' ASLAM JAVED MINHAS, J.---Through this constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the petitioner has challenged the vires of order dated 12.11.2013 passed by the learned Justice of Peace, Multan whereby the SHO, respondent No,2 was directed to record the statement of the petitioner-bank and then proceed strictly in accordance with law.
2. The facts, in a small compass, necessitating the filing of the instant petition are that respondent No,3-Bank Al-Falah Limited Islamic Banking, Bosan Road Branch, respondent No,3 filed a petition under section 22-A, Cr.P.C. For registration of case against the petitioner by alleging therein that the petitioner issued cheques valuing Rs,119,440/- in favour of respondent-bank which on presentation were dishonoured.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner inter alia contends that the impugned order suffers from gross illegality and irregularity. Further contended that in the light of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, no criminal case could be registered against the petitioner. Further added that the banks are debarred to adopt the provisions of section 489-F, P.P.C. In presence of special law, therefore, the learned Justice of Peace passed the impugned order wrongly and illegally.
4. On the contrary, the learned A.A.G assisted by learned counsel representing respondent No, 3/complainant argues that the impugned order has been passed by the learned Justice of Peace squarely in accordance with law and that since the cheque issued by the petitioner dishonoured, therefore, provisions of section 489-F, P.P.C. Are fully attracted. They further contended that the learned Justice of Peace after considering the factual aspect, issued a valid direction, therefore, the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or irregularity. Learned counsel for the respondent-Bank argued that taking cognizance is something different as compared to the registration of case and the provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, therefore, registration of case is not barred under this Ordinance.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6. Earlier, Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 was promulgated and later, after certain modification, the same was re-enacted between the Financial Institutions and its customers including Guarantors, etc. Section 9(1)(b) of the Ordinance, ibid, provides:-- "7. Powers of Banking Courts.---(1) Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, Banking Court shill,
(a) ..
(b) in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction, try offences punishable under this Ordinance and shall, for this purpose have the same powers as are vested in a Court of Session under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898): ' Provided that a Banking Court shall not take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Ordinance except upon a complaint in writing made by a person authorized in this behalf by the financial institution in respect of which the offence was committed."
(4) Subject to subsection (5), no court other than a Banking Court shall have or exercise any jurisdiction with respect to any matter to which the jurisdiction of a Banking Court extends under this Ordinance, including a decision as to the existence or otherwise of a finance and the execution of a decree passed by a Banking Court."
"(5) Nothing in subsection (4) shall be deemed to affect-
(a) the right of a financial institution to seek any remedy before any court or otherwise that may be available to it under the law by which the financial institution may have been established; or
(b) the powers of the financial institution, or jurisdiction of any court such as is referred to in clause (a); or ' Require the transfer to a Banking court of any proceedings pending before any financial institution or such court immediately before the coming into force of this Ordinance."
' Section 7(4) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 clearly postulates that no Court other than Banking Court shall have or exercise jurisdiction with respect to any matter to which the jurisdiction of Banking Court extends under this Ordinance. A bare reading of the above reproduced provision clearly show that any financial institution can avail remedy before any court, but the basic requirement is that such remedy must be available to the said institution under the law by which the financial institution has been established.
7. Section 20 of the Financial institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 is the provision relating to certain offences and its subsection (4) deals with dishonest issuance of a cheque towards repayment of a finance or fulfillment of an obligation which is dishonoured on presentation. The punishment of said offence has been provided as one year or with fine or with both. Therefore, it becomes quite obvious that in the matter, like the one in hand, the jurisdiction only lies with the Banking court established under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances)
Ordinance, 2001 and not before any other court, until and unless the same is provided by law, by which the financial institution is established.
8. The contention of learned counsel for the respondent bank is that taking cognizance is something different as compared to the registration of case and the provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 deal with cognizance of offence but not deal with registration of cases, therefore, the registration of case is not barred under this Ordinance. I am afraid this stance advanced by learned counsel for respondent Bank is not considerable at all.
Section 20(6) of the Ordinance, ibid, read as under:-- "20. Provisions relating to certain offences.--
(4) Whoever dishonestly issues a cheque towards re-payment of finance or fulfillment of an obligation which is dishonoured on presentation, shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year, or with fine or with both, unless he can establish, for which the burden of proof shall rest on him, that he had made arrangements with his bank to ensure that the cheque would be honoured and that the bank was at fault in not honouring the cheque.
(5)
(6) All offences under this Ordinance shall be bailable, non-cognizable and compoundable."
The above reproduced provision makes it abundantly clear that offences under this Ordinance shall be bailable, non-cognizable and compoundable and section 154, Cr.P.C. Comes in the field where the commission of a cognizable offence is disclosed. But as discussed above, when the Statute itself makes it clear that offence is not cognizable then the registration of criminal case by the local police could not be permitted by law. Even otherwise, the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 is general law, whereas, the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 is a special law and the legislators have enacted it in such a manner so as to have overriding effect of any other general enactment. A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in part materia and should, accordingly, be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both. The rule is that where there are two Acts, one of which is special and particular and the other general, which if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special Act, the special law must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than that of a general statute.
9. Although by amendment in P.P.C., section 489-F, P.P.C. Has been inserted after promulgation of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, but this insertion would also not give it an overriding effect over special law, for law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general Act; and where... The general Act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication. The fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. If the legislators had an intention otherwise, they could at the very beginning formulate or afterwards could amend the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 in such a manner so as to bring this offence within the definition of "cognizable" offence. In such circumstances, when the amendment was not made in the Ordinance, ibid, the legislators explicitly made their intention clear that with regard to the matters between financial institutions and their customers, this enactment shall hold the field and section 489-F, P.P.C. (dishonestly issuance of cheque) will be applicable to all other persons in general except those covered by the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.
The purpose by not amending the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 appears to be that normally in any case of loan from financial institution, the loans are protected by mortgage, warranties and covenants made by or on behalf of the customer to a financial institution, including representations, warranties and covenants with regard to the ownership, mortgage, pledge, hypothecation or assignment of, or other charge on assets or properties, and the financial institution can recover the amount by adopting appropriate process under any of the above mode.
10. For what has been discussed above, this writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 12.11.2013 passed by learned Additional Judge/Ex-officio Justice of Peace, Multan, is hereby set aside. This order, however, will not be considered a bar in the way of the respondent Bank to plead their case before the appropriate forum under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances)
Ordinance, 2001.