1. SHAFI-UR-RAHMAN, J.-Leave to appeal was granted to the appellant, a landlady, for examining the legal question whether notwithstanding the repeal of Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Repealed Act) by Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repealing) Ordinance, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the Repealing Ordinance) a notice to the tenant as required under section 30 of the Repealed Act was still necessary for filing an ejectment application against the tenant for eviction filed long after the repeal of the Repealed Act.
2. Javed Iqbal and Nasir iqbal were the transferrees under the Repealed Act of a Bungalow No. 106-B Model Town, Lahore. They sold it to the appellant by a registered deed dated 2nd of May, 1975. The appellant straight away filed an application seeking ejectment of the respondent who was in possession of the property. The appellant claimed ejectment of the tenant on the ground that he had failed to pay rent, that he had damaged the property, and that she required the premises for her own bona fide use and occupation. The respondent-occupant took up the plea that notwithstanding the repeal of the Repealed Act prior to the institution of ejectment proceedings a notice to the tenant as prescribed under section 30 of the Repealed Act was still necessary. The other grounds taken up by the landlady were also challenged.
3. The Rent Controller held that a notice under section 30 of the Repealed Act was no longer necessary after its repeal and that of the grounds taken, the landlady had succeeded in proving her personal need. He, therefore, ordered the ejectment of the respondent. An appeal was preferred which was dismissed. On second appeal the High Court reversed the finding of the two authorities on the question of the legal requirement of a notice under section 30 of the-Repealed Act holding that as provided in section 6 of the General Clauses Act a right had accrued to the tenant of receiving such a notice before ejectment proceedings on the ground of personal need could be initiated against him and such a notice having not been admittedly served, the application for ejectment was not competent.
4. When this appeal came up for hearing a decision of this Court on the specific point of law on which leave to appeal was granted had been delivered and published. It is in the case of Muhammad Ramzan v. Ch. Bashir Ahmed (PLD 1981 SC 340). The learned counsel for the appellant relied entirely. On the decision given by this Court in that case for resolving the question of law arising in this appeal. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, tried to argue that there was yet another way of looking at the controversy requiring decision. According to him the rights of the landlady or her predecessor-in-interest in the property were traceable to section 30 of the Repealed Act followed by the permanent transfer deed if at all it issued in her favour. The condition of notice to the tenant before seeking his eviction on the ground of personal need or default was a condition attaching to the title of the transferree under the Repealed Act and it was an obligation to be discharged by him at all times and in all circumstances. It was a protection to the tenant. The condition attaching and the protection given to the tenants could not be detached or delinked by treating one part of the Statute to be creating or conferring permanent rights and the other (proviso) a temporary and transitory protection to the tenant. There was nothing in the repealing Act to indicate that section 6 of the General Clauses Act was to have a restricted effect or was to be modified in any way and for that reason it should be given full effect as was done by the High Court. His other contention was that in the High Court he had challenged the findings of the two authorities with regard to the bona fide personal need of the landlady and as no finding had been recorded on it, that question was still open for examination and determination.
5. As regards the second contention of the learned counsel for the respon--dent, we find that it was in the memo of second appeal that he challenged in the High Court the finding on personal need of the landlady but the only point which was argued, as would appear from para. 3 of the judgment under examination, was the requirement of notice under section 30 of the Repealed Act. Besides, leave to appeal was granted only to examine the question of notice. So this question of fact is not open before us.
6. The scheme of section 30 of the Repealed Act would show that a protection to certain occupants of the properties transferred under the repealed Act was engrafted on the general law of the land governing the relationship of landlord and tenant. The protection from eviction was for a specified period commencing from the date of transfer, a notice of which was required to be given the transferree by registered post acknowledgement due and if such notice was not given as was required, the specified period was to count from the date of receipt of such notice -by the tenant.
7. This was a protection afforded by the Act to the tenants. With the repeal of the Repealed Act the protection itself disappeared. To contend that it was a condition attaching to the title of the transferree and was to have had an abiding effect and was to last as long as the title or the property lasted would be an extension of the claim not warranted by the law. When a repeal takes place, the situation but for the provisions like section 6 of the General Clauses Act is as if the repealed law never existed. The saving is with regard to the proceedings pending, and in the context of this case, the rights accrued or the obligation incurred. The exact meaning and scope of concepts like rights accrued or the obligation incurred have. Been considered time and again and are not question open for serious debate. . For example, in the case of Abbot v. Minister of Lands (1894 A C 425at p. 431, it was held that- "It has been very common in the case of repealing statutes to save al rights accrued. If it were held that the effect of this was to leave open to any one who could have taken advantage of any of the repealed enactments still to take advantage of them, the result would be very far-reaching.
8. Itmay be, as Windeyer J. Observes, that the power to take advantage of an enactment may without impropriety be termed a "right". But the question is whether it is a "right accrued" within the meaning of the enactment which has to be construed.
9. Their Lordships think not, and they are confirmed in this opinion by the fact that the words relied on are found in conjunction with the words "obligations incurred or imposed". They think that the mere right (assuming it to be properly so-called) existing in the members of the community or any class of them to take advantage of an enactment, without any act done by an individual towards availing himself of that right, cannot properly be deemed a "right accrued" within the meaning of the enactment."
10. We find that the decision given in the case of Muhammad Ramzan holds the field and effectively governs the situation. The appeal is allowed with costs. The order of ejectment is restored. The respondent is allowed two months' period as he undertakes to voluntarily surrender the possession of the property and to pay the rents due for the period, he remained in occupation of the property.