IKRAMULLAH KHAN, J.---Through the instant Constitutional petition, petitioner has challenged the impugned judgment of learned Civil Judge-V, Charsadda dated 14.7.2014 and that of learned Additional District Judge, Charsadda dated 21.9.2015, whereby learned Courts below have extended the period for depositing Court fee on the suit filed by respondent.
2.In essence, a suit for possession through partition was instituted by respondent Muhammad Faraz, against the petitioner Gul Faraz, which was decreed by learned trial Court on 29.3.2010. The same decree attained finality as the appeal as well as the revision against the aforesaid judgment was dismissed by learned appellate Court and by this Court vide judgment dated 12.7.2011 and 7.2.2014 respectively. The respondent filed an application for final decree before learned Civil Judge, Charsadda on 18.3.2014. Petitioner was put to notice and on his appearance, the petitioner filed an application under Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C., for rejection of the plaint. The application was contested by respondent and the learned trial Court vide its impugned judgment dated 14.7.2014, dismissed the application filed by the petitioner for rejection of the plaint, with direction to respondent to deposit fee of Rs.15000/- before 3.9.2014. The amount was deposited by respondent within the prescribed period under the direction of trial Court dated 14.7.2014. Petitioner assailed the said judgment dated 14.7.2014, before the Revisional Court but the same was also dismissed by the learned Revisional Court vide its impugned judgment dated 21.8.2015, hence the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court in terms of Article 199 of the Constitution 1973.
3.The only ground vehemently agitated by learned counsel for petitioner was that, the respondent had not deposited the Court fee within a month as directed by learned trial Court while passing decree dated 29.3.2010, therefore, the preliminary decree passed in favour of respondent had automatically deems to be rejected and no final decree could be passed by learned trial Court as legally there is no decree in favour of the respondent.
4.On the other hand learned counsel for respondent argued that as the decree passed in favour of respondent was preliminary, therefore, during proceedings to get final decree, the learned trial Court was competent to extend the prescribed period fixed in the judgment and decree dated 29.3.2010.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties in light of law and available record.
6. Prior to dilate upon the legal proposition put forward by learned counsel for the parties, I would like to reproduce the findings of the learned trial Court rendered upon issue No.8 framed in the suit, which reads as:-- Plaintiff in both the suits prayed for possession, therefore, proper Court fee is liable to be affixed hence both the plaintiffs are directed to affix proper Court fee within one month, in case of their failure, both the plaints shall be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C., for non-affixation of Court fee. "
7.There is no cavil to the proposition that trial Court may direct the plaintiff to affix the Court fee within a prescribed period at any stage of the suit, even may pass a conditional decree. However, in case in hand, the learned trial Court had rendered its finding on issue No.8 in regard to affixation of Court fee but the same direction is omitted in the relief column as well as in the preliminary decree drawn accordingly.
8.Learned counsel for petitioner had placed reliance on the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Lahore High Court in case of "Ali Akbar v. Sardar bin" (2008 YLR 144) and "Saad Ullah's case (PLD 2011 Peshawar 47). In both these judgments referred by learned counsel for petitioner, has interpreted the provision contained in section 148, C.P.C. and it is held in both the above mentioned cases that a Court could not extend period for depositing of court-fee in term of section 148, C.P.C., when a case is finally decided in terms of Order XX, Rule 3, C.P.C., which reads as:-- "The judgment shall be dated and signed by the Judge in open Court at the time of pronouncing it, and when once signed shall not afterwards be altered or added to save as provided by section 152, C.P.C. on review."
9.I have gone through the above mentioned provisions of law, which could not be debated upon as no exception could be taken to the substantive law. However, in case in hand, the situation is a little bit different as the present case is not that of alteration or addition but it purely pertains to extension of period for deposit of required Court fee. It is also settled law as envisaged there under Order XX, Rule 6, C.P.C., that the decree shall agree with the judgment and shall specify clearly the relief granted or other determination of the suit but as mentioned hereinabove, no any such direction had rendered by learned trial Court while drawing the decree in terms of Rule 7 of Order XX, C.P.C., which reads as:-- "The decree shall bear date the day on which the judgment was pronounced, and, when the Judge has satisfied himself that the decree has been drawn up in accordance with the judgment, he shall sign the decree."
10.Section 148, C.P.C. confers unlimited jurisdiction upon the Court trying a suit to extend in its discretion any period fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act or allowed by C.P.C., the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time enlarge such period, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. While as per section 149, C.P.C., where the whole or any part of any fee prescribed for any document by the law for the time being in force relating to Court-fee has not been paid, the Court may, in its discretion at any stage, allow the person by whom such fee is payable, to pay the whole or part, as the case may be, of such Court-fee and upon such payment, the document, in respect of which such fee is payable, shall have the same force and effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance.
11. It is also settled principle of law that a plaint could not be rejected except where the relief claimed is under value and the plaintiff on being required by Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so. No doubt in case in hand, the time is fixed by the Court for deposit of Court fee, which was one month after the passing of the preliminary decree but the learned trial Court had not corrected the valuation nor had specified the amount to be deposited by the respondent/plaintiff.
12.The proposition of law under discussion in hand has already been resolved by the apex Court through a chain of judgments rendered time and again that where a matter is not finally decided, then the Court while passing final decree has the jurisdiction to enlarge period for depositing the required Court fee even if the time fixed already by the Court, has been expired. The Hon'ble Lahore High Court in case of "Nizamuddin and others v. Ch. Muhammad Saeed and others (1987 CLC 1682) has held that:-- "There is a general rule that, unless otherwise provided, a Court is not competent to alter a decree and that neither Section 148 nor the residuary Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure will avail a person who seeks the alteration. Section 148 gives the Court power to extend time fixed or granted by it for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code and this the Court can do even after the period originally fixed or granted has expired. But this section does not apply where the period is fixed by a decree unless the decree is in the nature of a preliminary decree and the Court still retains seisin over the action."
13.Likewise, the apex Court in case of Mukhi Chatromal and others v. Khubchand and others (1993 SCMR 1113 has held C that:--<i>"S.149---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3)--- Delay in paying Court fee in appeal filed before High Court---Dismissal of appeal--- Validity---- Court's failure to fix the date for payment or specify the amount of deficient Court fee---Effect---High Court had failed to specify the date and the exact amount of Court fee to be deposited---Defect of delayed payment of Court-fee, but from the date the suit/appeal was originally cured not from the date of ultimate payment of Court fee, but from the date the suit/ appeal was originally filed in the Court--- Court's failure to fix a date within, or by which Court fee was to be supplied and its failure to specify the amount, would not justify any penal action to be taken against appellants by way of dismissing the appeal whether on account of delayed payment of Court fee or on account of bar of limitation---Case was, thus, remanded to High Court for hearing of appeal on merits."</i> In case of "Shabbir Ahmed and others v. Zahoor Bibi and others" (PLD 2004 SC 790) the apex Court has held that:- "Ss. 12 & 35--- Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.2(2) and 148---Suit for specific performance-- - Decree- Extension of time---Conditions--- Where specific performance of sale has not been effected within the period laid down by the decree, it is open to purchaser to apply to the Court for an extension of time for payment of the purchase money, and to the vendor to apply for an order rescinding the contract either immediately or to follow automatically on expiry of the date peremptorily granted and the original Court has ample power to extend the time for specific performance."
14. It is settled principle of law that a Court cannot extend, enlarge or grant any further time for doing of an Act if it is specifically mentioned in the relevant statute of law itself in terms of Section 148, C.P.C., however, may extend time to time such period prescribed by the. Court itself but the jurisdiction confers upon a civil Court in term of section 149, C.P.C., which relates to Court fee is not leviable by any other law as it is exclusive jurisdiction of the civil Court to direct at any stage and allow any party to the suit to pay the whole or part as the case may be of such Court fee. Therefore, keeping in view the peculiar facts of the case I did not find any illegality in the impugned judgments that the same were rendered by learned Courts below without jurisdiction therefore, this Court cannot exercise powers to interfere in the impugned judgments of learned Courts below, which were rendered on solid reasons and in accordance with law. This Writ Petition is dismissed accordingly.