' The appellant by filing this appeal under section 417(2-A) Cr.P.C. Has challenged vires of the judgment, dated 31.10.2013, whereby learned Additional Sessions Judge, Piplan, district Mianwali acquitted respondent No,1, Muhammad Imran of the charge, on conclusion of his trial in case-FIR No,428/2009, dated 14.12.2009, under section 302/34, P.P.C., registered at Police Station Kundian (Mianwali). The learned trial court, however, convicted Waheed alias Naheed co-accused under section 302(b), P.P.C. And sentenced him to death, through the same judgment.
' Precisely, the facts giving rise to this appeal are that the appellant, being complainant, got the aforesaid FIR registered, as regards the occurrence, wherein his brother Muhammad Wazir was murdered at 10.30 a.m. On 14.12.2009 by the respondent (Imran) and his mentioned co-accused; the attribution to the respondent, Imran is that he raised a Lalkara, that they had come to avenge their insult. The motive behind the occurrence pertained to a previous criminal case (FIR No,134, dated 31.7.2009, under section 337-H(2), P.P.C. Read with section 13 of the Pakistan Arms Ordinance XX of 1965, at police station Hernoli), which caused grudge to the accused. The completion of investigation led to submission of challan under section 173, Cr.P.C. Against the accused before the learned trial court. After a full-fledged trial, the respondent was acquitted of the charge through the impugned judgment (dated 31.10.2013). Hence, the instant appeal.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the prosecution successfully brought home guilt of the acquitted respondent through a credible ocular account and other immensely important pieces Of evidence, including medical evidence tendered by Dr. Muhammad Zubair (P.W.5) and a detailed account of the investigation conducted by Tariq Khan SI (P.W.10), but learned trial court casually dismissed every bit of it to record his acquittal, which has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice; Waheed Khan, the death-convict, could not have fatally shot at Muhammad Wazir, but for facilitation of the respondent who, by all means, raised a commanding Lalkara giving an impetus to the lone shooter to have a go at the deceased; the impugned judgment is patently illegal, which has caused serious prejudice to the appellant-complainant.
4. After hearing the learned counsel for the appellant and going through the impugned judgment, it is observed that the acquitted respondent was, admittedly, empty handed at the time of the occurrence, that took place at 10.30 a.m. On 14.12.2009 near the shop of Tariq Mistri. According to the allegation, both, the acquitted respondent and the death-convict Waheed Khan walked to the place of occurrence, hence, it could hardly be believed that they facilitated or helped each other to reach the spot. Being empty handed, respondent Imran could lend no help to his co-accused, rather he might have put himself in danger of being harmed by the other side, had there been any retaliation or counter-attack by them. The respondent had, though, got lodged the motive-FIR case against the deceased and his companion Matiullah on 31.7.2009, yet, it could not be inferred that he had gone to the place of occurrence without being armed, as in such a situation, he could offer no help to his companion, if he would find himself in trouble. The allegation of raising a Lalkara during the occurrence by the respondent could not be verified by the investigating officer (P.W.10) during the course of investigation and he opined that Imran (respondent No,1) did nothing at the crucial hour, nor did he hold any arm then. Learned trial court has taken care of this fact in paragraph 30 of the impugned judgment, which cropped up no other idea in our minds, than the one, as arrived at by the said court. The opinion of the investigating officer may not be of any consequence, during the course of the trial, yet its persuasiveness may not be a taboo altogether.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Muhammad Sharif's case, reported as 2003 SCM R 528 had observed as under:- "Though finding recorded by the police officials during investigation cannot be the sole basis for acquittal of the accused but in this case this has been taken into consideration as a circumstance in support of the findings independently arrived at, that the prosecution had failed to prove the case beyond reasonable shadow of doubt."
5. The observations of the learned trial court as to innocence of the respondent, recorded in paragraph 30 (supra) are not unexceptionable, hence, called for no interference by this court.
While dealing with an identical situation, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has held in so many words and on so many occasions that a judgment of acquittal cannot be upset sparingly, as the accused would enjoy double presumption of innocence, one relating to the pre-judgment stage, that every accused is innocent till proved otherwise and the other one through a judicial verdict, besides it can only be interfered with, if it looked wholly perverse, capricious, arbitrary, artificial, ridiculous, speculative and based on misreading or non-appraisal of the evidence available on the record. Reliance in this regard may be had on, Ghulam Sikandar and another v.
Mamraz Khan and others (PLD 1985 SC 11), Alam Khan v. Swans Khan and 3 others (1996 SCM R 1742), Inayatullah Butt v. Muhammad Javaid and 2 others (PLD 2003 SC 563) and Mst.Saira Bibi v.
Muhammad Asif and others (2009 SCM R 946).
' The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Ghulam Sikandar's case (supra) has held as under:- "hi an appeal against acquittal the Supreme Court would not on principle ordinarily interfere and instead would give due weight and consideration to the findings of Court acquitting the accused.
This approach is slightly different than that in an appeal against conviction when leave is granted only for the re-appraisement of evidence which then is undertaken so as to see that benefit of every reasonable doubt should be extended to the accused. This difference of approach is mainly conditioned by the fact that the acquittal carries with it the two well-accepted presumptions: One initial, till found guilty, the accused is innocent; and two that again after the trial a Court below confirmed the assumption of innocence."
' And in Alam Khan's case (supra) that:- "It is a settled position of law that the superior Courts act slowly in interfering an order of acquittal, unless grounds for acquittal are perverse or wholly illogical or unreasonable. "
' And in Inayatullah Butt's case (supra):- "It is well settled principle of law that an appeal against the acquittal has distinctive features and the approach to deal with the appeal against conviction is distinguishable from appeal against acquittal, because presumption of double innocence is attached in the latter case. An order of acquittal can only be interfered when it is found on the face of it as capricious, perverse, arbitrary or foolish in nature, which are lacking in this case."
' The apex court also observed in Mst. Saira Bibi's case (supra) that:-- "12 It is a settled law that before the order of acquittal is reversed, it must be shown that the judgment of the learned Court was not reasonable or wrong. If two conclusions were equally possible, the order of acquittal should not be reversed."
6. As a matter of fact, the learned trial Court acted strictly in accordance with law and the principles regulating the safe administration of criminal justice. Therefore, the impugned judgment does not call for interference by this Court. This appeal being meritless is dismissed in limine.