the time of their initial appointment in the year 1995 were not qualified to be appointed, therefore, they were not entitled to the reinstatement/appointment under the Act ibid and their services were rightly dispensed with by Respondent No, 1.

5. We have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners and learned A.A.G. for the respondents and perused the available record appended with the writ petition.

6. It is important to note that the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has enacted "The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sacked Employees, (Appointment) Act, 2012" and accordingly the present petitioners applied for their appointment under the Act ibid and after fulfillment of all the codal and legal formalities, the Departmental Selection Committee recommended their appointment after determining suitability and eligibility of the present petitioners in terms of Section 7(4) of the Act ibid. Thereafter the petitioners assumed their charge and served against their posts, however, all of a sudden, on 28.8.2015, Respondent No, 1 dispensed with their services through the impugned office orders dated 28.8.2015. It is important to note that the Respondent No, 1 has not provided any opportunity what to call of sufficient opportunity before dispensing with their services which is a clear violation of principle of natural justice "audi alteram parterm" Moreover, it is also noteworthy that the petitioners' suitability and eligibility were finally determined by the Departmental Selection Committee specifically constituted under Section 7 (4) of the ibid Act for the said purpose.. We are astonished to note that in the presence of the recommendations of the said Departmental Selection Committee how the Respondent No, 1 through the impugned orders had dispensed with the services of the petitioners. In fact, the Respondent No, 1 through the impugned orders has reviewed the DSC recommendations after two long years which are totally illegal and are therefore, untenable in the eye of law. Moreover, the Respondent No, 1 has taken a stance in his comments that the petitioners were lacking prescribed qualification and experience at the time of their initial appointments, however, this very issue was first addressed and resolved by this Court in Writ Petition No, 1662-P of 2013, decided on 24.12.2014, which decision was subsequently upheld by the Apex Court in Civil Petition No, 401-P/2016 along with other Civil Petitions on 24.5.2017. Relevant paragraph is reproduced below.- "We have been apprised by the learned counsel for the respondents that according to the advertisement and appointment letters issued to the respondents, two kinds of candidates could be appointed: (i) those who have the requisite academic qualifications and training; (ii) those who have the requisite academic qualifications but do not possess the necessary training. As regards the second category, such persons would be provided with an opportunity to complete the training within a specific period. This is exactly what the learned High Court has allowed in the relief granting portion of the impugned judgment. Undoubtedly, this is consonance with the Department's own advertisement and the terms and conditions of service, therefore, the learned High Court did not fall into any error by requiring the Department to allow the respondents to complete the training within a specific period of time and to take action against them in case of failure to do so. No exception can be taken to the impugned judgment, which is upheld. Resultantly Civil Petition No, 401-P/2016 is dismissed on merit. The connected petitions are also dismissed on the above score and for being time-barred as no sufficient cause has been shown for condonation of delay."

7. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, this Court reached to the conclusion that the impugned orders dated 28.8.2015 of Respondent No, 1 are illegal, void ab initio, result of colorful exercise of authority and passed in blatant violation of the principle of natural justice, therefore. while allowing this writ petition the same are struck down and the Respondent No, 1 is directed to reinstate the petitioners into their service. No order as to costs.

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