1. Raja Saeed Akram Khan, J.--The above titled appeal by leave of the Court has been directed against the judgment and decree passed by the High Court on 19th April, 2014, whereby the appeal filed by the appellants, herein, has been dismissed.
2. 2.The facts in brief as stated are that the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff-appellants, herein, filed a suit for declaration with consequential relief on 16.2.2009, against the defendant- respondents, herein, in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Bhimber, for cancellation of the gift-deed dated 29.8.1992 and Mutation No, 2799, sanctioned on the basis of the said gift-deed, regarding `Shamilat Deh' land, measuring 121 kanal 18 marla, bearing khasra No, 1151-min, khewat No, 298-min (old), khata No, 1760-min, situate at Dhok Paneri/Gurha Karjal, Tehsil & District Bhimber. After framing the issues by the trial Court, the defendant-respondents moved an application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C., for rejection of the plaint. This application was contested by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants by filing of the objections. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit aide judgment and decree dated 20.6.2012. Feeling aggrieved, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants filed an appeal before the District Judge, Bhimber on 10.9.2012, which was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 28.3.2013. The judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge Bhimber was further challenged by filing second appeal before the High Court, which also met the same fate vide impugned judgment and decree dated 19.4.2014. Hence. this appeal by leave of the Court.
3. Mr. Kamran Tariq, Advocate, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellants, argued that the judgment and decree of the learned High Court has been passed in deviation of the law laid down by this Court. He argued that the learned High Court fell in error while not taking into account that when the suit was ripped for evidence the same could not be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C.
3. He contended that the plaintiffs moved an application under Order XXIII, Rule 2, C.P.C. for withdrawal of the suit before the High Court but the same was rejected without assigning any reason. The learned counsel contended that the controversy involved in the matter has not been resolved in a legal manner. The question of limitation is mixed question of law and the fact, which has not been resolved properly. He argued that after coming into knowledge about the execution of the gift-deed and the attestation of the mutation the plaintiff immediately filed the suit. The proper course was to provide an opportunity to the plaintiffs to produce the evidence to prove their version regarding the limitation but the same has not been provided. The learned counsel has relied upon the cases reported as Khalid Hussain & 3 others vs. Haji Muhammad Rafique & another [2008 SCR 207], Barkat Ali & another vs. Sultan Mehmood & 18 others [2009 SCR 158] and Muhammad Younis Arvi vs. Muhammad Aslant and 16 others [2012 SCR 135]. The learned counsel also referred to the documents Le. photocopy of khasra Girdawri, photocopy of Jamabandi pertaining to years 1967-68, photocopy of Jamabandi pertaining to years 1998-99 and stated that all these documents show that the plaintiffs are the shareholders in the 'Shamlat Deh' land in Mozia Gurha Kanjal Tehsil & District Bhimber.
4. 4.On the other hand, Sheikh Masood Iqbal, Advocate, the learned counsel for the defendant- respondents, strongly controverted the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellants and submitted that there are concurrent findings recorded by three Courts below which cannot be disturbed as the appellants failed to point out any misreading or non- reading of evidence. He argued that it is settled principle of law that no declaratory decree can be passed regarding "Shamilat Deh" land. Even otherwise, the suit filed by the plaintiffs was otherwise time-barred as the same has been filed after a lapse of 17 years. He further argued that the learned High Court has thoroughly attended the question of limitation, therefore, no interference is called for by this Court. The learned counsel lastly argued the object of filing a fresh suit is only to indulge the defendants in a new litigation.
5. 5.We have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record made available. The record reveals that the plaintiff-appellants mainly filed suit for cancellation of the gift-deed dated 29.08.1992 and the entries made in the revenue record in pursuance of the said gift-deed. The trial Court rejected the plaint on the ground that the plaintiff regarding the Shamilat Deh land sought declaration which cannot be granted, moreover, the plaintiff-appellants challenged the gift-deed after a considerable delay; therefore, the suit is barred by limitation. The learned District Judge as well as the learned High Court upheld the findings recorded by the trial Court and also observed that the plaintiff-appellants have not brought on record any evidence which shows that the predecessor-in-interest was the owner of the land in the relevant village. In this regard, during the course of arguments the learned counsel for the appellants drew the attention of this Court towards the documents i,e, photocopy of khasra Girdawri, photocopy of Jamabandi pertaining to years 1967-68, photocopy of Jamabandi pertaining to years 1998-99 and submitted that all these documents show that the plaintiffs are the shareholders in the `Shamlat Deh' land in Mozia Gurha Kanjal but the Courts below have not considered the same. When this position was confronted to the learned counsel for the respondents he has also not denied the stance taken by the counsel for the appellants. The authenticity of the documents can only be determined after recording the evidence. Furthermore, the Courts below are unanimous on the point that declaratory decree regarding the Shamilat Deh land cannot be granted, however, it has not been discussed in the judgments that what sort of declaration has been claimed by the appellants. Even otherwise, it is now settled that where the multiple remedies have been prayed by a party, if anyone of the same cannot be granted that does not mean that the suit would be treated barred for all other claimed remedies. It is well established principle of law that the plaint can only be rejected if all the reliefs claimed, as, are barred under law. Reference may be made on a case reported as Muhammad Younis Arvi v. Muhammad Aslam and 16 others [2012 SCR 1351, wherein, it has been held by this Court that:-- "8. The plaintiffs have claimed multiple remedies in their prayer clause which has been reproduced hereinabove. Even for the sake of argument, it any one of the prayer cannot be granted it doesn't mean that the suit will be treated barred for all other claimed remedies. While attending this question the superior Courts are unanimous on the question that under the provisions of Order VII, Rule 11 the plaint can only be rejected if all the reliefs claimed, as, are barred under the law. If some of the reliefs claimed are available, the plaint cannot be rejected because under the codal provisions, there is no concept of piecemeal rejection of the plaint."
6. Similarly, in another case reported as Muhammad Afzal v. Muhammad Manzoor & 40 others [PIA 2013 SC (AJ&K) 198] while dealing with the proposition this Court has held as under: "6. The plaintiffs have claimed multiple remedies in their prayer clause which has been reproduced herein above. Even for the sake of argument, if any one of the prayer cannot be granted it doesn't mean that the suit will be treated barred for all other remedies claimed therein. While attending this question the superior Courts are unanimous on the question/ that under the provisions of Order VII, Rule 11, the plaint can only be rejected if all the reliefs claimed are barred under the law. If some of the reliefs claimed are available, the plaint cannot be rejected on the basis of one of the relief which cannot be granted because under the codal provisions, there is no concept of piecemeal rejection"
7. As the appellants claimed the multiple remedies in the prayer clause, therefore, in view of the case law referred to herein above the trial Court was not justified to reject the plaint mere on the ground that one of the claimed reliefs cannot be granted. The question of limitation is mixed question of law and the fact, which also requires to be decided after recording of the evidence. In this scenario, we are convinced that the trial Court has wrongly rejected the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C.
8. In the light of what has been stated above, this appeal is accepted while setting aside the judgments of the Courts below the case is remanded to the trial Court with the direction to decide the same afresh on merits after recording the evidence. No order as to costs.