' This petition filed under Article 199 of the then Constitution of Pakistan of 1973, challenges the judgment and decree passed in Suit No, 1914 of 1977 by the Court of the III Family Judge at Karachi, whereby the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent No, 2 was dissolved by granting "Khula" with the condition that the plaintiff shall not be entitled to dower amount and present and past maintenance as well as maintenance for the period of "Iddat". '
2. It may be mentioned here that besides the above-mentioned Suit No, 1914 of 1977 filed by the wife for dissolution of marriage, the petitioner also instituted Suit No, 2077 of 1976 for restitution of conjugal rights against respondent No, 2 (wife). Both the suits were tried together. However, in view of the relief granted for dissolution of marriage in Suit No, 1914 of 1977, on the ground of "Khula", the second suit mentioned above and filed by the petitioner was dismissed.
3. I have gone through the judgment given by the learned Family Court and find that the said Court found as a matter of fact on the material on record that under circumstances of the case it would be impossible for the spouses to live as husband and wife within the limits ordained by Allah and that respondent No, 2 (wife) in that suit had proved circumstances where hatred had developed between the parties and it would be cruel if the wife (respondent No, 2) was compelled to continue her ties of marriage for any further period with the petitioner. The learned Family Court further gave the following findings of facts on material on record :- "If the rift between the husband and wife was so serious that there was no chance of reconciliation and harmonious relations between the parties had become an impossibility, the Court has to see that such life was impossible then Khula should be allowed. In this context there are two leading cases. The first is Bilquis Fatima's case (PLD 1959 Lah. 566) and the second is of Khurshid Bibi (PLD 1967 SC 97) which extends the Scope of Khula. In the instant case plaintiff has taken ground of Khula and she has expressed that she is ready to forego the dower and maintenance. When she had foregone the debt of any further amount then there remains no hitch in granting Khula."
' In some cases defendant is unwilling to release the plaintiff from the matrimonial ties but there is no possibility of the parties living together consistently with their conjugal duties and obligations and in the event the marriage with the defendant is not dissolved, it will otherwise mean forcing the plaintiff into a hateful union with the defendant when plaintiff has developed intense hatred and disliking for the defendant that she would certainly be transgressing the limits of God if forced to live with him. In this case same position has arisen. I have therefore, no he situation to grant Khula.
My finding on this issue is in affirmative. I therefore, hold that plaintiff is entitled to exercise her rights of Khula and in consideration thereof she shall not be entitled to dower amount, present or past maintenance and maintenance for the period of Iddat."
4. Perusal of the petition shows that the decree has been challenged on the ground that certain items of gift alleged to have been given to the respondent No, 2 were not ordered to be returned to the petitioner as a condition for granting of "khula" and that respondent No, 2/wife failed to establish the grounds of cruelty and non-maintenance. The learned counsel referred to the evidence of the respondent No, 2, wherein she had stated to have admitted that the items mentioned in column No, 17 of the Nikahnama were received by her. Respondent. No, 2, however, in her evidence explained that all these ornaments had been snatched away from her by the petitioner before she was turned out from his house. In his evidence the petitioner during his cross- examination deposed that he did not know whether respondent No, 2 has developed hatred for him and that she could not live with him. In view of the above evidence it is not possible for this Court to enter into an enquiry as to whether the articles, which were said to have been given to respondent No, 2 at the time of Nikah in fact remained with the respondent No, 2 when she was turned out from his house or as claimed by the plaintiff (wife) the same were snatched away from her by the petitioner. The findings on these disputed issues B of fact cannot be made subject- matter of writ petitions as laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Muhammad Hussain Munir v. Sikandar (1) where it was held as follows :- "The High Court's supervisory jurisdiction under Article 98 (a) (ii) of the 1962. Constitution (or for that matter under Article 199 (1) (a) (ii) of the present Constitution having regard to its nature or content is assimilable to its jurisdiction under section 115, Civil Procedure Code except in two important respect first; the former jurisdiction being a creation of the Constitution stands in a higher pedestal than that under section 115, C. P. C. Second; the former jurisdiction has a wider reach than the jurisdiction under section 115, Civil Precedure Code, which is confined to subordinate Courts.
However, that may be, it is wholly wrong to consider that the above constitutional provision was designed to empower the High Court to interfere with the decision of a Court or tribunal of inferior jurisdiction, merely because in its opinion the decision is wrong. In that case, it would make the High Court's jurisdiction indistinguishable from that exercisable in a full-fledged appeal, which plainly, is not the intention of the Constitution-makers."
' Reference may also be made to the case of Badruddin Khan (2; where the honourable Supreme Court held :- "The proposition is indisputable that when there is jurisdiction to decide a particular matter then there is jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly and the fact that the decision is incorrect does not render the decision without jurisdiction."
' In view of the above authoritative pronouncement by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan I find that no case has been made out for interfering with the findings of fact arrived at by the learned Family Court while dissolving marriage on the ground of " Khula" in the terms mentioned above.
' Respondent No, 2 was married on 3rd March, 1972 when she was about 17 years and the marriage broke down in March, 1973, when she was turned out from the house of the petitioner as stated in the suit for dissolution of marriage filed by the respondent No, 2 and also admitted by the petitioner. In the circumstances it is not a fit case, which calls for an interference by this Court after lapse of a period of almost 10 years since the parties parted with each other in an unhappy manner with no chances of reconciliation, coupled with the hatred which has been held by the Family Court, to have developed between the parties.
For the reasons stated above and keeping in view that the policy of law which confers finality on such decrees as observed in C.P.S.L.A. C No, K-223 of 1981 by the honourable Supreme Court, I do not find
(1) PLD 1974 SC 139 (2) P L p 19745 C ;04 ' any valid reason to interfere with the decree passed by the learned Family Court in these proceedings. Nothing has been shown, which would call for declaring the impugned judgment/decree as having been passed without any lawful authority and of no legal effect.
The upshot of above discussion is that this petition is dismissed. Since nobody has appeared for respondent No, 2 there shall be no order as to costs.