IBAD-UR-REHMAN LODHI, J.---This judgment shall decide the instant appeal as well as the appeals listed in the schedule as the question involved in all these cases is as to which Court will be considered as "principal Civil Court" in order to exercise the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claims preferred under erstwhile Insurance Act, 1938.
2. The appellant herein, approached the Court of District Judge at Gujranwala seeking an award of interest (liquidated damages) on account of settlement of group claim under section 47-B of the Insurance Act, 1938. The learned Additional District Judge, Gujranwala, to whom the matter was entrusted, by means of impugned order dated 09.04.2015 has accepted the application moved by the respondent-State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan under Order VII, Rule 10, C.P.C. And plaint was ordered to be returned to the plaintiff/appellant for its presentation before the learned Civil Court.
3. Heard. Record perused.
4. Before commencement of Insurance Ordinance, 2000 the matters relating to business of insurance were being dealt with through the Insurance Act, 1938 (Act IV of 1938) (hereinafter referred to as an "Act").
By means of section 2(6) of the Act "Court" means the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original Civil jurisdiction.
5. The learned Additional District Judge while returning the plaint to the appellant has placed reliance on the judgments of this Court reported as Mst. Robina Bibi v. State Life Insurance and others (FB) (2013 CLD 477), State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Attorney v. Mst.
Kaneez Bibi (2014 CLD 1323) and State Life Insurance Corporation of (2015 CLD 342).
In Mst. Robina Bibi's case (Supra), the learned Full Bench of this Court in paras 9, 12, 15, 21(ii) (iv) has held as under:- "9. Brief review of the insurance laws show that under section 46 of erstwhile Insurance Act, 1938 (Act No, IV of 1938) ("Act") holder of an insurance policy obtained after the commencement of the Act could sue for any relief in respect of the policy in any Court of competent jurisdiction in Pakistan. Under section 2(6) of the Act, "Court" meant the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district and included the High Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction. The period of limitation for such a suit not being .Provided under the Act, was three years under Article 86(a) of the Limitation Act, 1908 which states:- Description of suit Period of Limitation Three yearsTime from which period begins to run
(a) The date of the death of the deceased 86(a) .On a policy of Insurance when the sum insured is payable after proof of the death has been given to or received by the insurers.
12. Collective reading of the above provisions of law shows that only the claimi arising under insurance policies issued after the commencement of the Ordinance can be brought before the Insurance Tribunal while the insurance policies issued prior to the commencement of the Ordinance continue to be governed .
Under the repealed Insurance Act, 1938 and will continue to be agitated before the court of competent jurisdiction in terms of section 2(6) of the Act.
15. For the above reasons there is no need to touch the merits or the grounds of appeals/petition in these cases, when at the very outset the Insurance Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the Application of the appellants. These-appeals/petitions are, therefore, allowed and the impugned orders are set aside with the direction to the Insurance Tribunal to return the applications of the appellants to be filed before the court of competent jurisdiction.
21(ii). There is no provision under the Ordinance to transfer pending cases under the repealed Act to the Insurance Tribunal, hence, claims arising out of insurance policies prior to the commencement of the Ordinance shall continue under the repealed Act i,e,, Insurance Act, 1938 before the court of appropriate jurisdiction.
(iv). Claims arising out of insurance policies prior to the commencement of the Ordinance may 'apply to the court of competent jurisdiction under the repealed Act, subject to the provisions of Limitation Act, 1908, which will be considered by the respective court on its merits in accordance with law. "
Earlier to that learned Full Bench in Karachi High Court in case titled Patricia Anne Patel v. Gerald Cowling Patel (PLD 1972 Karachi 444) has held that the Courts of the District Judges established by or under the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, within the limits of their respective pecuniary jurisdiction, will be deemed to be the principal civil Courts of original jurisdiction.
This Court in the case of Messrs S. Ghulam Dastgir and Sons v. Union Insurance Company of Pakistan Limited (PLD 1995 Lahore 290) while referring the case of All India Motor Transport Mutual Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rapheel George of Bombay Indian Inhabitant (AIR 1963 Bombay 7) has held that if the principal place of business of an insurance company is situated within a district which has no High Court, then the Court which could have jurisdiction under section 53 of the Insurance Act would be the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction in that district, that is, the District Court.
6. A learned Single Bench of this Court in case of Syed Akhtar Hussain Zaidi v. Sheikh Abdul Majeed (PLD 1986 Lahore 663) has held that District Court is principal Civil. Court of original jurisdiction within a district presided over by District Judge o Additional District Judge.
On 08.01.1962 an Ordinance namely the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 (II of 1962) was promulgated to amend and consolidate the laws related to Civil Courts in all provinces. Section 3 whereof provides classes of Civil Courts which read as under:- "Besides a Court established under the Small Claims and Minor Offences Courts Ordinance, 2002 (XXVI of 2002) and the Courts established under any other enactment for the time being in force, there shall be the following classes of Civil Courts, namely:-
(a) the Court of the District Judge;
(b) the Court of the Additional District Judge; and
(c) the Court of the Civil Judge; "
7. Learned counsel for the respondents, by referring section 15 of the C.P.C., has submitted that every suit shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it.
8. I am afraid the contention of learned counsel for the respondents has no weight. While placing reliance on the section 15 of the C.P.C., respondents have conveniently ignored the significance of the word "principal Civil Court" as used in section 2(6) of the Act. No doubt the ordinary suits to be instituted and regulated under the Code of Civil Procedure ought to be instituted in the Court of lowest grade competent to try it but the suits or the proceedings to be instituted under any other special law have to be instituted in the forum specifically provided in such special law.
9. In this case when the special law viz. The Act provides the Forum of "principal Civil Court" then it cannot be argued that the suits or proceedings to be instituted under the Act are to be filed before the Court of Civil Judge. If this practice is allowed, it would defeat the very intent of the specific provisions of the Act which is a special law, provisions of which have to be given preference over general law.
This fact is also note-worthy that while repealing the Insurance Act, 1938 by promulgating Insurance Ordinance, 2000 (Ordinance No,XXXIX of 2000 promulgated on 19.08.2000) again the Court of District Judge has been designated as Tribunal to entertain and adjudicate the claims arising out of insurance policies. By virtue of section 121 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 an appeal from any findings of the Tribunal is provided in view of section 124 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 before the High Court.
10. In the Insurance Act, 1938 section 47 is an enabling provisions providing remedy to the aggrieved family of deceased policy holder to claim the policy amount and the forum provided to sue for any such relief is "Court of competent jurisdiction in Pakistan". Such forum provided in said provision of law is referable to the Court defined under Section 2(6) of the Act which means only the "principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a District".
11. The learned Additional District Judge while returning the plaint to the appellant has placed reliance on the cases of Mst. Robin Bibi and State Life Insurance Company of Pakistan (Supra) but in fact has misapplied the said reported matters, for, in all the reported matters it was either the principal Civil Court or the Court of competent jurisdiction which has been held as appropriate forum to entertain or adjudicate the claims under the Act and in view of the law laid down, discussed hereinabove and the statutory provisions already referred, it is the Court of District Judge or at the most the Additional District Judge which is considered to be the principal Civil Court and not the Court of Civil Judge.
12. The final conclusion arrived at by the learned Additional District Judge while returning the plaint for its presentation to the Court of Civil Judge is thus misconceived which is not supported by any law, the same is not sustainable.
The impugned orders therefore are set aside by allowing the appeals with a direction to all the District Judges and the Additional District Judges to entertain the claims filed under thy Act being the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction.
SCHEDULE F.A.Os. Nos.213, 214, 215, 216,.218, 239, 240, 241,242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 289, 290, 291 and 292 of 2015.