This judgment will dispose of the following writ petitions as common questions of fact and law are involved:
(1) W. P. No. 2245 of 1978, Mrs. N. G. Hassan and others v. Taxation Officer, District Council, Sargodha and another.
(2) W. P. No. 2763 of 1978, Messrs Mian Ahmad v. District Council, Sargodha and another.
(3) W. P. No. 2764 of 1978, Samina Hassan v. District Council, Sargodha and another.
(4) W. P: No. 2765 Sargodha and another.
2. The petitioner was engaged in the business of export of salt from Warcha Salt Mines situated in District Sargodha. An export tax -was levied in 1963, by the District Council, Sargodha under section 60 of the Basic Democracies Order read with rule 7(2) of West Pakistan Local Councils (Imposition of Taxes) Rules, 1961. The petitioner was liable to pay that tax but he did not and has questioned his liability in these petitions.
3. As regards the competence of the District Council regarding the levy of the tax, the provisions of the Basic Democracies Order read with Tax Rules of 1961, provide a complete answer.. The learned counsel for the petitioner also has no quarrel with that proposition but it has been urged that the demand for the tax was made as late as in 1977, and since the demand related to the periods ending in 1972 this could not be lawfully recovered by the District Council after such a long delay.
The learned counsel has tried to build a case from the analogy of the provisions, contained in sec- -tion 149 of the Income-tax Act wherein a specific period has been laid down after which a demand for income-tax cannot be made. It has been contended that even though no specific provision of law exists with regard to the tax in question yet a demand should be made within a reasonable time. He has stated that a delay of 5 years is a delay which should not be ignored.
4. It is obvious that the petitioner is liable to pay the tax which is being demanded from him by the District Council, Sargodha. There is no provision in the law that a delay in demanding a tax, extinguishes the liability to pay. In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary a right or a liability does not come to an end merely because of a delay in demand. Even on facts, it has not been shown that there was a delay of 5 years in demanding the tax. A letter written by the petitioner (Annex. K) clearly shows that the petitioner was aware of his liability even in January, 1973.
5. In view of the above considerations, I find no force in these petitions. These are dismissed with costs. The petitioner deposited the disputed amount in the High Court on the direction of this Court pending disposal of the writ petition. The District Council may draw that amount.