SHAFI-UR-REHMAN, J-The appellant, a tenant, under orders of ejectment from residential premises, was granted leave to appeal on 23rd August, 1973, to examine the question whether there was attornment by the petitioner and the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties.
2. The appellant came to occupy a portion of the first soot of a Bungalow on Plot No. 1 l9-B, Block No. 2 in P. E. C. H. Society on 19-9-1961 under an agreement of lease executed in favour of Haji Abdul Karim. The rate of rent was Rs. 140 p.m. Payable in advance by the 5th of every calendar month. The lease was for a period of twelve months. The appellant continued as a tenant even after the expiry of lease. Haji Abdul Karim expired in 1963. The appellant stopped payment of rent, ostensibly on the ground that after the death of Haji Abdul Karim, the claimants of rent were numerous but she was not satisfied about the claim or title of any one of them. This property was on 1-7-1964 sold by registered deed in favour of respondent, who served a notice on the appellant demanding rent at Rs. 250 p.m. But she made a counter-demand for a Photostat copy of the registered deed.' The rent was not paid to him as well. The respondent on the 13th October, 1964 filed a petition seeking eviction of the appellant on the ground of default in the payment of rent since 1964, on the ground of bona fide personal need and on the ground that she was committing nuisance in the premises and had converted residential premises into commercial use. The Rent Controller decided all the grounds in favour of the landlord and directed ejectment. On appeal, the learned Additional District Judge, upheld the finding of default, reversed the, other findings and maintained the order of ejectment. The appellant's second appeal was dismissed by the High Court.
3. An examination of the case of the appellant at different stages shows that varying grounds were taken up by her for defeating the claim of the respondent landlord. The first ground was that at after the death of Haji Abdul Karim, she had been in genuine doubt about the person entitled to receive rent. There were indeed conflicting claims and they were never resolved. It was this state of indecision and doubt which accounted for the correspondence ensuing the service of notice by the respondent. This prompted her even to repudiate his status as a landlord in respect of this property. The second ground was that though the rate of rent was Rs. 140 p.m. He demanded rent at the exorbitant rate of Rs. 250 p.m. And Sthis justifiably made the rate of rent disputed and thereby served as an effective excuse by way of mitigation against default, if any. This ground was noted in the leave granting order and rejected as untenable.
The third ground taken up during the hearing of this appeal was that in calculating the period of default all the three Courts ignored the principles of law laid down by this Court in Muhammad Yusuf v. Abdullah (PLD 1980 SC 298). If these principles had been kept in view the default would have been in paying rent of only one month and that too of twelve days and not a default of three months as held by all the three Courts. Such a marginal default, shorn of its gravity, may have as well justified exercise of discretion in favour of the tenant.
4. The respondent being the successor-in-interest of the original landlord, Haji Abdul Karim and having served a proper notice on the appellant giving particulars of the registered deed, stepped into the shoes of Haji Abdul Karim. No further act was necessary in law, either on his part or that of the appellant, to bring about or complete the relationship of landlord and tenant. Even if full effect is given to the principle of law laid down by this Court in Muhammad Yousaf's case, the default of the appellant is there. Not for the purposes of determining the period of default, but for exercising discretion of the Court, the entire conduct of the appellant as a tenant could be seen. She had admittedly not paid the rent since the death of Haji Abdul Karim. Her excuse was neither genuine nor reasonable.) Situations which are effectively and expressly taken care of by the law. [Section 13
(2) Explanation (b) of West Pakistan Urban Restriction Ordinance] cannot be taken by the parties to be vague and indeterminate, nor can their inaction or in decision be a legitimate ground for claiming exercise of discre--tion in their favour. In the circumstances, we find no merit in this appeal which is dismissed with costs. The appellant is, by agreement of the parties, allowed three months period from today to hand over vacant possession of the property.
Meanwhile she will continue discharging all her obligations as tenant.