The petitioner in this civil revision is a widow and mother of respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 2 is the were of respondent No. 1. On 9-1-1976 the petitioner instituted a suit for a permanent injunction against the respondents. She alleged that she was living in a house which she had inherited from her father. As she was an old woman of 80 years of age and invalid she was unable to look after herself. She bad invited her daughter and her husband to stay with her. Accordingly they were living together. Respondent No. 1 had two wives. The two wives were not pulling on well with each other and for that reason respondent No. 1 wanted to make separate arrangement for the accommodation of respondent No. 2. With this object in view respondent No. 1 approached her for providing temporary shelter for respondent No. 2. She agreed to help him and allowed respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to occupy a room on the first floor of the house.
2. The petitioner further alleged that relations between respondent No. 1 and his sister deteriorated as respondent No. 1 was not prepared to give her due share in the property left by their father.
Consequently the sister brought a civil suit against respondent No. 1.This infuriated respondent No. 1 who by way of retaliation locked the passage to the barsati where the only lavatory of the house was located. When she (petitioner) approached respondent No. 1 he abused her and threatened to forcibly throw her out of the entire house together with her daughter with the help of goondas. In the circumstances she prayed :-----
(i) the respondents be permanently restrained from interfering with her possession of the house and the enjoyment by her of all the easements and conveniences ; and
(ii) the respondents be directed to unlock the passage to the lavatory and allowances (sic) to the plaintiff:
3. On 2-4-1976 the respondents filed their written statement. Apart from taking other pleas they averred that the house in dispute was owned by respondent No. 1 and 'that the petitioner was living in a portion thereof merely as a licensee under-him.
4. On 19-4-1976, before the issues could be framed, the petitioner moved an application before the trial Court for the amendment of her plaint. By the proposed amendment she wished to substitute the relief clause with the following :----- "In view of the submissions made above it is respectfully prayed that a decree be passed with costs in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants directing them to deliver vacant possession of the first floor as well as the top floor of House No. 224/4 Street No. 14, Sadar Bazar, Lahore Cantonment, described fully in paragraph 2 of the plaint, to the plaintiff."
By an order slated 1-6-1976 the learned trial Court disallowed the prayer for amendment 'on the ground that it would change the nature of the suit. By the same order it also dismissed the suit on the ground that it had become infructuous.
The petitioner went in appeal before an Additional District Judge at Lahore who adopting the reasoning of the trial Court dismissed the same. The petitioner has now come in revision before this Court.
6. During the pendency of the civil revision the petitioner transferred the house to her daughter who, subsequently, further sold it away to some other persons. In view of this position the learned counsel for the respondent has contended that this civil revision in no longer maintainable as the transferees have not chosen to get themselves impleaded. I find no merit in this contention. The true position is that ordinarily a plaintiff who institutes a suit can prosecute it to its conclusion notwithstanding the fact that during the pendency of the litigation there has been a devolution of his interest in the property in dispute to a third person and that any decree R which he may obtain will enure for the benefit of his successor-in-interest. If any authority is needed for this proposition I would refer to Rai Charan v: Biswa nath (AI R 1915 Cal. 103) and Joti Lal v. Sheodhayan (AIR 1936 Pat.
420). Apart from that, in this case the transfer of interest has taken place during the pendency of a revision petition. Now the High Court can exercise the revisional jurisdiction suo motu. This being so, the mere fact that a party has transferred away all its interests after the High Court has called for the record can hardly deter the High Court from making an appropriate order. I would, therefore, repel the preliminary objection of the respondents to the maintainability of the revision.
7. No doubt the Courts below have held that the proposed amendment in the plaint would change the nature of the suit but they have not given any reason in support of their view. A perusal of the plaint clearly indicates that the petitioner was basing her right on the assertion that she was the sole owner of the house in dispute as she had obtained the same from her father. In their written statement the respondents denied that the house belonged to her but set up a claim of their own to its ownership Thus the only controversy between the parties is as to who is owner of the house in dispute. The amendment sought in the plaint will not alter the nature of the controversy. Both the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff, that is, the one C sought in the plaint as it is and the one which she wishes to obtain through the proposed amendment, would as a matter of course follow the decision on the main controversy. This being so, it is difficult to see how a substitution of one relief with another would change the nature of the suit for whether the amendment is allowed or not the basic controversy between the parties will remain precisely the same, that is, which of the parties is the owner of the house. I should, therefore, think that the view taken by the Courts below that the proposed amendment would change the nature of the suit is based upon a complete misapprehension of the facts of the case.
8. For the reasons stated above I set aside the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below and direct that the petitioner may be permitted to amend her plaint in the manner proposed by her and that the suit should be disposed of in accordance with law. The costs in this civil revision shall abide by the final event.