' MUHAMMAD IQBAL KALHORO, J.--- Applicant has filed captioned miscellaneous applications, one is under section 114 r/w Order XLVII, Rule 1, C.P.C. For seeking review of the judgment passed on 11.08.2015, authored by the undersigned while sitting with the then Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Faisal Arab, whereby his petition numbered above for implementation of the judgments passed by the Federal Services Tribunal (FST) in Appeal No,1560-K/1998 dated 31.03.2001, and by the Honorable Supreme Court in C.P. No,371-K/2001 dated 27.05.2002 and in C.Ps. Nos.101-K and 153-K of 2006 dated 13.10.2006 was dismissed. The other is under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (`1908 Act') for condonation of delay in filing of the review application.
2. Applicant in support of these applications has argued that this court while rendering the judgment under review has not considered the fact that no compliance of the judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court in respect of his promotion, seniority and financial benefits of the period he remained out of service has been made by the respondent/PIA; that although he was ordered to be reinstated with all back benefits but the PIA contrary to such orders re-employed him without any benefits of the period (25.02.1982 to 01.02.1990) he remained out of service; that for pension benefits, his service from the date of re-employment has not been counted, which is a sheer violation of the above judgments and this court while passing the above judgment has entirely ignored this fact. As for the point that his application for review was time barred, he argued that he was seriously ill and under treatment in Gujranwala Punjab when the judgment under review was passed, therefore could not file the review application within the prescribed period. And to establish the factum of his ailment he referred to the medical certificate that he has filed in support of his application for condonation of delay. He further stated that even otherwise no limitation runs against the void orders, and since the judgment under review was void, his application for review thereof could not be dismissed being time-barred.
3. Mr. Khalid Javed, learned advocate for the respondent/PIA, on the other hand in his arguments first questioned maintainability of this application on the ground of limitation and in this regard referred to Article 162 of 1908 Act. According to him, this application was hopelessly time-barred as it was filed after almost 7 months of prescribed limit of 20 days provided under ibid provision of law. He also challenged authenticity of the medical certificate of the applicant on the grounds that although the applicant was resident of Karachi but surprisingly the medical certificate he had obtained was issued by some doctor stationed at Gujranwala, Punjab; that it does not disclose the date of its issuance; the period the applicant remained under treatment for and whether or not he was bed-ridden or was hospitalized, and what kind of treatment was given to him and whether he was too ill to communicate with his lawyer to instruct him to file the application. He further stated that medical certificate was shorn of such necessary details and was not reliable to condone delay of almost 7 months. He also pointed out that in law delay of each day had to be explained but the applicant in this behalf had completely failed. He next stated that on the one hand medical certificate showed the applicant was under treatment in Gujranwala till 20.03.2016 but strangely as per endorsement of the copying branch, copy of the judgment was applied on 09.02.2016 meaning thereby that he was in Karachi and if it is the case the authenticity of medical certificate would be highly doubtful. But, he further stressed, that if it was presumed that not him but his advocate had applied for the copy on that date under his instruction, then applicant's taking ground of ailment to seek condonation of limitation period would be wholly irrelevant because then it would be natural to ask why he did not instruct his counsel to obtain the copy earlier. On merits, his argument was that the review application was filed only on one ground that there was an apparent mistake on the face of the judgment under review, that is, this court while passing the judgment failed to consider that the PIA had not complied with the directions of the Honourable Supreme Court qua applicant's promotion and his entitlement to benefits of the period he was out of service. That, according to him was not the case as this court not only had considered the entire case of the applicant, but directions of the Honourable Apex Court were duly attended to and reproduced in the judgment under review. In regard to the compliance of final order of the Honourable Supreme Court dated 13.10.2006, he added that not only the status of the applicant was determined but as a consequence of which the applicant was paid an amount of Rs,9,48,771/- in the year 2006 that he had accepted without any objection. There was nothing more left to be paid to the applicant. The instant petition being filed in May, 2011 after almost more than 4 years of the final payment itself suffered from laches and was rightly dismissed.
4. I have considered the above submissions and have perused relevant material. It is not irrelevant to state here that in. Review the entire matter cannot be reopened, its scope is limited and confined to the aspects of the case that are shown to have not been considered in the judgment. A review application can be filed only on discovery of new and important matter or evidence which was not within the knowledge of aggrieved person or the same he could not produce at the time when the order or decree was passed against him, or he is able to show that there is some mistake or error apparent on the face of record or for any other sufficient reason the court was misled in arriving at the given conclusion. As for limitation for a review of judgment passed by the High Court, it is 20 days as provided under Article 162 of 1908 Act. In the matter in hand the short order whereby this petition was dismissed was passed on 11.08.2015 and detailed reasons in support thereof were rendered on 28.08.2015. But the applicant has filed the application for review on 02.04.2016 a long time after the prescribed period stood elapsed; therefore, apparently this application is time- barred, yet I have examined the case on this point in detail. The endorsement of copying branch on the copy of judgment shows that application for copy was filed on 09.02.2016, which itself was time-barred, the copy was delivered on 20.02.2016, but the applicant filed review application on 02.04.2016 after 41 days. The applicant has neither explained the delay of each day from announcement of the short order viz. 11.08.2015 till applying for the copy on 09.02.2016 nor has he accounted for the period of 41 days spent after obtaining the copy on 20.02.2016 till filing of the review application on 02.04.2016. The medical certificate produced in this behalf by the applicant lacks the necessary details in respect of date of its issuance; the exact period the applicant was under treatment for and whether he was hospitalized or was confined to bed and whether his illness was such that he was not able to even contact his counsel on cell phone or it materially and virtually restrained him to make it to the court to file review application. The applicant has also not been able to satisfactorily explain why he remained in Gujranwala for treatment although he is resident of Karachi where medical facilities are more modern and state of the art. Obviously, for these reasons, this medical certificate cannot be taken into consideration to condone delay of almost 7 months in filing of review application.
Another unexplained factor which cannot be ignored is that the applicant was ill till 20.03.2016 in Gujranwala but then strangely the copy of judgment under review was applied in Karachi on 09.02.2016. If it was the applicant who applied for the copy, then authenticity of his medical certificate would be highly doubtful. But if it is presumed that he did not do so but his advocate did it under his instruction, then the question would be why the applicant did not do so earlier and why his counsel did not file the application earlier. But suppose although the applicant instructed his counsel earlier but due to some lethargy on the part of his counsel, the application for the copy could not be filed within time, then also the ground of applicant's ailment to condone the delay would be wholly irrelevant. So, in view of foregoing discussion, it is obvious that this medical certificate is not helpful to the applicant insofar as his attempt to explain delay in filing the review application beyond the prescribed period is concerned.
5. Nevertheless, I have considered the case of the applicant for review on merits. A perusal of the judgment indicates that all the pleas taken by the applicant here were taken into consideration and decided accordingly. We in the judgment under review have noted that after the order of the honourable Supreme Court in CP 101-K/2006 and CP 153/2006 dated 13.10.2006, which is final as far as any benefit to the applicant is concerned, any other claim that is beyond the terms whereof would not be allowable to the applicant. For ready reference, the said order is reproduced herein under: "We have heard the petitioner in person and learned counsel for the PIA at length. The learned counsel for the PIA stated that judgment of the Tribunal to the extent of deduction will not be implemented and deducted amount from the account of Mr. Inayat petitioner herein, approximately comes to Rs,59,202/- and consequential benefit shall be calculated accordingly and will be paid to the petitioner in due course of time. The perusal of the order of the Review Board, would show that petitioner on reinstatement, would be entitled to the promotion and seniority without any financial benefits for the period during which he remained out of the service from 1980 to 1990 and in view thereof, the department shall calculate the benefit of the petitioner according to the rules then prevailing and fix his status accordingly on the date of his retirement and rejoining the department. The further promotion shall also be allowed to him with all back benefits except the claim of markup which, in our opinion, is neither admissible nor can be granted by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 212(3) of the Constitution but conceded by the learned counsel for the PIA, the provident fund for the relevant period shall be admissible to the petitioner in accordance with the rules".
' It is therefore obvious from a perusal above order that applicant's prayer clause (b), that is, "to direct the respondent PIA to calculate the Golden Handshake Scheme dues effective from 30.06.1970 and submit calculation sheet along with cheque before this Hon'ble Court for verification and payment to the petitioner", was not grantable. And as to the question of implementation of the above judgment(s) of the honorable Supreme Court, which is prayer clause (a), we have noted that before us, in view of payments made to the applicant subsequently (which is evident from the letter of PIA dated 20.12.2006 available with the objections at page No,161), it is not the case where allegation of non-implementation of the judgment (of Honorable Supreme Court) is leveled so as to attract Article 187 Of the Constitution, but the applicant had raised dispute over final settlement of his dues that according to him were not in accordance with the said judgment. And this claim of the applicant was seriously disputed by the PIA. Therefore, obviously, we were not competent to resolve disputed facts under Article 199 of the constitution particularly so when no exact figure of benefits received by the applicant and/or any outstanding dues duly established by relevant documents was propounded before us. It was mainly due to that consideration we had dismissed the petition. In review application, the applicant has not brought any new material suggesting that our above findings are result of any misappreciation or non-appreciation of the record. He has again urged the same point that he has not been paid entire dues without bringing any new evidence, which has again been seriously contested by the counsel for the PIA by referring to the undisputed letter dated 20.12.2006. Apart from it no error apparent in the judgment to justify its review has been pointed out. The applications therefore merit no consideration and are dismissed accordingly.