' SHAUKAT AZIZ SIDDIQUI, J.--- The necessary facts are that respondent filed Suit for Declaration against petitioner wherein she claimed that her actual date of birth is 17.08.1994 whereas it has been mistakenly mentioned in her educational certificate as 17.08.1992. She prayed for declaration and mandatory injunction to correct the date of birth in the educational certificates. Petitioner contested the claim of respondent by filing written statement. Learned trial court settled the necessary issue, recorded the evidence of the parties and decreed the suit in favor of respondent, through judgment dated 06.05.2016. Petitioner filed the appeal and learned appellate court dismissed the same vide judgment dated 24.06.2016. Petitioner has challenged the findings of the learned trial court and learned appellate Court through institution of instant petition.
2. Learned counsel for petitioner has argued that findings of the learned lower courts are against the facts and law as respondent herself provided her date of birth as 17.08.1992 in the admission form i.e. Exh-D1. That she had filed the said suit beyond the period of limitation i.e. 03 years as provided in Article 120 of the first schedule of Limitation Act but the Learned Lower Courts have ignored this aspect and no findings have been recorded. Learned counsel as further argued that the Learned Lower Courts have ignored the principle settled in the case of Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education v. Junaid Iqbal Bajwa (2005 YLR 2114), Salma Altaf v. Principal Junior Bernhall Girls College (2001 CLC 972) and the case of Muhammad Arshad v. Mian Noor Ahmed (2008 SCMR 713) and also one unreported judgment of this Court in C.R. No.170/2015 with the title Syed Razia Bukhari v. FBISE and in C.R. No.538-D/2002 with the title Federal Board v. Mustafa Nawaz.
Conversely, learned counsel for the respondent has controverted the contentions of learned counsel for petitioner and has supported the validity of the impugned judgments for the reasons recorded therein.
' Arguments heard, record perused.
3. Respondent instituted the suit for declaration with the averments that her correct date of birth is 17.08.1994 as recorded in her CNIC as well as birth certificates issued by the concerned Union Counsel but the same was wrongly incorporated as 17.08.1992 in the record of petitioner. Petitioner contested the claim of respondent by filing written statement wherein it is mentioned that according to the rules of petitioner the change in name, father name and date of birth of candidate is not allowed and that respondent herself provided her date of birth as 17.08.1992. The above referred averments of the written statement of petitioner are reflective of the fact that petitioner has not disputed that the correct date of birth of respondent may be 17.08.1994 and it refused the correction of date of birth on the ground that same is not allowed by its rules and that respondent herself provided the date of birth as 17.8.1992.
4. Lower courts properly and correctly appraised the evidence of respondent and held that respondent remained successful to prove that her correct date of birth is 17.08.1994 and it has been mistakenly mentioned as 17.08.1992 in her academic record. Learned counsel for petitioner has argued that learned trial court wrongly admitted the photocopies of the documents and those should not have been read in evidence, being inadmissible. With reference to this contention of learned counsel it is observed, that at the time of the recording of evidence of respondent, photocopies of the documents have been produced in her statement and learned counsel for petitioner cross-examined her but not a single suggestion was put to her that the documents submitted by her are forged and fabricated. Petitioner did not raise any objection on the admissibility of the documents in evidence of respondent. It has been held through various pronouncements of the constitutional courts that once a document is admitted in evidence, it cannot be ruled out of consideration on subsequent objection to its admissibility. In this regard, the reported judgments in the cases titled as Haji Abdul v. Yahya Bakhsh (PLD 2001 SC 158), Malik Din v.
Muhammad Aslam (PLD 1969 Supreme Court 136) Abdullah v. Abdul Karim (PLD 1968 Supreme Court 140) and Allah Rakha v. Muhammad Ameen (194 SLC 1494)(sic) are' relied.
5. Learned counsel for petitioner has also raised the objection of limitation in the institution of the suit, and it is observed that in the written statement of petitioner there is no mention of the plea that the suit of respondent was barred by limitation. This plea has been raised for the first time during the hearing of this petition; however, petitioner is not competent to take this plea before this court in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The reference can be made to the reported judgments in the cases of Abdul Karim v. Bashari Ahmed (1988 CLC 1400), Shahida Parveen v.
Samiullah Malik (PLD 2006 Lahore 401), Muhammad Saadiq v. Shah --- (2003 YLR 79), Ahmed All v.
Manzoor Hussain (2008 YLR 109).
6. It has been held by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Abdul Khaliq v. M--- Noor (PLD 2005 Supreme Court 962) that in the cases of conflict/discrepancy in date of birth recorded in CNIC, Dakhil/Kharij Register of School and certificate of Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, the CNIC would be treated more authentic as presumption of truth was attached thereto. The honorable court further observed that CNIC could be considered in evidence and would hold the field, unless the same was rebutted by good and better evidence. In the case in hand, petitioner has only submitted the copy of admission form Exh-D1 wherein date of birth of respondent is mentioned as 17.08.1992. As far as Exh-D1 is concerned, it is the plea of respondent that, this date of birth was mistakenly incorporated on account of illiteracy of her parents therefore, Exh-D 1 is not sufficient to rebut the entries of the CNIC, which is corroborated with the birth certificate Exh-P2.
7. The mother of respondent appeared as PW-2 and she stated that her son i.e. Waqas Masood was born on 30.12.1992 and respondent is younger to her above referred brother. This statement of PW-2 has not been rebutted by petitioner and in the case of BISE v. Hassan Sauna (2000 SCMR 1415) the Honorable Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that Physio-Chemistry of birth of two brothers, on different dates, cannot be lumped together, for the purpose of determination of their date of births. If the version of petitioner that the date, of birth of the respondent is 17.08.1992 be presumed to be correct the result would be that her elder brother would be presumed to have born after about four months from the birth of respondent and this is humanly not possible. Learned lower courts have recorded concurrent findings of the facts and it is settled law that concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower courts, cannot be interfered in the exercise of jurisdiction under section 115 of C.P.C. In the case reported as 2001 SCMR 1700, the Honorable Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that different view of reappraisal of evidence by High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. Cannot become a ground, for interference with concurrent findings of fact, of the two courts below. Learned counsel for petitioner failed to point out any perversity or arbitrariness in the concurrent findings, which is condition precedent for justifying the interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Even otherwise from the perusal of the evidence, available on the record it is held that there is no scope of framing different view about the facts as appraised by the learned lower courts.
8. It is further observed that mistakes in recording the entries of date of birth of students in academic institutions is not uncommon and such mistakes may creep in academic record, and if no prejudice is caused to any other from the correction of the entries, these should be corrected and should not be retained in the record. I have considered the case law relied by the learned counsel for petitioner but the facts of the instant case are quite distinguishable, from the case law.
In the case BISE v. Junaid Iqbal Bajwa, the plaintiff had applied for correction of the date of birth before the* concerned board and his application was rejected on 14.10.1986, his review was also dismissed on 15.11.1986 but he filed the suit on 26.03.1996 which was also the period of limitation under Article 120.
9. The stock of the above discussion is that the instant petition is IF without any subsistence and is hereby dismissed.